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Abstract
This thesis analyses the development of safety regulation for the intentional release of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) between 19 89-92, especially in Britain in its
European context, and by contrast to the USA. The thesis emphasizes the practical
dilemmas of GMO regulation in accommodating uncertainties about public unease and
environmental harm. It serves as a case study of safety regulation as a constructed
rationality, of national regulatory styles, and of environmental precaution.
In anticipating hazards prior to evidence of harm, GMO regulation had a contested
'rational' basis. Regulators encountered disputes in defining the risk problem, in
establishing risk-management institutions, and in reducing scientific uncertainty about
potential harm. Insofar as GMO regulation had a precautionary content, it undermined
the 'rational' stereotype of risk-assessment steps.
Both the precautionary potential and its limits derived from the project of overcoming
obstacles to a biotechnology market. This meant symbolically normalizing GMOs as
benign products, while specifying testable ecological uncertainties rooted in some
naturalistic analogy. Technical 'risk' abstracted potential harm from issues of socio-
agronomic control which underlay the earlier environmental controversy.
The thesis argues for recasting theoretical models of safety regulation as a 'technical' or
'procedural' rationality. GMO regulation contained poles of tension which such
theoretical models attribute to antagonistic rationalities. Broadly speaking, the
regulatory system was managing an internal contradiction between social legitimacy and
commercialization. The difficulties of GMO regulation arose from its implicit role in
legitimizing biotechnology, by default of any democratic procedure for adjudicating a
contentious technoscientific development.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s a public controversy arose over the hypothetical hazards of laboratory
experiments which were creating genetically modified organisms (GMOs). By the mid-
1980s, GMOs were being designed to survive and perform functions live in the
environment; prospective products included crops, microbial pesticides, live viral vaccines
and bioremediators (for pollution control). As these R&D efforts reached the stage of
small-scale field release, there were renewed disputes over safety.
This thesis traces the development of Britain's approach to regulating the intentional
release of GMOs between 1989-92, in the international regulatory context. The thesis
analyses the contested 'rational' basis of GMO regulation, as a precautionary attempt to
anticipate hazards prior to evidence of harm. This attempt provides a case study for
exploring theoretical perspectives on safety regulation as a distinct type of rationality. In
particular the study examines difficulties in defining the risk problem, in establishing risk-
management institutions, and in reducing scientific uncertainty.
This introductory chapter sets the scene as follows:
* classifying GMOs: how the early debate disputed the status of GMOs and their
regulatory implications (section 1);
* procedural rationality: theoretical perspectives on how the stereotypically 'rational' form
of risk regulation becomes constructed and challeged (section 2).
* the thesis: summary argument and structure (Section 3).
1.0 CLASSIFYING GMOs
The early risk debate entailed a dispute over the conceptual status of GMOs, as a leading
part of the new biotechnology, for which government was providing substantial research
funds. Enthusiasts celebrated the potential for biological methods to devise safer, less
polluting agricultural practices. Yet popular suspicion of the genetic modification
process, especially as controlled by agrochemical companies, tended to associate GMO
releases with pollution, in both tangible and symbolic ways.
According to public-opinion polls, greatest unease focused on particular aspects of
biotechnology, such as the prospect of food containing human genes, or of animals being
genetically modified at all. More generally, images of 'mutant' organisms potentially
associated GMOs with nuclear power and pesticides (Tait, 1988, 1990).
Amidst that inchoate unease, many people conflated environmental, social and ethical
aspects. For bioscience generally, 'the public is aware that traditional values are indeed at
hazard in the process, despite presentation of the science as "value-free"..., conflicts in
this area arise from the tension between recognized social values and the unstated values
embedded in scientific developments and technical possibilities' (Roy et al., 1991: 321).
Such tension was manifest in contending ways to classify GMOs, at three related levels:
* defining biotechnology (section 1.1);
* anticipating effects (section 1.2); and
* structuring safety regulation (section 1.3).
Let us consider those three levels in turn, though without assuming that the regulatory
debate or policy follows such a logical sequence.
1.1 Defining biotechnology
This study concerns mainly agricultural GMOs, which form part of the new
biotechnology, as variously defined. Any definition conveys some meaning about a
value-free or value-laden content, about familiar or novel features, and about the natural
or artificial origin of biotechnology. In this study, the term denotes the 'new
biotechnology', based upon recombinant DNA techniques for transferring selected genetic
material across species barriers.
In some accounts, the term 'biotechnology' encompasses the entire human history of
biological intervention, including the 'old biotechnology' -- itself a retrospective new name
for beer brewing, breadmaking, etc. In this way, the US Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment defined biotechnology as '... any technique that uses living
organisms (or parts of organisms) to make or modify products, to improve plants or
animals, or to develop microorganisms for specific uses'; this report identified
biotechnology not as an industry in itself, but as an enabling technology with diverse
applications (OTA, 1984: 3). Similarly, an academic writer described biotechnology as
.knowledge and techniques involving the integrated use of biochemistry, microbiology,
genetics and engineering sciences to achieve the technological application of capabilities
of micro-organisms, cultured tissue cells and parts thereof; he emphasized the greater
knowledge and control over the smaller-scale 'parts' of organisms (Orsenigo, 1989: 32).
Some accounts celebrate novel features of a molecular-level control. According to an
industry-funded booklet, this control offers us 'the ultimate study of mankind', perhaps 'the
most dynamic of the great technological revolutions of the 20th century' (Taveme, 1990).
Another such booklet, intended for school students, announces 'biotechnology -- a new
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industrial revolution', defined as 'the application of organisms, and their cellular,
subcellular or molecular components, in order to provide goods, services and
environmental management' (Satelle, 1988). A company official speaks of 'supply-side
genetics' and 'utilization-side or value-added genetics' (Lawrence, 1988: 32); such
metaphors acknowledge the market priorities which are often embedded in the genetic
redesign of nature.
This historical novelty has been imbued with a natural legitimacy. According to the
Monsanto Company (1984), biotechnology is based upon a 'natural science', i.e., genetic
engineering. With biotechnology, We have entered a joint venture with nature'; we have
launched 'yet another industrial revolution', which offers society 'a cornucopia of new
products' (Harbison, 1988). Indeed, We can at last fmd biological solutions to biological
problems that mechanization and chemicals cannot solve' (Earle Harbison quoted in
Krimsky, 1991: 84).
This ambitious project builds upon its 1930s origins in molecular biology: 'It is a biology
built on fundamental abstractions such as the notion of a universal code, the idea of
information, the metaphor of a programme controlling cellular activity.' And it redefines
nature itself as constructible, reprograrnmable, interchangeable (Yoxen, 1983: 34). In
these ways, molecular biology de-emphasized the natural-historical, evolutionary and
functional explanations which had previously characterized biology. Instead it favoured a
reductionist focus on genetic structure; the latter approach proved amenable to the
biotechnological project of 'capitalizing life' (Yoxen, 1981: 80).
Consequently, molecular biology has facilitated an 'industrial genetics', which applies a
systems engineering model to all living things, while recasting life in its own image. In
this way, biotechnology departs from Lewis Mumford's earlier vision of biotechnics,
whereby improvements would 'rest upon a more organic utilization of the entire
environment, in response to the needs of organisms and groups considered in their
multifold relations...' (quoted in Krimsky, 1991: 9). Instead, biotechnology treats
problems as genetic deficiencies; for example, it attempts to correct 'nutritionally deficient
seeds' or even the undesireable outcomes of other technologies. Through this genetic 'fix',
it aims to optimize ecological and economic efficiency, by industrializing environmental
resources (ibid: Chapter 5; e.g. Harbison, 1988: 7).
As an industrial project, then, biotechnology extends a bioengineering vision far beyond
the laboratory or factory walls. It redefines what counts as a biological problem to be
solved, in terms of genetic changes; this can mean, for example, enhancing food quality as
valued by market price, making crop products more interchangeable, or replacing
traditional chemical inputs with genetic ones. Conversely, 'life' becomes reconceptualized
in terms of computer-controlled chemicals; subcellular components become instruments
which themselves embody the 'third industrial revolution', the principles of computer
programming.
In sum, given the contentious values in biotechnology, it was evaluated according to
antagonistic models for conceptualizing the agricultural environment. Biotechnologists
celebrated their new techniques which, paradoxically, would bring us a technological-
industrial revolution by extending an evolutionary continuum of natural processes. For
some critics, biotechnology transgressed and/or reconstructed nature, in ways which might
preclude alternative directions for bioscience and agriculture. How, then, did they
anticipate environmental effects of GMOs?
1.2 Anticipating effects
In disputing possible effects of GMO releases, protagonists evaluated biotechnology as a
mode of environmental control. According to one agronomist, for example, 'As plant
breeding per se is a wholly benign technology, any enhancement of it must be welcomed
as being in the public good, no matter who does it' (quoted in Kloppenburg, 1988: 5). In
this account, GMO products offered us the logical next step of a beneficent tradition.
On the contrary, according to some critics, the 'old' biotechnologies have been driven by
capitalist imperatives, turning all resources into commodities and intensifying the social
division of labour. Those forces have caused both socio-economic and environmental
damage, the latter resulting particularly from genetically uniform seeds dependent upon
chemical inputs. The seed 'becomes the nexus of control over the determination and
shape of the entire crop production process' -- and now more effectively so, by
'reprogramming the genetic code' (ibid.: 201).
From that perspective, biotechnology facilitates greater genetic uniformity and
commercial control. Consequently, for example, the design criteria for GMO
biopesticides impose the likelihood of harm to non-target insects and selection pressure
for resistant insects; the predominance of herbicide-resistant crops within biotechnology
R&D carries prospects for prolonged chemical dependency and further environmental
damage (ibid.: chapter 9; cf. Doyle, 1985). Herbicide-resistant crops could encourage
increased herbicide spraying, which has already increased crops' vulnerability to disease
and thus required additional protective chemicals (Pimentel, 1987). Such accounts
warned that GMO products may aggravate types of systemic harm which have been
already documented yet inadequately regulated.
Much early debate focused less upon systemic effects than upon the initial small-scale
field trials, some of which met organized opposition in the USA, where R&D efforts were
most advanced. According to many laboratory scientists, experience hitherto had
confirmed that GMOs were analogous to other domesticated, predictable organisms;
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groundless concern about hypothetical hazards was unduly restricting scientific research
(e.g. Davis, 1987). At a major scientific conference in 1988, the closing address implied
that the question was resolved: 'The small amounts of foreign DNA introduced by genetic
engineering, however, are unlikely to increase fitness, which requires evolutionary co-
adaptation of the entire, balanced genome' (in Sussman et al., 1988: 296).
For many ecologists, by contrast, it was premature to classify GMOs by analogy to
organisms familiar from past experience. Indeed, some GMOs could prove analogous to
non-indigenous organisms which have unexpectedly acquired a selective advantage in
their new environment (e.g. Alexander, 1985; Sharples, 1987). Ecologists associated
genetic novelty with greater unpredictability; some conceptualized 'ecological niches' as
dependent upon genetic variation, not simply upon environment (e.g. Regal, 1985, 1990).
In order to detect potential harm, they proposed extensive field tests, and more basic
ecological research, before any GMO could be regarded as innocuous (e.g. Tiedje et al.,
1989).
That disagreement has been analysed as a 'disciplinary fault line' between scientific
paradigms. Geneticists emphasized nature's unity and stability, which warranted putting
great confidence in human control over biological systems. By contrast, ecologists
emphasized nature's complexity and interdependence, which left open the prospect of
GMOs causing unpredicted disturbances (Krimsky, 1991: chapter 8; see further my
Chapter 4, section 1.2).
Partly at issue was how to classify GMOs by analogy to previous experiences, e.g. non-
indigenous organisms and/or agricultural products. Scientists disagreed on how to
conceptualize unintended effects in relation to intended ones, within an overall control
system. In anticipating possible effects, they brought to bear different cause-effect models
of environmental harm, and different concepts of the risk-generating system, e.g. intensive
monoculture. How would these differences bear upon regulating GMO releases?
1.3 Regulating GMO releases
Early GMO releases presented a difficult case for risk regulation, because there could not
yet be meaningful evidence to confirm or dismiss hypothetical hazards. Regulatory
measures came partly in response to public unease and protest, which lent greater weight
to ecologists' proposals for safety testing. In an attempt at some international agreement,
it was proposed that biotechnologists carry out a case-by-case risk assessment of GMO
releases; by progressively relaxing containment, in a stepwise manner, each GMO could
become better characterized and predictable (OECD, 1986: 29). This nominal agreement
remained open to divergent interpretations (see Chapter 4, section 1.2).
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In Britain, the government was promoting biotechnology research for its expected
environmental, agricultural and economic benefits (HMG, 1990: 184; AFRC, 1992). In
parallel with such R&D efforts, it co-ordinated a voluntary self-regulation of GMO
releases from the mid-1980s onwards. In Britain the regulatory initiative came from
biotechnologists themselves, though perhaps mindful of political protest elsewhere.
In 1985, when planning Britain's first GMO release, a research institute submitted its
application to the Health & Safety Executive and consulted local environmental groups
(Bishop et al., 1988: 150). Soon afterwards, the HSE set up a special subcommittee for
assessing such applications (Shackley, 1988: 68); they also issued a set of wide-ranging
risk-assessment criteria (ACGM/HSE, 1986; cf. OECD, 1986). According to the
subcommittee chairman, 'the guidelines would have to be very general in nature to allow
flexibility and to ensure that important, but presently unrecognized, aspects of risk would
be considered' (Beringer, 1988: 168). Prospective releasers submitted their own risk
assessments, seeking to demonstrate safety before carrying out any release (Shackley,
1988: Appendix 1).
Regulators acknowledged the unusual precautionary (or proactive) feature of their efforts.
Speaking at a 1988 conference, a leading HSE official noted that 'there are few other
experiences of this type of proactive regulation'. Britain had already set a precedent in the
1970s by anticipating 'conjectural hazards' from the contained use of GMOs, with flexible
guidelines which could be adjusted with experience; similarly, for regulating GMO
releases, 'learning by experience would be an important element' (Ager, 1990).
Such 'learning' posed new difficulties. In the 1980s, biotechnologists designed microbial
GMOs not to survive outside specified conditions; soon regulators cited the absence of
harm and greater predictability, to justify relaxing precautions on GMOs within contained
use (Bennett et al., 1986; Wright, 1986). For agricultural products, however, regulation
would have to specify the criteria for permitting GMOs to proceed from the laboratory
stage, to small-scale field trials, through to commercial product approval.
Indeed, given that the live products were intended ultimately for an international market,
political pressures were mounting to standardize safety rules across national borders. At
the same time, governments faced political uncertainty about public responses to GMO
releases. Under such pressures, governments sought appropriate safety controls which
could be initially imposed and then eventually relaxed, by showing that the precautions
were no longer necessary. At issue was how to formalize a statutory and scientific basis
for such a regulatory procedure.
1.4 Thesis focus: research questions
This study analyses the difficulties which arose in devising and implementing a procedure
for regulating GMO releases, particularly in Britain, within the international regulatory
context. The research initially posed the following questions:
* How does the regulatory system defme the risk problem?
* How and where do value judgements enter risk assessment?
* How do various socio-political forces interact around the regulation?
* What is the precautionary content of the regulation, and why?
In the course of this study, the regulatory regime encountered some difficulty in justifying
its 'rational' status. The study gave this problem a theoretical structure, by asking: How
does GMO regulation construct its own rationality? In particular:
* How does the regulatory system handle diverse accounts of the risk problem? How
does this selectively treat some 'perceived risks' as if they might be real?
* How is a risk-management regime devised and justified? What is the significance of
'national regulatory styles'?
* How does the regulatory procedure attempt to reduce uncertainty about risk? (How)
does this effort depoliticize scientific uncertainty?
2.0 RISK REGULATION AS PROCEDURAL RATIONALiTY
Given the public dispute over a 'rational' basis for regulating GMO releases, this section
will survey writings on risk regulation as a constructed and contested rationality. Social
theorists of risk have analysed safety procedures as a means of providing social legitimacy
for regulatory policy, even for the hazardous activity being regulated. They have
variously theorized safety regulation -- as a procedural rationality, a procedural
rationalism, a technical rationality, a pragmatic rationality, a scientific rationality, etc. In
general this thesis will use the first term, 'procedural rationality', partly because its
adjective emphasizes a legitimation process rather than a scientific basis.
Through a series of public controversies, safety regulation has met challenges to its
'acceptable risk' judgements, its quantitative risk estimates, and even its concepts of risk.
Often in dispute has been the 'rational' status of the regulatory procedure or of public
protest, as if there were only one kind of rationality. Some analysts suggest that risk
controversy arises from scientific uncertainty, or even from public irrationality.
Yet rationality itself is a social construct, as critical theories emphasize in various ways
(e.g. Beck, 1992a: 59). As one study concludes, 'uncertainty and (ir)rationality are the
outcomes of a given controversy, not its causes' (Cambrosio and Limoges, 1991: 387);
that is, a policy outcome retrospectively defines the relevant scientific uncertainty and a
rational manner to deal with it. Similarly, a 'pragmatic rationality' denotes a flexible
procedure which can accommodate underlying disagreement on scientific evidence, even
on socio-political goals; this procedure seeks robust solutions that can withstand the
pressures to which they will inevitably be exposed (Rip, 1985: 107; cf. Rip, 1986: 166).
By defining rationality as a flexible social construct, however, these theoretical models
may be merely ex-post: any outcome can be retrospectively labelled as 'rational'. To avoid
such tautology, let us consider theories of antagonistic rationalities.
According to a 'cultural theory' of risk, safety regulation exemplifies a procedural
rationality; as the adjective implies, this 'is more concerned with the proprieties of who
does what than with trying to evaluate the outcome', if there is one (Schwarz &
Thompson, 1990: 7). A procedural rationality is one of four rationalities, or political
cultures, each of which emphasizes a different structure of the relevant uncertainty, rooted
in a cognitive 'myth of nature'. According to this typology (ibid.: 62-68):
* A 'hierarchist' culture imposes its authority to ensure that technological developments
remain within the uncertain limits of environmental stability, within the safe bounds of
'nature perverse/tolerant'. A procedural rationality anticipates those limits, by developing
an expert interdisciplinary knowledge.
* An 'individualist' (or market) culture promotes developments which can reap the
cornucopian bounty of 'nature benign', through a 'thai-and-error' process. It counterposes
a laissez-faire policy to any regulatory control which may threaten the functioning of the
market.
* An 'egalitarian' culture often opposes technological developments as threats to a fragile
'nature ephemeral'. Through a critical rationality, it promotes democratic control over
such developments, by accepting only 'trial without error', and by counterposing a holistic
knowledge to any specialist expertise.
* A 'fatalist' culture passively endures the vicissitudes of 'nature capricious'; by default,
such people remain excluded from the social contest among political cultures.
According to this typology, technological controversy arises from incompatible problem-
definitions, each of them rooted in a distinct political culture. Each selects 'risks' which
stand as proxies for technological choices, which in turn are made possible by some form
of social control (ibid.: 7-8). In attempting to influence such choices, any act may be
deemed as 'rational' if it promotes a preferred mode of social organization, as classified by
grid-group theory (ibid.: 53, 61). However, this typology may oversimplify the subtle
differences and ambivalences which arise in real-life controversies (Wynne, 1992: 291).
In particular, by distinguishing between 'regulatory hierarchies vs entrepreneurial
markets', the typology may be too simplistic, for several reasons. First, when risk
controversy has challenged the legitimacy of technoscientific 'progress', safety regulation
has often served to overcome the threat (Beck, 1992a: 22; see further below). Second,
when national regulatory differences have posed trade barriers -- to hazardous chemicals,
for example -- industry has often been willing to accept more stringent regulation and to
incur higher regulatory costs, for the sake of promoting free trade (Brickman et aL, 1985:
390). Third, safety standards often play the implicit economic role of co-ordinating
market relations, while favouring some innovations over others (Salter, 1988: 168-7 1).
Fourth, environmental regulation may spur innovation by altering market conditions, often
as an implicit or explicit rationale for regulatory changes (e.g. Weale, 1992: 67-92). Thus
a 'procedural rationality' may complement, incorporate or promote market-innovative
forces.
Somewhat parallel to the 'critical versus procedural rationalities' as above, another
theoretical model distinguishes between 'cultural versus technical rationalities', as a
typology for theorizing conflict between public protest versus safety regulation,
respectively. In the USA, for example, protest against 'mutant' organisms challenged the
natural, benign status of GMOs; farmers in particular questioned wider socio-economic
effects of the biotechnology R&D agenda: 'The political rhetoric of the popular culture
stressed control over its environment'. Such protest expresses a cultural rationality, which
'does not separate the context from the content of risk analysis' -- in contrast to a technical
rationality, which considers only measurable parameters (argue Krimsky and Plough,
1988: 107-8, 306). Yet, as their research material also indicates, the risk-assessment
procedure took for granted that GMOs offer a benign control and environmental
predictability (ibid.: 95); thus the technical rationality also had a cultural content.
Along similar lines, Ulrich Beck too identifies 'competing rationality claims': that is,
scientific rationality emphasizes the technological manageability of accident probabilities,
while social rationality locates problems in the industrial mode of production. Yet, as he
also argues, the distinction is becoming less possible: scientific rationality relies upon
social expectations and value judgements, while public protest depends upon scientific
arguments. In these ways, 'Scientific and social rationality do indeed break apart, but they
remain at the same time interwoven and interdependent' (Beck, 1992a: 30).
A related interdependence has been theorized via the concept of 'procedural rationalism'.
This denotes a decision-making procedure which has promoted 'a particular model of
democracy -- one that required only the expert discovery of objective facts about a
narrowly defined question', e.g. the safety of particular nuclear plant (Wynne, 1982: 10,
163). A procedural rationalism can credibly claim authority only by restricting its
breadth: 'To be genuinely definitive, it must eventually face the question of its own
agenda-defining premises; yet, to stand a chance of being authoritative, it must pretend
that no such question exists' (ibid: 172). There arises a practical dilemma: safety
regulation can be authoritative only by denying the limits of its narrow problem-
definition, which excludes the wider risk-generating system.
Often risk controversy revolves around assumptions about system boundaries, and thus the
legitimacy of the hazardous activity. Ulrich Beck argues that current innovations generate
risks which are relatively more pervasive, elusive and potentially catastrophic: Dealing
with these consequences of modern productive and destructive forces in the normal terms
of risk is a false but nevertheless effective way of legitimizing them.' At the same time,
risk assessment can offer an indirect means of democratizing technological choices:
Determinations of risk are the form in which ethics -- and with it also philosophy,
culture and politics -- is resurrected inside the centres of modernization.... [Such
determinations are] an unwanted means of democratization in the fields of
industrial production and management (Beck, 1992a: 22, 28).
Thus risk regulation may have a double-edged role: legitimizing a contentious innovation
and/or influencing its development.
In sum, regulatory agenda-setting entails conflicts which various theories attribute to
antagonistic rationalities and/or to internal tensions, in turn arising from the implicit
political role of risk regulation.
These theories also suggest ways to analyse how risk regulation constructs its 'technical'
criteria. According to the official stereotype, risk assessment follows a standard sequence
of steps, deploying objective science in order to guide subjective judgements or even to
overcome them. Such claims have encountered political protest -- in turn interpreted by
social theorists who critically analyse the putative norms of 'rational' risk regulation. The
rest of this section surveys critical perspectives on regulatory claims to distinguish
between objective/subjective judgements, in particular:
* real/perceived risks: identifying risks, by distinguishing real from merely perceived
ones (section 2.1);
* risk assessment/management: controlling risks, by basing risk management upon a prior
risk assessment (section 2.2); and
* fact/value: reducing scope for value judgements about risk, by reducing factual
uncertainty (section 2.3).
2.1 Identifying risk: real versus perceived?
Risk regulation has claimed to distinguish between 'real' versus 'perceived' risks, by
presuming that objective science overcomes subjective ignorance. In a major report on
environmental risk assessment, for example, the authors attributed conflicting risk
perceptions to inadequate information, as if better-informed people would abandon their
misperceptions (Whyte and Burton, 1980: 15). In a similar vein, it has been argued that
biotechnology faces public fears based partly on ignorance rather than scientific fact; real
risk 'also needs to be addressed, but in ways different from unfounded risks', as if science
could confidently make that distinction (in Batra and Kiassen, 1987: 168).
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In response to risk controversy, social science has sought to explain the gap between
scientific and public perceptions of risk. Early psychometric research obscured such value
conflicts by assuming them to be a function of public ignorance (Wynne, 1980). In
particular, psychological studies attempted to quantify perceived risks, in terms of
expected fatalities for different kinds of activity, as contrasted to the statistical record; an
early survey found people more willing to tolerate voluntary risks than involuntary ones
(Starr, 1969).
Later surveys found people equally influenced by such characteristics as familiarity,
control and catastrophic potential of risks. Some researchers acknowledged divergent
concepts of risk: although lay people may lack certain information, 'their basic
conceptualization of risk is much richer than that of the experts and reflects legitimate
concerns which are typically omitted from expert risk assessments' (Slovic, 1987). As a
recent report acknowledged, people appear to evaluate 'characteristics of hazards, rather
than some single abstract concept such as risk' (Royal Society, 1992: 89).
Even a qualitative assessment of 'real' risk involves some human interpretation, such as an
implicit model of the risk-generating system, or the cognitive framework of a scientific
discipline. 'In this light, what is commonly called the conflict between actual and
perceived risk is better thought of as the conflict between two sets of risk perceptions:
those of ranking scientists performing within their field of expertise and those of anybody
else' (cited in Royal Society, 1992: 97; cf. Schwarz & Thompson, 1990: 21, 139).
Similarly,
.if all risk is defined in accordance with the categories of a particular scientific or
modeling theory, then there is no actual hazard apart from some particular
theoretical account of it. Hence there is no uncontroversial way to distinguish
'actual' from 'perceived' risk (Shrader-Frechette, 1991: 82).
Indeed, any such distinction has remained controversial in the realm of 'modernization
risks': here cause-effect pathways of harm become more pervasive yet less accessible to
sensory perception, even to scientific disciplines. At the same time, lay protest has
catalysed interdisciplinary research, which often turns out to validate some 'perceived
risks' as real. Contrary to the official stereotype, public perception and experience has
helped to overcome specialist scientific ignorance. Thus, 'The distinction between
(rational) determination of risks and (irrational) perception of them also inverts the role of
scientific and social rationality in the origin of a civilizational risk consciousness.'
Moreover, 'The monopoly of rationality enjoyed by scientific hazard definition stands or
falls with this distinction' between real/perceived risks (Beck, 1992a: 57-58, 160).
That official distinction often attributes 'risk' to inadequate control, yet 'risk' often denotes
a fear that institutions will impose an ominous control. New technological developments
generate 'rational anxieties about loss of control and vulnerability' -- feelings which do not
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have 'an inevitable physical, environmental focus'. Yet risk regulation displaces these
tensions rather than address their substance (Grove-White, 1991: 439).
In particular, environmental biotechnology points to previously unthinkable ways of
controffing the environment, and so calls into question our environmental values: 'In some
ways, the public is more worried about biotechnology's succeeding than its failing'
(Wachbroit, 1991: 370); that is, people may associate risk with efficacious
biotechnological control. More generally, risk perception is about 'acceptance of the
totality of whatever activity causes the risk', i.e., about the entire risk-generating system;
to consider only quantitative risk, therefore, 'would be truly irrational' (Otway, 1992:
224).
These issues of control resonate with theories of how people evaluate technological
developments as modes of social organization (see section 2.0 above). Drawing upon
'cultural theory' in particular, commentators have analysed the diverse risk perceptions
which inform political protest. In general, 'different kinds of environmentalism' can stem
from each of the four political cultures (Johnson, 1987: 160).
Protest against GMO releases could take a NIMBY form, i.e. 'not in my backyard', or even
NIABY, i.e. 'not in anybody's backyard' (Tait, 1988). Early US protests expressed both
local and global concerns (Krimsky and Plough, 1988: 96, 104); they can be interpreted as
merging NIMBY and NIABY aspects. NTMBY protests may start by opposing some
local, negotiable nuisance, but they often develop into a NIABY stance, even into an
egalitarian culture which resists negotiation (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990: 21; Rayner,
1992: 92).
From these perspectives, we may examine how GMO regulation constructs a boundary
between real/perceived risk; the boundary can be analysed as favouring a specific
problem-definition, cognitive framework and mode of institutional control.
2.2 Controlling risk: assessment before managment?
Officially, safety regulation manages hazardous activities in order to ascertain the
objective risks and keep them within acceptable limits. This procedure has been codified
as a standard sequence of three main steps: from risk identification, to risk estimation, and
then risk evaluation, i.e., judging the acceptability of the estimated risk and setting
preventive measures (e.g. Whyte and Burton, 1980: 10). In elaborating on this standard
sequence, risk analysts tend to acknowledge that value judgements arise in the third step,
though not in earlier steps (e.g. Lowrance, 1976). As regulators have come under political
pressure to justify the type of preventive measures, especially in the USA, they have used
the term 'risk management' to distinguish the third step from earlier ones.
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According to the above-cited report, risk-management procedures allow safety regulation
to achieve rationality, though this ideal requires acknowledging scientific uncertainties
and any judgements which go beyond the available scientific evidence (Whyte and
Burton, 1980: xvi, 16); the authors imply that values begin where facts end. Yet this
fact/value distinction often becomes blurred or disputed. According to other experts, 'the
selection of which [dose-response] model to use has as large an influence on the [risk]
estimate as the experimental data'; yet somehow regulation must distinguish clearly
'between fact, assumption and science policy' (quotes from contributors to Hod et al.,
1985: 182, 309).
Moreover, at issue is not only the putative boundary between risk assessment and
management but also the logical sequence -- i.e. how control methods may frame the risk
problem. For example, in the more socially transparent case of crowd control,
engineering-based methods may lead practitioners to manage crowds as if they were
inherently dangerous objects which warrant strict external control (Royal Society, 1992:
175). Conversely, 'it is said that risks which are not yet technically manageable do not
exist -- at least not in scientific calculation or jurisdictional judgement' (Beck, 1992a: 29).
Thus risk-management methods and capacities may influence risk assessment, depending
upon which variables can be credibly controlled.
As another example of cognitive framing, hazardous substances are often declared 'safe if
used as directed'; this presumes that industrial workplace practices can be controlled as
carefully as a laboratory safety test. Critics argue that realistic conditions of chemical
usage are not reflected in safety testing; its over-confident assumptions entail a 'naive
sociology': These [assumptions] are not extra aspects distorting objective risk perceptions
-- they are judgements of factors that determine the objective risks' (Wynne, 1989: 35; cf.
Salter, 1988: 177).
As this problem illustrates, 'risk assessment' depends upon constructing and measuring
artificial microworids, where variations are restricted or ignored. For predictive purposes,
reality becomes standardized according to some cognitive framework which informs an
organizational culture (Jasanoff, 1993). In this vein, 'cultural theory' makes a stronger
claim: that cognitive differences render policymaking possible (Schwarz & Thompson,
1990: 68). Such theoretical perspectives challenge the putative or idealized neutrality of
'science-based regulation', as expressed in a recent report which lamented that 'rational'
risk-management institutions have been difficult to design, supposedly because risk debate
'has become heavily politicized around different cosmologies or woridviews' (Royal
Society, 1992: 153).
For analysing links between risk assessment and management, national regulatory styles
are also relevant (e.g. Vogel, 1985; Jasanoff, 1986); although also called political cultures,
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they can be seen as national variants on a procedural rationality. These theoretical models
identify recurring patterns by which a nation-state handles regulatory conflict. In
particular, the USA has been characterized as an ariversarial culture, where the regulatory
authority enforces compliance with pre-set rules, which are publicly justified in clear
scientific terms. As the US government has a constitutional separation of powers, this
offers outsiders many entry points for influencing or undermining regulatory policy, e.g.
through court cases and Congressional oversight. By contrast, Britain has been
characterized as a consensual political culture, where the regulatory authority flexibly
applies its broad powers, exercising much discretion in guiding self-regulation by
industry; conflicts are mediated by incorporating selected representatives into confidential
procedures (O'Riordan & Wynne, 1987: 398-402).
More specifically, in the early 1980s, US regulatory agencies were accused of pro-
industry bias, thus undermining their claims to base policy upon neutral expertise.
Subsequently, in regulating chemicals, the US government attempted to demarcate risk
assessment from risk management, and so to demonstrate the objective status of the
former (e.g. NRC, 1983: 7). In order to fill an apparent gap between ambiguous scientific
findings and public policy, regulatory agencies devised clear administrative rules, known
as 'science policy'; yet these rules in turn came into political dispute, thus undermining the
executive's attempt to depoliticize regulatory science (Jasanoff, 1986: 10, 26-27, 72).
More generally, the US government has tried to substitute detailed technical criteria for
overtly political ones. Yet 'the role allotted to science in American policymaking is one
which it simply cannot fulfil' (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986: 158). Despite those
difficulties, 'what matters most in risk management is the process, not the outcome'
(Jasanoff, 1986: 81); in the USA, the open participatory process can lend legitimacy to the
formal regulatory outcome.
Recently such access has become more exclusive in practice, as US regulatory agencies
have attempted to enhance their own authority through scientific advisory committees. In
this way, diverse experts could negotiate a more resilient version of 'good science',
capable of resisting external political attack. In some cases this procedure has helped to
stabilize a 'science policy', i.e. a risk-assessment policy which can protect risk-
management measures from transient political pressures. In so doing, the policymaking
venue has been moved from high-profile administrative hearings to routine meetings; in
effect, such a terrain has favoured industry specialists over public-interest organizations.
Thus a more resilient 'science policy' may restrict the substantive access which formerly.
lent legitimacy to regulatory decisions (Jasanoff, 1990).
In contrast to the USA, Britain's regulatory procedures have not attempted to demarcate
between stages of risk assessment and management. Rather than claim expertise,
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regulators claim 'competence' in obtaining and applying appropriate scientific advice. By
integrating science and policy in advisory committees or Royal Commissions, the British
government has generally avoided public disputes over the scientific basis of policy, e.g.
in regulating hazardous chemicals (Jasanoff, 1986: 73-75, 58-59). Britain has developed a
strategy of 'responsible co-optation', incorporating relevant interest groups into
confidential procedures; this serves to protect the neutral image of regulatory science,
while gaining public deference to expert committees (Vogel, 1986: 5 1-52; Brickman et
al., 1985: 310; Jasanoff, 1986: 66). More recently, however, British regulation has
undergone pressure to formalize its scientific rationale by adopting clear statutory rules
(O'Riordan & Wynne, 1987: 409).
From these theoretical perspectives, we may examine how GMO regulation justifies its
risk-management measures, as linked to risk assessment. We may also examine how
GMO regulation reproduces or alters national regulatory styles (also known as political
cultures).
2.3 Reducing uncertainty; facts before values?
It is often assumed that scientific uncertainty causes policy conflict, which therefore can
be overcome by obtaining additional scientific knowledge. However, new data has often
intensified methodological controversy among experts (e.g. Collingridge and Reeve, 1986:
5 1-60; Salter, 1988: 166, 199-201). This difficulty has been explained by theorizing how
facts are value-laden, though theoretical models do so in different ways.
According to some models, technical uncertainty sets the context for risk controversy. For
example, such uncertainty provides greater opportunity for conflicting interpretations of
science for policy, even though such conflicts may be irreducible to facts (e.g. Majone,
1989: 40; Nelkin, 1979: 16). Technical uncertainty lends greater importance to value
conflicts over 'risk', though the term may really denote a problem of moral responsibility
(Neilcin, 1985: 18-21). Similarly, it is argued, the fact/value distinction breaks down in a
context of high uncertainty, though our scientific knowledge always arises from some
vision for framing the social and natural order (Jasanoff, 1993: 125).
In contrast, other theoretical models deny that 'uncertainty' explains conflict. In the
controversy around a proposed oil pipeline in Canada, for example, experts variously
expressed confidence or caution about managing uncertainty, partly according to how they
evaluated its potential consequences. Here 'uncertainty' served as a strategic argument
among experts, rather than as the source of their disagreement. That is, 'the problem of
adequate knowledge becomes related to what is reasonable to know for practical purposes'
(Campbell, 1985).
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Moreover, actors draw upon divergent cognitive frameworks for disputing the range of
uncertainty deemed relevant for policy; yet often an administrative procedure treats this
structural uncertainty as if it were merely a technical uncertainty (Schwarz and Thompson,
1990: 159-62). Values arise in generating facts, not simply in interpreting them: new
scientific knowledge 'is formed politically'. Each problem-definition generates its own
'structural interdependence of facts and values'; thus any putative fact/value boundary is a
social construct which wanants analysis (ibid.: 22, 27). A procedural rationality treats a
particular range of uncertainty as the most relevant to policy, defines this range as the
'technical' issues, and thus depoliticizes its own problem-definition (ibid.: 139) -- at least
potentially.
Yet safety regulation can also do the opposite -- i.e. inadvertently politicize the attempt to
reduce scientific uncertainty. Under critical examination, argues Beck, scientific facts 'are
nothing but answers to questions that could have been asked differently'; they are products
of rules for gathering and omitting aspects of reality. Given the competing assumptions
of different scientific disciplines, science 'offers an image of the self-relativizing pluralism
of interpretations', which 'virtually force the practitioner to make his own cognitive
decisions'. Thus the mobilization of belief becomes a central means for the social
enforcement of validity claims (Beck, 1992a: 166-68). That is, the policy relevance of
any factual evidence requires a cognitive argument, which may undermine its apparent
neutrality.
What would it mean, then, to reduce uncertainty about risk? Even the initial step of 'risk
identification' presupposes some causal theory, 'an epistemic value judgement' which
guides actors in generating and interpreting scientific facts. Likewise for risk estimation,
where for example toxicity estimates depend upon some dose-response model. Moreover,
when attempting to confirm such a predictive model, any test presupposes some
methodological value judgement (Shrader-Frechette, 1991: 58-59, 42).
Nevertheless it remains tempting to presume a single account of the risk problem. This
was implied by the above author in prescribing 'democratic proceduralism', an attempt at
'increasing the analytic precision of hazards assessment and the democratic control of
environmental risks' (ibid.: 29, 171). Would such an attempt be a contradiction in terms?
Moreover, in cases where evidence of harm is absent or disputed, how can uncertainty be
reduced? When a Royal Society report (1992: 155) discussed the precautionary principle,
it asked 'how far public policy should run ahead of clear scientific findings'. Such
language presumes an ordinal scale of safety, operating within a consensual range of
scientific uncertainty.
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More generally it is assumed that a precautionary approach intervenes mainly at the third
step of risk assessment -- risk evaluation -- by lowering the burden of evidence for risk:
tThis conventional view appears to hold that the body of scientific knowledge remains
qualitatively the same, whilst the threshhold of acceptable risk is simply moved across the
body of knowledge to a different position within that knowledge' (Wynne, 1993).
However, in regulating North Sea pollution, a prime case for a precautionary approach,
there arises a fundamental conflict between two bodies of knowledge; their respective
'natural' facts derive from two competing methodologies for marine epidemiology. Many
toxicologists perceive the environment as an 'assimilative capacity' for waste; they simply
cannot perceive the indirect cause-effect inferences and circumstantial evidence which are
studied by other scientists. In dispute are the criteria for evidence of harm; the technical
aspects 'merge with epistemic questions as to why we are constructing such knowledge
anyway' (ibid.).
Given these theoretical perspectives, what would it mean to reduce uncertainty about
GMO releases? In the North Sea pollution case, ecologists could at least cite some
evidence of harm, as grounds for investigating its causes, even for relaxing the burden of
evidence for harm. In the case of GMO releases, however, there was little common
ground for how to define the relevant uncertainty, so as to enhance predictability.
- According to an early report on GMO releases, a complex ecosystem dynamics allows at
best an 'embryonic' predictive capability; little would be resolved merely by identifying
possible outcomes (Fiksel and Covello, 1986: 26-27). A subsequent report asserted that
new genetic tools, along with a study of organisms introduced into the environment, offer
useful knowledge which 'can provide a rational base to the establishment of prudent
procedures for future applications' (Mooney and Berardi, 1990: 6).
Yet that 'rational base' lacked criteria for meaningful evidence; it depended upon posing
hypothetical analogies, e.g. between GMOs and non-indigenous organisms. For example,
argued a risk analyst, 'the distinction between domesticated and weedy or feral varieties of
an organism is far from absolute'. And, in seeking evidence, 'the absence of positive
evidence [for risk] is not at all the same as the presence of negative evidence [for safety]'.
An anticipatory approach should 'strike a reasonable balance, always improving in the
light of experience, between technical progress and environmental safety' (Ravetz, 1989:
72). How, then, would such progress and safety be 'balanced'? We should 'examine the
structure of our uncertainties': that is, 'a natural ordering of relevant questions can be
accomplished so that enquiry and debate can have some coherent structure' (ibid.: 78).
At issue, however, was the relevant structure of uncertainty: any 'natural ordering'
presumed some model for how to convert a fundamental ignorance into mere uncertainty
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about identifiable cause-effect relationships. For the hypothetical hazards of GMO
releases, at issue was not simply uncertainty, but how to prioritize among different
uncertainties, and how to test them by producing new facts. Yet new facts would not
necessarily bridge the disciplinary divide between geneticists and ecologists, who embed
facts in a different model of causality (Krimsky, 1991: 151).
More fundamentally, what was the problem-object, the risk-generating system? Safety
regulation could variously define the problem as the genetic modification techniques,
particular GMOs, their 'natural' properties, their agronomic design, intensive monoculture,
etc. From these theoretical perspectives, we may examine how GMO regulation defined
the relevant 'uncertainty' to be reduced.
3.0 THE THESIS
This thesis builds upon earlier critical studies which have analysed the contested 'rational'
basis of safety regulation. The thesis argues for moving beyond theoretical models of
antagonistic a priori 'rationalities', e.g. beyond technical-procedural, socie-critical, and/or
individualist-market rationalities. Such models emphasize external conflicts which, in
GMO regulation, arose also as internal poles of tension within the regulatory procedure.
Broadly spealdng, the regulatory system mediated tensions between social legitimacy and
commercialization. These tensions arose from the implicit role of the safety procedure in
symbolically normalizing agricultural biotechnology. This role can be seen by elaborating
the theoretical concept of a 'procedural rationality', at many levels: how safety regulation
defines the risk problem; how its risk-management rules frame risk assessment; and how it
reduces scientific uncertainty.
In the late 1980s biotechnologists faced political challenges to their R&D agenda of
further industrializing agriculture, of investing nature with computer and market
metaphors. For enthusiasts, society was at risk of failing to reap the indispensible benefits
of biotechnology. For some critics, society was at risk from a sinister biotechnological
control.
In response to public controversy, safety regulation fragmented issues of biotechnological
control into distinct benefits and 'risks'. It emphasized the hypothetical prospect that
GMOs might escape from an otherwise benign control; in this way, GMO regulation
selectively incorporated some accounts of the risk problem, while marginalizing others..
As a procedural rationality, safety regulation translated risk as cultural danger into risk as
a technical uncertainty, amenable to expert management.
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Regulators had difficulty in justifying their risk-management rules in terms of a prior risk-
identification method for hypothetical hazards. As a scientific rationale for their rules,
regulatory authorities cited naturalistic biological analogies, such as exotic introduced
organisms (EC & Britain) or plant pests (USDA). In each case, the risk-management
regime embodied a cognitive framework; although this framework made a regulatory
commitment possible, it also generated disputes, thus politicizing the official account of
scientific uncertainty.
In particular, the US 'product-based' system provided little regulatory scope beyond
preventing hazards already regulated. Rigid executive-level rules provoked
environmentalist challenge and constrained agency-level efforts at building a scientific
consensus. While invoking 'risk-based regulation', the government inadvertently extended
the US 'adversarial' style to GMO regulation from other regulatory regimes.
The EC 'process-based' framework arose partly from the political imperative of
overcoming national regulatory differences. The EC Directive, with its precautionary
features, came under industry attack as 'irrational'; there were related pressures to narrow
the risk-assessment criteria, especially for market approval of GMO products. At least in
Britain, however, industry participated in developing the process-based regulatory
framework, which served to legitimize small-scale field trials.
As the EC framework pushed Britain to go beyond the HSE's voluntary controls, the DoE
took the opportunity to devise a 'precautionary' rationale for process-based legislation.
For its new advisory committee, the DoE strengthened the ecologists' role and
incorporated an implicit public-interest representation. By subjecting all GMO releases to
scrutiny, the regulatory authorities could discreetly negotiate risk-management
judgements, case by case. This broadly-based, confidential procedure extended Britain's
consultative regulatory style to GMO releases.
The step-by-step principle provided a means for Britain's regulators to postpone
distinguishing between 'real versus perceived risks', and thus to legitimize early releases.
Regulatory advisors were informed by pollution analogies in perceiving and anticipating
hypothetical hazards; by keeping trial releases under safe control, initial precautions
accommodated the perceived abnormality of GMOs. Nevertheless, some GMOs evoked
anxiety about a sinister biotechnological control -- concerns which the formal procedure
displaced.
In effect, value conflicts over potential consequences made scientific uncertainty more
important, rather than vice versa. Starting from divergent accounts of the risk problem,
each actor emphasized particular types of uncertainty. This meant favouring some inner
link between science and policy, not simply filling an a priori 'gap' between them. As
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regulatory advisors acknowledged, the acceptability judgements on hypothetical effects
would influence the effort to ascertain whether such effects were plausible; environmental
values guided proposals for fact-finding. Nevertheless a naturalistic framework provided
a means for eventually routinizing safety criteria through a 'technical' form, thus
depoliticizing uncertainty.
The regulatory procedure translated some 'perceived risks' into testable characteristics of
GMOs, while marginalizing complexities which might defy such testing. Monitoring
results were cited to justify relaxing or even abandoning some regulatory controls. Safety
sceptics emphasized further ecological and/or agronomic uncertainties, thus implicitly
challenging the prevalent R&D priorities. Yet the political context offered little potential
for democratizing risk assessment, much less for influencing biotechnological innovation.
Insofar as GMO regulation had a precautionary content, both its potential and limits
derived from the project of overcoming obstacles to a biotechnology market. This task
meant symbolically normalizing GMOs as benign products, while specifying testable
ecological uncertainties rooted in some naturalistic analogy; technical risk was abstracted
from issues of socio-agronomic control, thus displacing wider environmental issues. The
regulation was less about applying some a priori 'precautionary principle', than about
defming both safety and innovation.
In effect, the regulatory procedure was managing internal contradictions between social
legitimacy and commercialization. These tensions arose from the implicit regulatory task
of legitimizing biotechnology, by default of any democratic procedure for adjudicating a
contentious technoscientific development. In this case study, the theoretical concept of a
'procedural rationality' is elaborated to encompass poles of tension which some theories
attribute to distinct rationalities, e.g. to a socio-cultural rationality or an individualist-
market rationality.
The thesis has the following structure:
Chapter 1 surveyed early debates over how to classify GMOs; discussed theories of risk
regulation as contested rationality; and summarized the thesis argument, which Chapters
3-9 elaborate in detail.
Chapter 2 discusses methods for researching GMO regulation as a case study, for
investigating the aims which guide social actors, and for depicting their strategies via
cognitive maps.
Chapter 3 describes how political forces portrayed GMOs as an environmental issue, and
how public-interest groups defined the 'risk' problem, which the regulatory system might
accommodate or marginalize.
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Chapters 4-6 describes how risk-management institutions were established in the USA,
EC, and Britain, with their difficulties in justifying a scientific basis. Chapter 4 contrasts
the US product-based and the EC's process-based regulatory frameworks, the latter
mandating a precautionary approach. Chapter 5 describes how Britain's new legislation
formulated a broad technical-legal language for a precautionary approach to GMO
releases, yet narrowly defined the 'risk' system and legal liability. Chapter 6 describes
bow Britain's advisory committee was constituted so as to negotiate diverse values and
interests within confidential procedures, thus maintaining the neutral image of regulatory
science.
Chapters 7-9 describe how Britain's regulatory procedures handled diverse accounts of
uncertainty. Chapter 7 describes how initial safety measures deferred the stereotypical
boundary between real/perceived risks, though not always so readily. Chapter 8 describes
attempts at 'reducing uncertainty' and so relaxing controls, amidst value conflicts over
which uncertainties warranted scientific fact-finding. Chapter 9 describes disputes over
rules for market approval, as a terrain for attempts at limiting the precautionary content
and symbolically normalizing GMO products.
Chapter 10 sets out the overall thesis argument on 'procedural rationality', by drawing on
earlier chapters and by referring back to theoretical issues raised in the literature survey
(Chapter 1, section 2).
A terminological note: Rather than 'the UK', the text often refers to 'Britain', for several
reasons: because the statutory controls initially excluded Northern Ireland; because no
GMO releases were requested there; and because the 'consensual' regulatory style hardly
applies there.
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Chapter 2
RESEARCH METHODS
This chapter relates the research methods to the aims of the study. The chapter discusses:
* theoretical aims (section 1);
* case-study methods (section 2);
* publicly available materials (section 3);
* interviews (section 4); and
* cognitive mapping (section 5)
1.0 THEORETICAL AIMS OF STUDY
In this thesis, the main object of study is Britain's system for regulating GMO releases, during
its shift from a voluntary to a statutory basis between 1989-1992, seen in its international
context. The initial research questions emphasized the role of value judgements and the
interactions among institutional actors (see Chapter 1, section 1.4). The research results
could have general relevance for technological-environmental controversies, in particular for
precautionary regulation, and for national regulatory styles.
The initial plan was to analyse GMO regulation by juxtaposing it with a quasi-official
procedure for selecting the Best Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO). The RCEP
(1988) had recommended the BPEO procedure for integrated pollution control, as part of its
more general argument for precautionary regulation. The RCEP intended the BPEO to make
value judgements more publicly transparent and accessible, while deferring such judgements
until after an investigative phase -- in effect, maintaining the fact/value distinction. So the
BPEO procedure seemed a useful reference point for studying how value judgements arise in
GMO regulation (see Chapter 5, section 1.1).
Eventually the BPEO procedure seemed less important than originally expected, for both
contingent and theoretical reasons. As it turned out, the RCEP did not mention the BPEO
procedure in its proposals for precautionary regulation of GMO releases (RCEP, 1989), nor in
its subsequent proposals for a risk-identification method, Genhaz (RCEP, 1991).
Nevertheless, the latter proposal did include a type of public transparency, similar to the
BPEO procedure (see Chapter 8, section 2.2).
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While the BPEO procedure can open up issues of technology assessment, GMO regulation
tended to convert such issues into risk assessment (see Chapter 3). In Britain's GMO
legislation, the duty of care cited the BATNEEC criterion, which would form part of any
BPEO procedure; for GMO releases, however, BATNEEC had an ambiguous meaning, with
little apparent bearing upon technological choices. More fundamentally, the BPEO procedure
is a variant of 'rational' decision-making models, which have become a collective target of
critical social scientists.
Their theoretical critiques of safety regulation seemed particularly relevant to my research
questions, in overlapping ways (see Chapter 1, section 2). For analysing value judgements,
the official fact/value boundary has been theorized as a social construct, embedded in a
procedural rationalism or procedural rationality (e.g. Wynne, 1982; Schwarz & Thompson,
1990). For analysing the interactions among social actors, the regulatory procedure has been
theorized as a distinctive national form of regulatory style or political culture (e.g. Vogel,
1985; Brickman et al., 1985; Jasanoff, 1986; O'Riordan & Wynne, 1987). For analysing the
attempt to reduce scientific uncertainty, 'uncertainty' itself has been theorized as both a cause
and outcome of controversy (see Chapter 1, section 2.3); some have analysed the dynamics of
'policy-relevant science', also called 'mandated' science (e.g. Jasanoff, 1986, 1990; Salter,
1988).
All those theories can help illuminate recurrent patterns through which actors seek social
legitimacy for a decision-making procedure. This chapter will describe the research methods
and sources which I used to study these features of GMO regulation.
2.0 CASE-STUDY METHODS
This section elaborates upon the research methods which bear upon the validity and wider
relevance of this case study -- for example, to precautionary regulation, procedural
rationality, and political cultures. Although there exists no definitive 'case-study method',
there are well-documented methods for investigating qualitative patterns of social dynamics.
The following sub-sections discuss: testing theories; interpreting actions; and decoding 'risk'.
2.1 Testing theories
Extending arguments of early social anthropologists, a sociologist has noted that a case study
does not consider each case as a representative sample, unlike a quantitive study. Rather,
from each set of events, certain social processes are abstracted for analysis. In implying some
relevance to other cases, 'the extrapolation is in fact based on the validity of the analysis
rather than the representativeness of the events.... A case study is essentially heuristic; it
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reflects, in the events portrayed, features which may be construed as a manifestation of some
general abstract theoretical principle' (Mitchell, 1983: 190-92). Because a system is always
responding to external forces, predictions from studying it tend to be theoretical rather than
empirical; the case becomes a way to study those influences, which by definition have wider
implications of some kind (ibid.: 205).
According to a commentary on Mitchell's argument, 'It is clear that the case is an event which
exemplifies because it is taken for granted that the real focus of interest is the underlying
social structures which generate the event; note, however, that these structures might to other
writers constitute the "case" (Platt, 1988: 5). In that sense, no case can be entirely typical or
atyptical, though its wider relevance depends upon how one defines the crucial features.
Exactly how does a case demonstrate the social structures behind events or institutions? It is
suggested that the case serves as 'a social barium meal, whose progress through the system
illuminates it' (ibid.: 10). This medical analogy presupposes a ready-made meter to detect the
social equivalent of radiation signals emanating from a discrete social body, now made
transparent. For a research method, however, partly at issue is how to define the boundary of
the system, and how to interpret its signals, especially the symbolic meanings which may
inform or even motivate actions (see later subsections).
Regarding its wider analytical relevance, the case of GMO regulation might be considered a
special, 'atypical' one. After all, it was Britain's first attempt to provide a statutory basis for
precautionary risk regulation, for a new technology whose status as 'progress' came under
political challenge from the very start. The wider relevance of this case may depend partly
upon how those features recur in other regulatory efforts. Equally, those combined features
of GMO regulation might well serve to highlight difficulties which arise subtly (though less
obviously so) in risk regulation more generally.
How might this case hold some wider theoretical relevance? For example, one can test a
theory by choosing a case most likely to confirm it; if the case results show the opposite, then
the theory itself requires modification, according to the afortiori principle (ibid.: 17).
Although this study was not designed to disprove a theory by counter-example, it is worth
considering the afortiori principle here, from several angles:
* Given the precautionary character of GMO regulation, one might expect this case in
particular to defy any BPEO-type 'rational' procedure, which is supposed to defer value
judgements until after a preliminary stage of fact-finding. GMO regulation did indeed
undermine that stereotypical sequence. Such a result would come as no surprise to social-
science researchers who investigate how the official stereotype of risk assessment always
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conceals its constitutive values. As a precautionary case, GMO regulation may have wider
significance for the following features: the flexibility of the factJvalue boundary, regulators'
vulnerability to industry attack, the potential for democratic participation, and the apparent
political neutrality of regulatory decisions.
* Given the early public disputes over how to conceptualize GMOs, and the subsequent
industry attacks upon the regulatory system as 'irrational', one might expect this case to
provide ideal material for confirming a theoretical model of antagonistic rationalities (e.g.
Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). Insofar as my conclusions contradict models of a distinct
technical-procedural rationality, this case casts doubt upon the general relevance of such
theoretical models, though it also suggests recasting them.
* Given that GMO regulation imposed an unprecedented statutory basis for precautionary
regulation and for information disclosure, one might expect this case to transform Britain's
regulatory political culture, i.e., its consultative procedure for reaching an apparent consensus
among selected insiders. Yet GMO regulation was anticipating and even pre-empting protest,
prior to any high-profile controversy in Britain. If the familiar British pattern is extended, as
in this study, then the wider theoretical significance remains open to interpretation. At the
very least, this case should lead us to doubt whether the characteristic national style ever
depended fundamentally upon voluntary regulation and confidentiality.
2.2 Interpreting actions
In a world pre-interpreted by its human producers, the meanings developed by active subjects
enter into the constitution of that world (Giddens, 1976: 146). This thesis analyses the
symbolic meanings which inform the strategic action. By studying the actors' own language
and stated aims, this study sought to avoid common pitfalls in social-science research.
In particular, some research has been criticized for conflating a 'meaningful act' with an
'intended outcome', and neglecting 'the origins of the purposes that actors endeavour to
realize' (Giddens, 1976: 156). In this regard, it is essential to understand 'the varying
definitions of the situation held by the actors', and their hierarchy of aims (Silverman, 1970:
222, 47). Otherwise, by default, one might attribute actions to some pre-defined interest, to
their intended outcome, and/or to the needs of a system, in turn reified as a thing (ibid: 221).
By investigating the actors' diverse aims, research can more readily identify conflicting aims,
and thus analyse conflicts as contradictions, rather than as a dysfunction or a functional
incompatibility (Giddens, 1976: 128). In a superficial sense, the term 'contradiction' denotes
opposed interests. In a more complex sense, as emphasized here, it denotes a double-bind or
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self-constraint of a system, whereby pursuing one course of action generates a countervailing
or inhibitory course of action (Bottomore, 1983: 93).
In the latter sense of internal contradiction, this thesis often describes the actors' dilemmas in
reconciling various aims. Such dilemmas may be more complex than the dictionary
definition -- i.e., making a stark choice between two equally unwelcome alternatives. For
example, by downplaying ecological uncertainties which defy meaningful testing, the
regulatory system may make itself vulnerable to environmentalist criticism; yet by
highlighting such uncertainties, it may strengthen arguments for greater public participation
(see Chapter 9).
Some actors and analysts have articulated these practical dilemmas in functionalist terms. For
example, they assume that the regulatory system must 'balance' competing priorities -- such as
ensuring safety versus encouraging innovation. By diagnosing a potential 'imbalance', their
language obscures conflicts over how to define safety and innovative progress. Their
diagnosis, and implied cure, also presumes that a finely 'balanced' regulatory system could
function smoothly on behalf of society's common interest.
In response, this thesis analyses a dynamic of internal contradiction, rooted in a legitimation
crisis of technoscientific 'progress'. My analysis eschews the pretended political neutrality of
a functionalist framework, which tends to flatten contradictions into correctible dysfunctions.
If my thesis has any political utility, then it may ifiuminate how the internal contradictions of
the regulatory system can be better managed -- or, alternatively, better exploited by
biotechnology critics.
2.3 Decoding 'risk'
In this case study, the 'risk' concept warrants a content analysis of its diverse labels and
meanings. In the standard administrative sense, 'hazard' denotes a qualitative potential for
harm; 'risk' denotes a calculated 'probability x magnitude' of such harm, though risk can also
mean simply a hazard (e.g. Whyte & Burton, 1980: 1). Alongside such meanings, the same
term 'risk' may also connote social illegitimacy. As 'risk' carries diverse meanings, this thesis
analyses how the regulatory system symbolically converts unknown dangers into a
manageable, acceptable form.
Some earlier studies provide evocative examples of such analysis. Through divergent
'languages of risk', protagonists have conveyed images of disorder versus precision control;
key terms can portray an issue as a problem or as routine. Language can define the risk
problem as inadequate scientific information or as a moral choice -- even to the extent that
26
'the discourse frames the policy agenda' (Nelkin, 1985: 20-21). In a similar vein, the term
'risk' may articulate protest against an abuse of power, while lending an aura of science and
predictable calculation, unlike the term 'danger' (Douglas, 1990: 3-4). These perspectives can
be helpful for analysing languages of environmental risk, and its management, which portray
GMOs as a problem of control in various ways.
From such perspectives, there arises a methodological question: whether or how to attribute
special significance to actors' choice of term -- e.g. risk, hazard, conjectural hazard, potential
hazard (surely a tautology, given that any 'hazard' is a potential, by definition). In this study,
such terminological analysis did not seem to be warranted by any systematic patterns of
intended meaning. Nor were such patterns evident in linguistic variants, such as 'planned
introduction' and 'intentional release' of GMOs. Rather, the thesis analyses how multiple
meanings of the 'risk' concept are linked to the euphemistic renaming of 'GMOs' (see
Chapters 3 and 4).
In that regard, actors disputed whether regulatory controls would associate GMOs with
pollution, and even whether they should do so. Like risk, the concept of pollution connotes
an action which violates some accepted value system; such values are expressed in the ways a
society classifies things (argues Mary Douglas, 1975: 50-5 1). It would be illusory to expect
that a society can base its pollution fears entirely upon science, devoid of social or moral
persuasion; indeed, any form of knowledge depends upon principles of classification, arising
from social values and experience (ibid.: 242-45).
However, Douglas further argues that the symbolic meanings serve an integrative or
stabilizing function. For example, 'pollution ideas are adaptive and protective' for a society's
values (ibid.: 245). Contrary to that functionalist perspective, this study investigated how the
conceptual status of GMOs provided a symbolic terrain for accommodating and/or imposing
antagonistic social values.
All these cultural perspectives provide methods for decoding 'risk', for analysing how its
symbolic meanings inform social actors. They help illuminate regulatory dilemmas
regarding, for example, how to classify GMOs, how to overcome their stigma as suspected
pollutants, how to exercise appropriate control, how to specify the relevant uncertainties, etc.
Most striking was the perceived importance of legitimizing one's action or policy, and of
devising a procedure which could allow a favoured meaning to prevail, e.g. to portray GMOs
as normal and/or benign.
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3.0 PUBLICLY AVAILABLE MATERIALS
For studying the regulatory system for GMO releases, the period 1989-92 generated much
publicly available material, both written documents and conferences. Throughout the period,
a clippings file was compiled from the popular and scientific press.
Initially studied was Britain, in particular, the shaping of the Environmental Protection Act
Part VI (EPA, 1990). Relevant documents included the Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution 13th report (RCEP, 1989), the Department of Environment consultation paper
(DoE, 1989), and the numerous written submissions to both bodies. Prior to publishing its
13th Report, the RCEP received forty written submissions, ten of which were possible to
obtain. Almost simultaneously the Department of the Environment (DoE, 1989) published its
consultation paper and solicited replies, which were filed at the DoE library, so it was
possible to obtain copies of them all. Many of the submissions to the DoE also commented
on the RCEP report. By collating and comparing comments from those submissions, the
study was able to clarify the range of issues and concerns, as well as to compare later
positions with earlier ones.
Some of those issues came to a head as the British government finalized the Environmental
Protection Bill Part VI, whose Parliamentary debate received some press coverage. Key
documents were Hansard reports of Parliamentary proceedings, including proposed
amendments from MPs. Their amendments could be traced to lobbying documents, which I
was able to obtain from industry and public-interest groups; also, the latter groups held a
briefing meeting before the House of Lords debate on Part VI. This material is discussed
mainly in my thesis Chapters 5 and 6.
This study did not extend to a detailed analysis of the Regulations, i.e. the secondary
legislation for implementing the Environmental Protection Act Part VI. The Regulations
underwent two major redrafts (DoE/.HSC, 1991, 1992) before being finalized and taking
effect in February 1993 (DoE/MAFF, 1992). Until that time, the regulatory authority
remained the HSE, under the Department of Employment, which provided little information
on GMO releases.
Other documents pertained more to risk-assessment methods and research. These included
official guidelines (ACGMJHSE, 1986, 1990), an additional report by the Royal Commission
on their proposed risk-assessment scheme, Genhaz (RCEP, 1991), unpublished briefs for risk-
assessment research (DoE, 1991; Prosamo, 1989), and reports of research findings. A series
of international conferences was held in order to share results of biosafety research and to
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discuss common standards (e.g. MacKenzie and Henry, eds, 1990; Casper and Landsmann,
eds, 1992). These documents are discussed mainly in Chapter 8.
Several conferences in Britain provided occasions for hearing and querying regulatory actors.
These included the following:
* April 1990, London, HSEIDoE/BIA conference on biotechnology regulation (CBC, 1990);
* June 1990, London, Society of the Chemical Industry conference on risk assessment for
GMOs; and
* August 1991, Nottingham, Regern 2 conference on risk- assessment research for microbial
GMOs, following up Regem 1 (Sussman et al., 1988; Stewart-Tull and Sussman, 1992;
Levidow, 1992a).
For links between Britain and the European Community, the EC Deliberate Release Directive
(CEC, 1988; EEC, 1990) set parameters for Britain's legislation long before both were
finalized and enacted. Industry lobbyists published glossy brochures (e.g. GIBiP, 1989,
1990; SAGB, 1990), intended to influence the Directive or its implementation, particularly
how it would be superseded by product legislation, e.g. the pesticides directive (EEC, 1991).
These efforts are discussed mainly in Chapters 4 and 9.
My attendance at three additional conferences provided an international perspective:
* November 1990, Montreal, 'Biotechnology and the Environment: Managing the Risks';
* May 1992, Brussels, DGXI information seminar on implementation of EC directives
90/220 and 90/22 1;
* June 1992, The Hague, 'The First Biotechnology Europe Conference: Products, Regulators,
and Politics' (see my combined report in Levidow, 1992b).
The USA's regulatory system became a frequent reference point in the EC debate, though this
debate glossed over the USA's difficulties. For my study of the USA, relevant documents
were available from the US executive office (OSTP, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1992; BWG/Quayle,
1991), from regulatory agencies (e.g USDA/APHIS, 1987; USDA, 1991; BSAC/EPA, 1990),
and from regulators justifying their policy. Also instructive was my attendance at two
conferences there:
* November 1990, Washington, D.C., 'Biotechnology: Agriculture and Environment', a large
quasi-public meeting of activists; and
* June 1991, Sacramento, 'Biotechnology at the Crossroads', a conference of the US
biotechnology academic-industrial complex (as reported in Levidow, 1991b).
The US material is discussed mainly in Chapter 4, and somewhat in Chapter 7, section 1..
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OECD reports were relevant for documenting differences in national regulatory approaches
(OECD, 1990a), and in attempting to overcome them. The initial 'blue book' (OECD, 19.86)
was followed by detailed risk-assessment guidelines (OECD, 1990b), ultimately published as
an expanded blue book (OECD, 1992), and supplemented by a survey of transgenic plant
releases (OECD, 1993).
In a category of semi-public documents, I obtained copies of several applications to release
GMOs; these came from ICI Seeds, as well as from government-funded research institutions
(AFRC at Rothamstead, IVEM-NERC at Oxford, and John Innes Institute at Norwich,
formerly Cambridge). Unfortunately, in no case did I request an application prior to a
relevant interview. I hesitated to press for these documents early on, lest I jeopardize the
interviewees' trust, at a time when industry was criticizing proposals for broad information
disclosure as a threat to commercial confidentiality. In retrospect, my hesitation was
probably Over-cautious, unnecessarily losing the opportunity to discuss these applications in
interviews. Nevertheless it was instructive to read the applications, especially regarding how
they accommodated requests for evidence of safety.
Near the formal end of the study, I requested the IVEM (1991a, 1991b) application for their
proposed release of a viral insecticide, after learning this had encountered difficulty within
ACRE. I chose this proposal for more detailed study, mainly by telephone mini-interviews,
even though the particular GMO set it quite apart from other GMO releases in Britain. For
similar reasons, I focused upon a trial release of a herbicide-resistant crop after learning that it
had provoked some public protest, unusually in Britain. As discussed in Chapter 7, the two
episodes illustrate the tensions managed by the regulatory system.
4.0 INTERVIEWS
During 1990-9 1 I conducted sixty interviews with key individuals involved in shaping the
risk regulation for GMO releases, particularly in its transition from a voluntary to statutory
basis. Some interviews were conducted jointly with Joanna Chataway, as part of her research
project on 'Strategic R&D Decision-Making in Biotechnology', and/or with Joyce Tait, who
supervised both projects. For reasons described earlier (section 2), the interviews sought to
clarify the aims of regulatory actors, as a way of investigating their interactions and the role
of value judgements.
4.1 Selection of interviewees
Interviewees were selected according to their key roles, especially their responsibility to
develop and promote an organization's policy. They included civil servants, their scientific
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advisors, other scientists responsible for risk-assessment research, industry officials,
Parliamentary lobbyists, and public-interest groups.
The British interviewees came from the following categories:
* civil servants: DoE, HSE, Dli, MAFF;
* members of their advisory committees: ACGM, IISC, ACRE;
* industrialists from biotechnology companies: IC! Seeds, Unilever, Nickerson Seeds
International, Agricultural Genetics Company, Shell (some individuals overlapping with the
previous category);
* industry-wide regulatory officers: Confederation of British Industry (CBI), Chemical
Industries Association (CIA), British Society of Plant Breeders (BSPB), Bio-Jndustry
Association (BIA);
* scientists involved in risk research: Prosamo, Genhaz (of the RCEP);
* dual members of the RCEP and House of Lords;
* public-interest groups which attempted to influence the regulation: the Green Alliance,
Genetics Forum, Trades Union Congress (TUC), and Association of Metropolitan Authorities
(AMA); and other such groups which attempted to generate wider public debate on GMO
releases: Norfolk Education and Action for Development (NEAD), and Greenpeace.
For the EC context, interviewees included officers from the European Commission's DGXI
(Environment) and DGXII (Science, Research and Development), the European Parliament's
Environment Committee, and the OECD's Environment Directorate. EC-level industry
lobbyists included the Senior Advisory Group on Biotechnology (SAGB), which arose from
the chemical industry; and Groupement International des Associations Nationales de
Fabricants de Produits Agrochimiques (GIFAP), which represents pesticides companies. For
comparing the EC and UK with the USA, interviewees included officials from the EPA and
USDA.
When this research project was designed, it was uncertain how many prospective interviewees
would accept my request and what information they would divulge. Particularly important
were members and departmental assessors on Britain's advisory committees (ACGM, its
subcommittee IISC, succeeded by ACRE). Formally they were bound by the Official Secrets
Act, as well as commercial confidentiality; yet, as it turned out, some committee members
were so forthcoming that it seemed worthwhile to interview more than twenty of them. Of all
my requests for interviews, the few refusals came from front-bench Parliamentarians, who
were understandably busy, and from two IISC members who were retiring from both the
committee and from their full-time employment.
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Much later I learned that the ACRE Secretariat had asked all members to redirect our requests
back to those government officers, for reasons of confidentiality. Fortunately for this study,
most members ignored the Secretariat's advice. It was almost as if the members were selected
for, and were already acting upon, an ethos of public access -- even at this early stage, before
the regulatory system had established rules for information disclosure, which were not
implemented until 1993. As one ACRE member commented after an interview, 'I am glad
that someone is recording these events for posterity.'
I undertook to cite interviewees' comments on a non-attributable basis, unless otherwise
agreed later (e.g. by Julie Hill of the Green Alliance). Many interviewees were women, so I
generally maintain their anonymity by using the male gender, 'he'. Of course, some
individuals might be identifiable by comparing their interview comments here with their
public statements.
In Chapters 6-9, interviewees in Britain are identified by a category code, as follows:
* ACRE members: Ci-C4 (CBI nominees), T1-T2 (TUC nominees), Si-S 12 (other specialist
members), Dl -D7 (departmental assessors);
* Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution members: R1-R2;
* Officers of companies, industry-wide organizations or DTI: 11-18.
4.2 Interview method and analysis
This study investigated how the actors conceptualized their actions within their own means-
ends (cause-effect) models of how the world works. In particular, my questions asked how
they could best influence the regulatory system and thus biotechnology more generally. In
this way, the study could connect regulatory procedures and outcomes to actors' diverse
intentions, which could be depicted in cognitive maps (see section 5). The documents
mentioned earlier (in section 4.1) provided a useful basis for formulating interview questions
and for interpreting the interviewees' comments.
I designed a standard set of questions for each interviewee category, such as regulatory
advisors, industry lobbyists, public-interest groups. In some cases, such as biosafety
researchers, the interview questions were specially designed for each individual. Interviews
were semi-structured; the planned order of questions had an internal logic, though sometimes
I adjusted them to each interviewee's responses.
The questions were designed for interviewees to give meaningful replies without necessarily
divulging details of particular GMO releases or committee discussions. Nevertheless,
sometimes the interviewee volunteered such details, and sometimes my follow-up questions
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elicited more. In retrospect, my interview approach may have been over-cautious, as was my
delay in requesting copies of GMO release applications.
Generally I requested a two-hour interview as a reasonable time period for replying to my
standard questions; most interviewees vaguely and/or reluctantly agreed in advance to that
request, though most turned out to give me at least that much time. Aware of the time
constraints, I was constantly having to decide whether to pursue a point or move on to other
ones. When a question elicited an awkward or cryptic reply, it might have been more tactful
to move on; however, sometimes pursuing the point yielded striking results, which otherwise
might have been foregone. Even in retrospect it is difficult to know which approach would
have been best.
Most interviews were tape-recorded and then transcribed; only two interviewees objected to
being tape-recorded (IVEM-NERC and DGXI). Transcripts were then analysed by two
different means: by collating different interviewees' comments on the same issue, and/or by
constructing cognitive maps for some of them, particularly for regulators, their advisors and
industry officials (see following section). Then, from individual maps of the advisory
committee members, I constructed composite maps on particular aspects, which relate to
Chapters 6-9.
5.0 COGNITIVE MAPPING
The term 'cognitive mapping' can refer to various diagrams for depicting cause-effect
relationships. These include, for example, influence diagrams with feedback loops, which
present the researcher's models of institutional dynamics. In this study the term refers to a
different type, known as a 'causal reasoning' map, which describes actors' own understanding
of how the world is organized. These relatively simple maps facilitate comparing different
actors' views, though that same feature does not lend itself very well to visualising perceived
points of uncertainty and contradictory forces (Huff, 1990: 28-31).
5.1 Individual maps
Cognitive mapping was originally developed in operations research, by consultants involved
in helping an organization to explore the problems that it faces; the resulting maps attempt to
clarify the 'messiness' of those problems (Eden et al., 1983). Such maps indicate how an
organization's managers conceptualize their role: 'The manager is taken to be involved in the
psychological construction of the world rather than the perception of an objective world'; in
that sense, 'action arises out of the meaning of situations', which may vary for different
individuals. By taking 'language as the common currency of organizational life', cognitive
33
mapping can help clarify different languages or different meanings of similar language (Eden,
1989: 23, 25).
Paid consultancy has used cognitive mapping as an integral part of an interview, so that the
map can be developed interactively between interviewer and interviewee. That time-
consuming process has been feasible where the client organization is seeking a counselor's
advice on how to handle its problems.
In our different context, using cognitive mapping for social-science research, a two-hour
interview was barely enough time to explore the planned interview questions. To construct a
map simultaneously, I would have required much more interview time and/or a two-person
team. Therefore I decided to concentrate on listening, taking notes and asking follow-up
questions during the interviews.
Also unlike a consultancy context, my interviews were directed more at the research
questions, especially concerning interactions among socio-political forces. The research
context is reflected in the cognitive maps, where often a cause-effect relationship spans
different institutions. The maps cannot help but oversimplify complex views but do help to
make instructive comparisons.
The cognitive map identifies and arranges 'concepts' from the interview, so as to indicate how
each actor locates their his/her purposeful action within a model of cause-effect relationships.
As indicated in the simplified mini-example provided below: ideas (or 'concepts') are
arranged in a hierarchical format, leading from lower-level options to higher-level outcomes;
arrows link the options to the goals (dotted lines indicate implicit links between concepts);
when warranted by the interview, the negative pole of a concept is indicated after three dots
(...), meaning 'rather than'; a negative sign attached to an arrow indicates that the lower-level
option links to the negative pole of the higher-level concept.
The previous paragraphs are illustrated by a simple three-concept map:
obtain material
for broad-
ranging map
cover essential
points within
limited time
do map afterwards
during interview
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Usually each map was done first with paper-and-pencil, in order to see how best it could fit as
sub-sections into the COPE computer software. I had access only to the early software,
whose grid was limited to eight columns of concepts (Eden, 1988; Eden et aL, 1985). I found
the software helpful more for printing out the map than for deciding its structure. This was
because the software did not allow the user to save or revise the map structure; it saved only
the list of concepts.
From all those standpoints, I later found the MacDraw program more helpful. Most maps in
this thesis were done or redone on that program (except Map 6.9, composite map on public
access). The thesis includes only a few of the individual maps, and only an excerpt from each
one, mainly for reasons of the space needed to explain an entire map.
Each map was sent for checking to the respective interviewees. Some returned it with minor
corrections, and none of them objected to the dotted lines, indicating presumed links.
However, most did not reply at all; one interviewee mentioned, in person, some difficulty in
understanding the map of his own interview.
It should be acknowledged that the researcher has some discretion in converting the
interviewee's comments into a cognitive map, i.e. into an action strategy as s/he perceives it
(Eden, 1989: 29). This is true especially if constructing the map after the interview. For
example, when an interviewee described some aspect of the regulatory process with implicit
approval, I often took the liberty of representing that description as a prescription. In some
cases the interviewee expressed ambivalence -- 'on the one hand and on the other' -- which
does not lend itself very well to the map's logical cause-effect format.
The fmal set of interviews were mainly with ACRE members who had not served on its
predecessor committee. At this stage, I did not construct a new map for each individual;
rather, I scanned the transcripts for points to collate with the earlier interviews, more than for
points to map. Perhaps as a result, ambivalent or ironic comments became more noticeable,
than in the earlier transcripts.
5.2 Composite maps
When the researcher inter-relates the individual cognitive maps, there potentially arises
another difference between operations research and social-science research. In the former
case, the consultant looks for overlaps among the concepts in different individuals' maps, so
as to link them (e.g. Eden, 1989: 35). This procedure can identify intersecting problem-
definitions and avoid misunderstandings, thus helping to improve the organization's internal
coherence.
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In a similar vein, social-science research has used cognitive mapping to draw out the shared,
implicit assumptions of an organization, whose internal differences concerned minor nuances
(Hamwee et al., 1990). As in paid consultancy, here the composite map can clarify the
internal coherence of an organization.
My study, however, featured different problem-definitions among social actors, and different
meanings of similar language. When I was attempting to merge the individual maps into
composite maps, it was essential to depict divergences as well as convergences. As a result,
the form of composite map depends upon the particular aspect at issue.
In the simplest case, the composite map indicates complementary options which lead to
shared goals -- for example, as ACRE members seek to keep all GMO releases publicly
acceptable (Map 6.8). Another map depicts apparent agreement on information access, but
this entails somewhat different alms for whether or how the access should influence R&D
priorities (see Map 6.9).
In a more complex map, the same concept has quite divergent rationales but which are
somehow accommodated within a consensual regulatory procedure; in particular, initial
precautions 'contain perceived risks' (see Map 7.1). Further maps depict more divergent
views, e.g. regarding whether or how additional scientific knowledge can minimize the need
for value judgements (see Map 8.1). Moreover, the same map depicts scientific uncertainties
in stereotypical 'rational' sequence, if only to emphasize that the value judgements may run in
the reverse sequence as well; the map should be read from the bottom up, but then also from
the top down (and juxtaposed with Table 8.1).
Another kind of composite map depicts interviewees using similar language whose practical
meanings become incompatible, as shown in distinct sectors of the map. A common
regulatory slogan, 'regulate the product, not the process', has divergent meanings for how to
obtain market approval (see Map 9.1).
In these ways, the composite maps can clarify different aims or meanings which might
otherwise remain hidden within a common language. Variant structures for a composite map
become appropriate, depending upon the shape of convergent and divergent views. Such
interpretations are possible, provided the analysis becomes freed from the consultant's task of
merging or reconciling different problem-definitions.
The maps are also included in the list of Figures on page v. Each map is discussed in the•
corresponding chapter.
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Chapter 3
BIOTECHNOLOGY AS ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
GMO regulation was being formalized in Britain and the EC in the late 1980s, a period of
heightened environmental controversy. How would biotechnology intersect with the
'greening' of politics? How was the risk problem defined? Which uncertainties were
emphasized? How were value conflicts expressed? What kinds of previous experiences were
cited as most relevant for anticipating the effects of GMO releases?
This chapter analyses how GMOs were portrayed as an environmental promise or threat.
Although referring to an international context, the survey emphasizes protagonists mainly in
Britain. Whenever appropriate, the analysis relates symbolic language to modes of control
and social organization (see Chapter 1, section 2.0). In particular the chapter analyses:
* the rhetorical greening of biotechnology, via contentious metaphors of control (section 1);
* strategic perspectives and dilemmas of public-interest groups (section 2); and
* the issues of control which underlay the 'risk' debate (section 3).
1.0 THE GREENING OF BIOTECHNOLOGY?
On the surface, the environmental debate concerned whether and/or how to permit GMO
releases. More fundamentally, it concerned whether the biotechnological project should be
accepted as progress, whose effects would be divisible into distinct risks and benefits.
Scenarios of potential harm went beyond physically measurable effects, to encompass features
which some proponents regarded as beneficial. (For more detailed references to this section,
see Levidow and Tait, 1991; Levidow, 1991a.)
Biotechnologists sought to 'industrialize agriculture' (GIBiP, 1990), while critics attacked
them for aiming 'to convert agriculture into a branch of industry' (Haerlin, 1990) -- in reality,
a conversion long since underway. Put more starkly, enthusiasts emphasized the 'risks', even
the immorality, of failing to adopt biotechnological solutions essential for humanity's welfare
(e.g. Taverne, 1990: 42), while some critics attributed 'risks' to biotechnology as such.
In particular, GMOs were cast as a violation of nature, which may then run out of control.
Environmentalists warned against opening a Pandora's Box of GMOs (Whe ale and McNally,
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1990) -- a suitable analogy for putative gifts which wreak disorder; similarly GMO releases
would plant an 'ecological time bomb', by analogy to some non-indigenous organisms
(Hatchwell, 1989). Amidst these fears of nature running out of control, moreover, GMOs also
symbolized invisible institutional forces controlling our lives, as in other technological
controversies (cf. Wynne, 1980: 285).
Biotechnologists counterposed a language of precision control. Their molecular-level
intervention would make GMOs' behaviour even more predictable than the products of earlier
techniques, such as cross-breeding, which improved strains of useful organisms by directed
selection from natural variation. By comparison to those techniques, genetic modification
offered even greater improvements: GMOs embodied a precision control, while retaining
proximity to natural processes and domesticated organisms (e.g. Sussman et al., 1988: 290,
296; AoA, 1989: 2).
On this basis, industry promised 'environment-friendly' products, reliably kept under benign
control, yielding up nature's cornucopia for society's benefit. GMOs offered us precisely
programmed, evolutionary extensions of naturally efficient organisms which would reduce the
need for harmful chemical inputs in agriculture. These metaphors of control -- software,
evolution and efficiency -- are not merely rhetorical; they express the biotechnological
reconstruction of nature as a mode of control. They also provide an entry point for analysing
different accounts of the risk problem.
1.1 GMOs as reprogrammed software
In a survey on the public understanding of science, less than half the respondents associated
DNA with living things, and seven per cent associated it with computers (Durant et al.,
1989). Although technically 'incorrect', such ideas may derive from industry's reduction of
organic matter to programmable, interchangeable chemicals. Through a computer metaphor,
life becomes reducible to a universal genetic 'code' which can be read, copied and edited
(Yoxen, 1981: 69; Yoxen, 1983: 32-37).
Biotechnology enhances control by isolating and manipulating molecular-level components,
as industrial chemists had already done with chemical 'building-blocks'. Molecular
intervention reprograms life, in a manner analogous to running software on a computer. To
ensure that a gene is expressed only where intended, biotechnologists construct and then insert
genetic 'cassettes', a term which has entered common parlance (e.g. BBC, 1990: 5).
This project encourages a fantasy of technological omnipotence, blurring the distinction
between science fiction and science. As one biotechnology publicist claimed, '... if we have
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the imagination and resources, there is almost no biological problem we cannot solve'
(Taverne, 1990: 4). This self-confidence derives from the prospect of selectively transferring
genes which 'encode life's processes' (ibid.), as if nature were reducible to coded information.
However, the computer metaphor for DNA has been contentious, especially where genetic
engineering crosses species barriers. Some critics portrayed DNA as sacred, as an 'essence of
life', whose molecular recombination transgresses the unity of living things and thus threatens
disaster (F&FS, 1989). Similarly, the World Council of Churches (WCC, 1989) regarded 'the
integrity of creation' as threatened by the mechanistic woridview of biotechnology.
The biotechnological claim to precision control also encountered scientific sceptics. A
leading ecologist argued that precise genetic changes do not guarantee precise prediction of
ecological characters, for several reasons: genes have pleiotropic effects; a particular gene
may turn out to interact with others, altering characters of ecological importance (Williamson,
1988). Moreover, 'the distinction between a crop and a weed is very narrow'; it depends upon
poorly understood genetic and environmental differences. Indeed, a slight change in its
environment can turn an innocuous organism into a pest (Williamson et aL, 1990).
In early scientific debates, ecologists suggested that the products of traditional breeding
techniques are less relevant precedents for GMOs than the introduction of 'exotic' (non-native)
species, some of which have displaced native species (see Chapter 1, section 1.2). This
analogy was taken up by Britain's Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. Even
where a GMO is derived from an organism already well characterized in a particular
environment, some genetic change might warrant calling it a 'non-native' organism, argued the
Commission (RCEP, 1989: 21).
Thus critics challenged the software metaphor by emphasizing complex interactions within
living systems vulnerable to ecological disturbance. While some overtly denounced
biotechnology as unethical, ecologists' warnings also provided an implicit ethical stance. And
these warnings provided some opportunity for promoting holistic concepts of the risk
problem, either within scientific ecology or beyond it.
1.2 GMOs as accelerated evolution
In the 1970s, when new biotechnology firms were seeking large injections of venture capital,
enthusiasts proclaimed that this new technology would transform our way of life; they drew
analogies to both the industrial and information revolutions (examples cited in Tait et al.,
1990). By the late l980s some enthusiasts were still issuing revolutionary proclamations (e.g.
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Taverne, 1990). However, such language became more characteristic of science journalists, in
the form of futuristic phrases like 'brave new botany' (Buck, 1989).
Generally promoters of biotechnology came to reserve the language of total novelty for more
selective occasions, e.g. in arguments for extending patent rights to GMOs, or in appeals for
government funds. According to a leading science advisor, for example, 'the biological
revolution' presents opportunities and challenges for Britain 'to survive in a hostile
competitive society [world]'; therefore funding priorities must ensure that Britain's agricultural
research strengthens its base in molecular biology (Stewart, 1989: 4-7).
In public discourse, the promoters' language largely shifted from biological revolution to
evolution. Biotechnology was presented as a modest extension of traditional methods: 'For
centuries biotechnology has been used in the development of products -- the conversion of
barley to beer for instance' (Id, 1989: 3), Thus the term 'biotechnology' was stripped of the
novelty associated with the term 'genetic engineering'.
In a similar vein, the genetic alteration itself was renamed. Until 1989, official documents
and regulatory bodies in Britain generally referred to genetic 'manipulation', sometimes used
interchangeably with 'engineering' (e.g. DoE, 1989). Given the sinister nuance of those terms,
they were replaced by 'modification', which presents GMOs as a modest evolutionary step.
The official term changed when draft legislation was published by European Community and
then by Britain (CEC, 1988; HC Bill 14, 1989).
This terminological shift can be understood partly as a response to public fears -- about novel
organisms degrading the environment or about industry controlling human destiny. The shift
formed part of an attempt to overcome doubts over whether the effects of GMO releases
would be adequately controlled -- that is, reliably predictable and socially beneficial.
Complementing the software metaphor for GMOs, the 'evolution' metaphor now classified
them as a familiar, benign control of nature.
Such evolutionary language has relevant antecedents in earlier ideas of nature, which was
anthropomorphized as a 'selective breeder'. In the late eighteenth-century concept of
evolution, such personification of Nature implied that nature 'could do something as conscious
as select'. Moreover, as the Enclosures transformed the social meaning of agricultural land,
'any positive conception of a just society... was replaced by new and ratifying concepts of a
mechanism and market' (Williams, 1980: 73, 79).
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In a similar vein, biotechnologists have literally invested nature with metaphors of computer
programs and industrial efficiency, while presenting their reconstruction as a discovery of
genetic properties. Not merely rhetorical, evolutionary language both expressed and
naturalized the values by which biotechnology reconstructs living matter. This language
eternalized 'biotechnology' as an accelerated selection of 'natural' qualities. Nevertheless its
project came under attack, e.g. for violating 'natural' boundaries, or for imposing the wrong
social values.
1.3 GMOs as enhanced efficiency
In claiming to enhance agricultural efficiency, biotechnologists often took for granted a
market definition of wealth. As expressed in the metaphor, 'value-added genetics' (Lawrence,
1988: 38), the term 'efficiency' tended to denote the maximum short-term extraction of a
particular raw material. Such a meaning was implied when ICI (1989) described its
biotechnology programme as 'giving nature a nudge towards greater efficiency' (cf. Derek
Burke in NEAD, 1989a: 33). In this account, a commercial criterion of 'efficiency' was
attributed to natural selection and/or selective breeding; this efficiency is then enhanced
through a careful molecular-level control, gently accelerating the evolutionary process.
Some critics counterposed a different concept of wealth -- in particular, traditional plant
varieties, which have come under threat from agricultural practices favouring genetically
uniform strains. From this perspective, efficiency should mean optimizing the use of
biodiversity for fulfilling people's needs, as well as maintaining farmers' access to this
diversity for the future, so that they can adjust to crop failures with indigenous solutions
(NEAD, 1989b: 10). Critics foresaw commercial biotechnology weakening that capacity by
making farmers more dependent upon selling cash crops and buying laboratory-based inputs;
indeed, the latter were directed at solving the wrong problem.
In these antagonistic accounts of agricultural wealth, at issue was the social form of food
production as well as its 'efficiency'. Predicting worse food shortages in the future, ICI Seeds
declared biotechnology to be essential for feeding the world: 'New varieties of wheat were the
key to India's successful green revolution, and improved varieties of all crops will be the most
reliable and environmentally acceptable way to secure the world's future food supplies' (Pike,
1989).
On the contrary, others argued that the Green Revolution made farmers more dependent upon
expensive inputs and even dispossessed them, as they became less able to buy the
revolutionary products. Such critics foresaw biotechnology causing yet more dispossession
(NEAD, 1989b: 33). From this perspective, socio-economic forces are not merely external
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conditions which affect the distribution of benefits; more profoundly, these forces become
embedded in a particular choice of research strategy amenable to empowering multinational
corporations.
In the industrial model of agricultural efficiency, also at issue were systemic hazards, such as
the scenario of pests and diseases adapting to the single-gene defence of biotechnology
products. Critics warned that the familiar 'chemical treadmill' would be replaced or
supplemented by a 'genetic treadmill' (e.g. Genetics Forum, 1989). They criticized a short-
term view of efficiency, whereby genetic designers solve problems by intensifying the sorts of
interventions that created the problems in the first place. For some biotechnologists, this
scenario was not hazard but rather a challenge for subsequent progress; for example, a leading
research manager expressed confidence that biotechnology would always find 'technical
solutions to the technical problems of homogeneous monoculture' (interview, 8 August 1990).
1.4 Environment-friendl y
 products?
So far this chapter has analysed three contentious metaphors for GMOs -- as a reprogrammed
genome, as a modest evolutionary extension, and as an enhanced natural efficiency. By
conceptually grounding biotechnology in natural or familiar processes, these metaphors
supported industry's claim to be developing 'environment-friendly' products. Such language
also provided a natural, even ethical legitimacy for industry's stated aim of industrializing
agriculture, a tendency epitomized by herbicide-resistant crops.
As Britain's largest seeds merchant, ICI Seeds defended herbicide-resistant crops as
'environment-friendly', on behalf of the entire biotechnology industry. It argued 'that even
such a simple effect.., has much to offer.... The general concept of herbicide tolerance.., is not
new.... Such natural variation within species has always existed.' Biotechnology now offered
the opportunity to extend that variation to more plants, by designing selective tolerance into
the crop species, rather needing to find selective herbicides. Moreover, they argued, 'By
encouraging the development of more efficient systems of integrated weed control, the cost of
food production will be contained at the present low levels', while reducing dependence upon
herbicides (Bartle, 1991). This scenario appealed to the key metaphors discussed earlier: a
precise genetic reprogramming of a modest, single-gene evolutionary modification, offering
enhanced efficiency.
In opposing this R&D priority, critics emphasized risks which arise from ecological and
agronomic uncertainties of herbicide-resistant crops. These scenarios included, for example,
the spread of herbicide-resistance genes to weedy relatives of the crop, or more widespread
use of a particular herbicide, in turn intensifying selection pressure for resistant weeds. The
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World Council of Churches described the prospect of increased herbicide usage as an
ominous example of 'intended effects' (WCC, 1989: 25).
Thus the concept of 'risk' went beyond mere accidental effects. For critics, herbicide-resistant
crops highlighted the potential of biotechnology to aggravate familiar hazards of intensive
monoculture. Such solutions would also preclude alternative methods of crop protection
(ibid.; Genetics Forum, 1989). Moreover, the crop-gene link would provide 'the ideal form of
total market control', i.e. an ominous control (Lees, 1990: 136).
As this example illustrates, the 'risk' debate linked physically measurable harm to issues of
socio-economic control and dependency. More generally, languages of risk associated GMOs
with a stigma of abnormality, implying special hazards, but also associating them with
familiar hazards of intensive monoculture. As biotechnologists explicitly sought to
industrialize agriculture, at issue was their reconstruction of nature, with its implicit model of
social organization. In questioning safety claims, critics also challenged the prevalent R&D
agendas, and so questioned whether potential effects could be divided into distinct risks and
benefits.
How, then, did various public-interest groups attempt to generate wider debate and to
influence biotechnology?
2.0 PUBLIC-INTEREST GROUPS: strategic difficulties
During the course of this study, Britain had scant public controversy on the safety of GMO
releases. Sporadic mass-media reports raised questions about particular GMOs and about
information disclosure on them generally (e.g. Erlichman, 1990; Chapter 5, section 2.6;
Chapter 7, section 3.0). A few television programmes questioned the R&D priorities of
biotechnology (e.g. BBC, 1990; BBC, 1991).
By surveying the public-interest groups which intervened in some way, this section analyses
their strategic difficulties. Many organizations in Britain expressed concerns about
environmental effects of GMO releases, but few raised these issues publicly. Friends of the
Earth made critical comments in 1988 (Lees, 1990) but proved unable to include
biotechnology among its campaigning priorities. In 1989 Greenpeace called for a total
moratorium on GMO releases but did not actively campaign for this proposal. The
organization Compassion in World Farming, with its magazine AgScene, campaigned against
genetically modifying animals and injecting bovine somatotropin into dairy cattle, but did so
mainly as an issue of animal welfare, not environment.
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A key actor offstage was the World Wildlife Fund, more recently called the World Wide Fund
for Nature; its new name indicates a conceptual shift from protecting identifiable species,
symbolized by its familiar panda logo, to protecting entire habitats. Although the WWF did
not make an issue of GMOs, it funded interventions by the Green Alliance and Genetics
Forum; together those two groups lobbied Parliament on the Environmental Protection Bill,
Part VI (see Chapter 5). Government eventually accommodated their proposed amendments
to guarantee specified information disclosure and to make the advisory committee statutory,
though not their other proposals, such as to establish a Public Biotechnology Commission for
assessing all implications of prospective products.
Also the Genetics Forum and Greenpeace, along with some other groups, formed a coalition
to oppose the patenting of 'life forms'. Their campaign against 'the ownership of life'
emphasized the commercial criteria guiding biotechnology (Patent Concern, 1991;
Greenpeace, 1991a). The coalition was responding to proposals, from the GAiT negotiations
and the European Commission, which would clarify and extend patent rights on GMOs.
Meanwhile Greenpeace formally challenged a company application to patent a herbicide-
resistance gene; the challenge cited, among other grounds, the European Patent Office rule
forbidding a patent on any product which contravenes 'public order or morality' (Greenpeace
1991b). Thus, for uniting diverse public-interest groups, patent rights seemd to provide a
clearer target than the safety issues.
Some groups regarded herbicide-resistant crops as a likely campaign target for highlighting
undesirable directions of biotechnology R&D (e.g. Pesticides TrustlGreenpeace, 1991; also
interview with Greenpeace, 31 July 1991). Such a campaign did emerge in the USA
(Goldburg et aL, 1990), where herbicide-resistant crops comprised half of all plant GMOs
being released in the late 1980s. When similar releases began in 1990 in Britain, on a more
modest scale, no protest campaign materialized (but see chapter 7, section 3.2).
For challenging the industry overall, it was even more difficult to find an effective strategy.
As the relevant groups were well aware, public opinion showed some ambivalence towards
biotechnology; many people both expected environmental benefits and feared potential risks,
partly depending upon the particular application (Connor, 1989; Highfield, 1990; Marlier,
1992). The campaign against patent rights encountered such ambivalence towards the
promised benefits of medical biotechnology, which provided early test cases of patent rights
on genes. Also, the existence of credible regulatory procedures may have also limited the
possibilities for campaigning on safety issues.
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Lastly, the biotechnology industry's green rhetoric found some resonance within an
entrepreneurial strand of environmentalism in Britain. A business consultancy,
SustainAbility, promoted the environmental benefits of biotechnology, as part of its mission to
encourage 'green capitalism' (Ellcington and Burke, 1989). In particular it advised the Danish
firm Novo Nordisk, though mainly on traditional types of biotechnology; this firm intended to
conduct no GMO releases in Europe (but see Chapter 9, section 1.2). SustainAbility's
involvement was an apparent exception which perhaps proves the rule about the stigmatized
image of the new biotechnology.
By 1991 only a few public-interest groups had attempted to influence GMO releases and/or
their regulation; these included Greenpeace, Green Alliance, Genetics Forum and NEAD. The
rest of this section analyses each group in turn. The following material is drawn largely from
interviews conducted in 1991 with officers or leading members; in some places I have
condensed quotations, which the interviewees subsequently approved.
2.1 Greenpeace
Greenpeace UK, funded mainly by individual membership subscriptions, was the only real
campaigning organization to make an issue of biotechnology in Britain. In its submission to
the DoE in 1989, Greenpeace UK called for a total moratorium on GMO releases, but it did
not campaign for that demand or intervene further in the regulatory debate. Meanwhile the
Science Director devoted some time to keeping up with developments in biotechnology.
In 1990 Greenpeace International decided to appoint a full-time staff member to prepare
campaigns against biotechnology; this appointee took up the post in late 1991, based in San
Francisco. Greenpeace thereby strengthened wider efforts to raise the patenting and
biodiversity issues. However, by 1992 it had still done no campaigning against GMO
releases, even though European industry was leaving itself more vulnerable to
environmentalist attack by undermining process-based, precautionary regulation (see Chapter
9, section 1).
Greenpeace conceptualized GMOs virtually as pollution -- as antagonistic to natural evolution
and threatening a vulnerable environment, including agriculture itself. As the Science
Director explained,
In any species, evolutionary changes have involved several parallel genetic changes on
a long timescale. Biotechnology creates single-gene changes, which are not dependent
upon an ecological balance. GMOs could reduce biodiversity and increase reliance
upon high-tech inputs; we already know that genetic uniformity has reduced plants'
resistance to disease. GMO products will be constantly pressurizing the ecosystem.
They may not only raise new hazards, but also intensify harmful processes in
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agriculture, which has been concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. GMOs divert
resources from solving the fundamental problems.... Irrespective of a precautionary
approach, GMOs fundamentally change how our society deals with nature: the risks
simply should not be taken (interview, 31 July 1991).
Greenpeace doubted that the regulatory procedure could prevent hazards: it criticized even
precautionary regulation for presuming safety and excluding wider complexities.
Science doesn't ask the right questions; it cites 'no proven damage' instead of proving
'no damage'. The present regulatory procedures cannot consider the wider effects on
agriculture. Small-scale field trials cannot answer all the important questions for risk
assessment.. For regulation of GMO biopesticides, for example, relevant expertise is
unlikely to be available under existing product legislation (ibid.). [This would soon
supplant GMO legislation; see Chapter 9, section 1.2].
For Greenpeace, their diagnosis warranted attacking the entire industry:
We will highlight the agrichemical industry's intentions and the implications of GMOs,
particularly herbicide-resistant crops, arguing that it's better to stop such developments
now, before GMOs do harm at a later stage. We will challenge the industry across
international borders. By raising the public profile of biotechnology, we can take
advantage of companies' intrinsic worry about public perception, and thus slow down
the investment and technology (ibid.).
In their view, GMOs inherently transgress evolutionary processes, and so threaten a fragile
ecological balance, including the agricultural environment. Greenpeace saw no grounds for
incurring these risks, which would mean intensifying harmful tendencies in agriculture. Only
'trial without error' was acceptable; regardless of precautionary regulation, no scientific
evidence could provide meaningful safety reassurances about self-reproducing pollutants. Yet
Greenpeace did not attempt to mobilize public unease into active opposition.
2.2 Green Alliance
According to the Green Alliance, it 'aims to raise the prominence of the environment on the
agendas of public and private institutions', particularly through Parliamentary lobbying. It has
been funded by diverse sources which include private foundations, industry subscriptions and
the DoE, for which the Green Alliance often prepares consultancy reports (Green Alliance,
1991; Dixon, 1993).
The Green Alliance organized Jeremy Rifkin's 1987 speaking tour, which it had hoped would
lead other organizations to make an issue of biotechnology, though none did so. When the
Environmental Protection Bill was published in late 1989, the Green Alliance co-ordinated
efforts to propose amendments strengthening the Bill (see Chapter 5, section 2). It obtained
funds from WWF to organize both the Rifkin tour and the Parliamentary lobbying. In April
1990 its Parliamentary officer was appointed to ACRE, the government's advisory committee
(see chapter 6, section 3.3).
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The Green Alliance regarded GMOs as inherently suspect, warranting special regulation.
Stated its Parliamentary officer, 'I feel that the fact that something has been through the
process of recombinant DNA technology distinguishes it qualitatively from almost anything
else you could call it' (CBC, 1990: 48). She later described GMO releases as a potentially
reckless activity, though adequate safety regulation could keep them safe and allow for
beneficial products:
I wish that people didn't feel the need to alter the genetic make-up of organisms and
throw them around in the environment. It's not a good idea. There is a lack of
knowledge about ecological interactions...
But I (and other environmentalists) see potential environmental benefits, as well as
potential pollution. We don't oppose GMO releases as such; we would never win such
a demand. And we would have no credibility if we called for a moratorium on GMO
releases and then demanded information disclosure (interview, 30 October 1991).
In developing precautionary regulation, the Green Alliance was carrying out its perceived
duty: 'We have always argued that environmental groups must take the responsibility to be
part of the decision-making process, for example, my role on ACRE.' At least provisionally,
this meant a commitment to the regulatory system: 'The Green Alliance would take a more
radical position against GMO releases only if the present regulatory caution became
compromised by political pressure; if something disastrous happens, then we'll have to admit
the weakness of our precautionary approach' (ibid.).
The Green Alliance regarded hazards as a problem of technical uncertainties, which might be
resolved by better scientific information, particularly through ecological research:
Genetic modification is not precise overall, for knowing what a GMO will do in the
environment; a small genetic change can cause a large phenotypic change.... My
intuition about GMOs translates into extreme caution. I wish that we didn't have to
take regulatory decisions on the basis of inadequate knowledge. There should be more
funding of pure ecological research, underpinning the risk assessment (ibid.).
By taking part in the regulatory system, the Green Alliance was committed to translating
environmentalist suspicions into technical criteria. This willingness applied even to the most
controversial case, herbicide-resistant crops:
It is not invalid for environmental groups to oppose herbicide-resistant crops for
running counter to sustainable agriculture. But I won't say that, because we are
looking for more evidence about what would actually happen in practice; it's not
reducible to technical considerations before you have experience in agronomic practice
(ibid.).
The Green Alliance saw its insider role as assisting wider political forces:
In lobbying on the Environmental Protection Bill Part VI, we engaged in the
workman-like task of getting the regulations through, with [an amendment for]
maximum information disclosure. That will help promote public debate about how
biotechnology fits into broader agricultural policy....
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We try to stimulate other, big groups to take on GMOs as an issue. Other groups are
more interested in the strategic agricultural questions; none seem very stimulated by
the risks of release per se, except perhaps Greenpeace (ibid.).
By 1992 these wider forces had hardly materialized; and neither had the information
disclosure (which was delayed until 1993). Yet some credible threat was needed in order for
industry to discuss its R&D priorities in relation to sustainable agriculture; indeed, the mere
mention of 'Greenpeace' provoked anxious responses:
Direct discussion with the industry will be practically more productive than discussion
with other public-interest groups, but you need the chimera of an opposition
movement in order for industry to feel any pressure to discuss it [sustainable
agriculture] (ibid.).
In summary, the Green Alliance regarded GMOs as potential pollutants but treated their
conceptual status as an empirical matter. It welcomed the challenge of developing
precautionary regulation, which would seek technical evidence to resolve uncertainties; this
empirical treatment could extend even to herbicide-resistant crops, which many other
environmentalists opposed on principle. The Green Alliance accepted the constraints of
operating within the terms of the regulatory system, while sharing other groups' concerns
about agronomic issues which lay beyond it.
2.3 Genetics Forum
The Genetics Forum forged a less distinctive identity of its own, as it acted as an umbrella for
several organizations and took up all aspects of biotechnology. Founded in 1988 without any
paid worker, it eventually obtained funding from the WWF to employ a part-time director in
1990, though that funding remained precarious.
The Genetics Forum (1989) located GMOs within a 'socio-economic revolution', ominous
because of the technology's power and 'continuing pressure on agriculture to become more
intensified and industrialized'. The group also saw GMOs as carrying 'inherent risks' due to
the genetic modification process itself, as well as due to ecological complexities.
Two years later, the director emphasized complex effects of genetic novelty rather than the
genetic modification process:
Classical breeding was 'dirtier' [less precise] but recombined genes only from the same
species. Genes can interact in unpredictable ways and have multiple effects; when we
combine genes from different species, even precisely, the element of genetic novelty
carries an additional set of risks. Ecosystem complexity makes prediction difficult; a
predictive science of ecology certainly doesn't exist at the moment (interview, 20 -
September 1991).
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For environmental risk assessment, the Director wanted the advisory committee to be both
more scientific and more self-conscious about its constituent value judgements: 'I have
reasonable confidence in ACRE to deal with technical risk assessment, though it should have
more representatives of environmental organizations' (ibid.). He favoured wider participation
-- so that the assessment is properly scientific, takes into account a broader range of scientific
opinion, and learns from the experience of other environmental problems.
Moreover, he argued,
Conventional risk assessment treats nature as a resource to be used and exploited for
humans' benefit; this value judgement, however, is presented as the norm of objectivity
Regulatory science should consider the purposes for which we use nature' (ibid.).
He regarded such ethical considerations as essential for making risk assessment truly
scientific, though he acknowledged that most scientists would regard his proposal as a
contradiction in terms.
In effect, the Genetics Forum sought some middle ground between the Green Alliance and
Greenpeace, as regards the proper basis for permitting GMO releases:
Most trial releases have been testing prospective products from GMOs. Our position
remains that there should be a partial moratorium, allowing releases only for scientific
purposes -- to learn more about potential hazards, not efficacy; but we are not actively
campaigning for it [a partial moratorium].
Here the Genetics Forum was attempting to define a cautious, scientifically reasonable basis
for advancing the ecological knowledge relevant to risk assessment -- learning more about
nature's vulnerability, short of commercial testing. Yet the partial moratorium remained a
notional compromise on paper; it had no means to resist the efficacy testing which drove the
regulatory system.
Earlier the Genetics Forum (1989) had warned that the 'chemical treadmill' may be replaced or
supplemented by a 'genetic treadmill' of GMOs, e.g. of pests developing resistance to
successive biopesticides. This critique was developed further:
Biotechnology is being used to pursue chemical-intensive agriculture, rather than
LISA (low-input sustainable agriculture). Even apart from herbicide-resistant crops,
there is the risk of [generating] resistance due to overuse of a particular set of genes.
We need to be careful even about those aspects of genetic modification which seem to
point towards organic agriculture. Biotech will create new [plant] varieties but with a
narrow set of inserted genes, so reducing biodiversity overall... There needs to be more
research by ecologists and agronomists on sustainable agriculture, to know what it is or
isn't; certainly it is not herbicide-resistant crops (interview, 20 September 1991).
In summary, the Genetics Forum attributed hazards of GMOs to their genetic novelty, to
ecological complexities, and to features of intensive monoculture. Its risk-assessment
proposals went far beyond integrating diverse scientific disciplines, towards ethically
evaluating the treatment of nature. This self-reflexive version of science potentially facilitated
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greater public participation, but it did not generate wider debate, much less a mass political
constituency.
2.4 Norfolk Education for Action and Development (NEAD)
As indicated by its magazine's title, Farmers' Link, NEAD developed a network of relevant
groups, including its local base of farmers and agronomists, and others in Third World
countries. NEAD promoted public debate on agricultural biotechnology, especially on
biodiversity and farmers' control, through its publications and public conferences (e.g. NEAD,
1989a, 1989b). NEAD funded that work mainly with a grant from the European
Commission's DGXII, which was promoting biotechnology R&D and 'information' campaigns
which emphasized the benefits of biotechnology. As an organization, NEAD issued no policy
statements and largely ignored safety regulation (unlike the three groups previously
discussed).
Echoing some other groups, NEAD foresaw hazards arising from the genetic novelty of
GMOs, though more so from the economic forces driving innovation:
One objective of the current biotechnology is speed, which is rarely compatible with
safety. Pushed by the profit motive, biotech speeds up breeding and substitutes
biological for chemical processes. In terms of safety, double haploids are no problem;
there are no extra ecological risks as a result. However, for GMOs, the analogy to
natural toxins is valid. Environmentalists must answer the challenge of ecological
uncertainty if we are going to live on the same planet as those who work for out-of-
control institutions (interview, 26 June 1991).
In this account, it was agribusiness rather than GMOs which might run out of control. That is,
NEAD located any hazards in the prevalent agricultural strategies:
Molecular biology is swapping [or adding] tool boxes in order to solve past problems
arising from intensive monoculture. Genetic modification speeds up the process of
genetic loss that has been brought by conventional breeding. Any hazards from GMOs
derive from the farming system into which they are put; the value or effect of genetic
modification depends on the context. There is no evidence that current developments
will produce something ecologically harmful; we don't want to make an issue of
GMOs as such (interview, 4 November 1991).
As NEAD recognized, the political system 'attempts to detach the environment from political-
development issues'; NEAD reconnected these issues, particularly by emphasizing farmers'
knowledge and control of biodiversity. It criticized industry's definition of biodiversity -- as a
negotiable proportion of genetic diversity controlled in seed banks, or a few selected genes
inserted into different plant varieties. In this vein, NEAD would flexibly evaluate
biotechnology according to its R&D agenda:
Our earlier view of biotechnology and sustainable agriculture has shifted from a
contradictory to a complementary view; they can be complementary, if we start from
50
the [agronomic] problem, not from a set of techniques that we must apply. ICI wants
to use all these techniques to make a lot of products (interview, 26 June 1991).
Overall, NEAD saw GMOs less as a problem than as a false solution. The organization
sought to raise public debate on industry's R&D priorities, rather than to campaign against
GMOs:
We take an educational approach, rather than a campaigning approach; that way, we
can continue dialogue with industry and generate a wider debate... When other
organizations (such as Greenpeace) go in hard against the industry, it opens up space
for NEAL) as reasonable, nice guys who can talk to ICI (ibid.).
In this vein, the organization promoted dialogue directly with industry, through such
encounters as 'A Day at ICI' (NEAL), 1990). It sought 'a more participatory approach, so that
we can have a real debate on technological choices before the horse has bolted' -- again, a
metaphor of agribusiness running out of control.
In summary, NEAL) regarded GMO products as a potential threat to farmers' security and
independence, more than to the environment generally. This agricultural focus left NEAD
with little basis for gaining an environmentalist constituency or for intervening in GMO risk
regulation. NEAD remained ideologically distant from those environmentalists who advise
industry on green products, but found itself by default seeking regular dialogue with industry;
it was attempting to influence R&D agendas by mediating between agricultural suppliers and
their fanner-consumers. In this effort, NEAL) regarded its political effectiveness as dependent
upon an anti-biotechnology campaign that did not materialize (e.g. from Greenpeace);
meanwhile, paradoxically, its critical approach was funded by biotechnology promoters, the
EC's DGXII.
3.0 CONCLUSIONS: 'RISK' AS CONTROL
Agricultural biotechnology was stigmatized as abnormal, portrayed as a cultural danger, and
thus turned into an environmental issue. GMOs were debated through languages of risk which
fundamentally concerned control -- i.e. GMOs as nature under a benign control, as nature out
of control, and/or as nature under a sinister control.
Each account of the problem had its own inner link between risk and benefit. On one side,
society was 'at risk' from biotechnology, which imposed a sinister control, transgressed natural
boundaries, created new pollutants, perpetuated intensive monoculture, and/or excluded
beneficial alternatives. On the other side, society was at risk from failing to reap the
indispensible benefits of biotechnology, whose environment-friendly products offered a
benign mode of controlling environmental threats to agriculture.
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To some extent, biotechnological risk became a proxy for disputing concepts of sustainable
agriculture. Biotechnologists promised to overcome the problems of chemical-intensive
agriculture by further industrializing it; critics warned against the prospect of aggravating
familiar agronomic hazards and possibly generating new ones. Partly at issue was the source
of agricultural vulnerability, which was attributed to intensive monoculture or to correctible
genetic defects. In this way, the debate concerned how to diagnose 'the injuries of the
industrially exhausted ex-nature', and how to claim legitimacy for an effective remedy, as in
risk debates more generally (Beck, 1992a: 81).
Languages of risk conveyed an implicit ethics: GMOs would enhance or degrade the
environment, even reorder or disorder nature (cf. Nelkin, 1985: 20). To some extent, these
accounts illustrate recurrent 'myths of nature' which morally justify a stance in technological
controversies (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990: 9-10, 59-61). Moreover, each environmental
model served as a rhetorical weapon for disputing the conceptual status of GMOs.
For enthusiasts, GMOs provided an environment-friendly means to yield up nature's
cornucopian potential, while overcoming environmental threats to agricultural security.
Through a set of metaphors, GMOs were cast as precisely reprogrammed organisms which
simulate and modestly enhance nature's efficiency. As a benign form of control, GMOs
warranted undertaking a trial-and-error improvement on previous agricultural progress.
For some opponents, especially Greenpeace, GMOs were virtually self-reproducing pollutants.
In this account, GMOs threatened an inherently fragile environment; new products would
weaken crops, thus necessitating yet more corrective high-tech intervention. Any error had a
potential for severe consequences, so only 'trial without error' was acceptable; this absolute
stance allowed little scope for intervening in safety regulation.
Other public-interest groups also criticized the industry's R&D priorities, though differently
linked to risk. One group advocated that safety regulators consider the environmental values
implicit in the R&D priorities, and that they restrict GMO releases to risk research; yet this
stance had no effective means to challenge the commercial forces which drove trial releases.
Another group made direct attempts at influencing the R&D priorities, while regarding safety
regulation as irrelevant.
Of all the groups which took some interest in GMO releases, only one regarded the
environmental issues as reducible to technical evidence, at least in principle. Partly funded by
government and industry, the Green Alliance made a commitment to develop precautionary
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regulation. This anticipatory effort would, in effect, ascertain the limits of perturbing nature's
stability.
With its expert-based risk as a problem of expert-based control, the safety regulation
analytically fragmented the wider control issues into risks and benefits; it largely accepted
biotechnological control as benign. The regulatory procedure developed and favoured a
specialist interdisciplinary expertise; for early trial releases in particular, hazards lay beyond
short-term sensory perception, so only science could provide the means for making potential
harm visible and interpretable (cf. Beck, 1992a: 162-63). In this way, safety regulation
marginalized concerned public-interest groups, which variously regarded GMOs as an ethical
violation, as a sinister control and/or as a socio-agronomic threat.
In their strategic thinking, these groups sought ways to make biotechnology R&D responsive
to environmentalist and farmer pressure, towards promoting sustainable agriculture. Yet they
found it difficult to generate such debate at this early stage, long before commercial products.
They saw little prospect of influencing products unless industry faced a credible threat from
overt opponents (e.g. Greenpeace), yet GMO releases met no active opposition in Britain.
How, then, did safety regulation incorporate some accounts of the risk problem, while
marginalizing others? How did it define the hypothetical harm which warranted risk-
management measures? Which 'perceived risks' did it treat as potentially real? How did
safety regulation respond to the symbolic meanings associated with GMOs, e.g. their
perceived abnormality?
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Chapter 4
PRECAUTIONARY OR PREVENTIVE REGULATION?
In many areas of environmental protection, there have been proposals to avoid the need for
remedial measures by adopting preventive ones, such as by reducing waste production at
source. There have also been calls to go beyond mere prevention, to precaution, by
anticipating hazards. Broadly spealdng, the latter means taking protective measures before
obtaining persuasive evidence of harm.
Given the disputed conceptual status of GMOs, how were these organisms classified for
regulatory purposes? How were regulatory measures justified by some account of the risk
problem? How were environmental issues translated into regulatory terms? What might
precaution mean for GMO releases?
This chapter will juxtapose the preventive/precautionary distinction with frameworks devised
for regulating GMO releases, mainly in the USA and European Community. The chapter will
discuss in particular:
* some precedents for precautionary regulation (sections 1.1);
* the 'product vs process' debate over regulating GMO releases (section 1.2);
* the US product-based regulatory framework (section 2);
* the EC's process-based regulatory framework (section 3);
* common dilemmas arising in these different frameworks (section 4).
1.0 FROM PREVENTION TO PRECAUTION
The shift from prevention to precaution can be schematically summarized as follows:
Preventive measures respond to harm already documented, e.g. by screening new products for
hazards similar to those documented for earlier generations of products; such regulatory
decisions are taken in relation to the relevant benefits and costs. By contrast, precaution
attempts to avoid hazards prior to accepted scientific evidence for their existence, or even in
advance of new products; thus safety issues can become an integral part of product
development (Tait and Levidow, 1992: 22 1-22).
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This section will survey proposals for moving from preventive to precautionary approaches,
mainly in Europe; then it will discuss their relevance to disputes over regulating GMO
releases.
1.1 Precautionary
 meanings
The precautionary principle has had diverse, controversial meanings: e.g. reducing waste
emissions at source, valuing the environment in its own right, relaxing the burden of evidence
for harm, and/or anticipating hazards not already documented. These meanings have proven
difficult to justify incorporating into policy. After all, even an inferential 'risk identification'
presumes some evidence of harm or grounds for expecting harm -- if only by analogy to some
other experience (Lowrance, 1976: 56-69).
As advocated by environmental scientists, a precautionary approach 'shifts the burden of proof
so as to give the environment the benefit of the doubt... [This approach] actually increases the
rigour of the scientific process because it is based on an understanding of the real limitations
of science' (Johnston and Simmonds, 1991).
However, even if the burden of evidence is shifted from harm to safety, there remain awkward
questions: If the aim is to prevent serious and irreversible harm, then which activities warrant
imposing precautionary measures? In the case of disputed evidence, one commentator has
asked, 'How much evidence of environmental harm is necessary to warrant precautionary
action?' As those questions receive such different answers, 'it is difficult to speak of a single
precautionary principle at all' (Bodansky, 1991). A brief survey will illustrate ambiguous
meanings of both 'preventive' and 'precautionary'.
The 'precautionary principle' found its classic statement in the Vorsorgeprinzip, formally
adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1976. Beyond remedying damage and
preventing imminent hazards, the principle required 'that natural resources are protected and
demands upon them are made with care'. According to a leading advocate, precaution
requires prevention as an end in itself; it initially accepts no economic criteria, though 'they
tend to reappear in practice'. Moreover, at least in Germany, the Vorsorgeprinzip became
cited for urging safety measures 'before damage occurs and beyond the current state of
knowledge', even for 'acting against risks which are not (yet) identifiable' (von Moltke, 1988:
58-61).
A prime site for precaution was the North Sea. As a large, complex ecosystem, it posed an
inherent difficulty for linking pollution sources with identifiable environmental effects (ibid.;
cf. Wynne, 1993). That case received a special mention in the EC's Third Environmental
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Action Programme, which advocated 'preventive measures' for ensuring 'the continued
existence of the North Sea as an important and immensely valuable ecological unit' (EEC,
1983). Here its economic value was left ambiguous, though Britain officially valued the
North Sea for its 'waste-absorbing capacity' (Holdgate, 1983: 12-13).
Like the EC's Third Environmental Action Programme, the Fourth one used the term
'preventive' and often mentioned economic criteria for safety measures. Yet it went further,
by welcoming 'the challenge to make a definitive move away from reacting to environmental
problems after they have arisen, towards a general preventive approach...', which would
'encourage the free market to operate in an environmentally rational way' (EEC, 1987: 40).
Thus the EC gave the term 'prevention' a precautionary nuance; it also appropriated the term
'rationality' for stronger environmental standards which could force technological
improvements. The Fourth EAP signalled a policy move towards 'ecological modernisation',
as one analyst has called it; this advocates using environmental protection as a spur to
technological innovation and economic growth (Weale, 1992: 75-79; Weale and Williams,
1992: 5 1-52).
In the case of acid rain, for example, the environmental damage became undeniable but the
precise source remained in dispute among EC countries and scientists. Amidst these disputes,
the German government imposed vehicle-emission standards so stringent as to favour the
catalytic converter, which German industry developed with state assistance. Following moves
to extend these environmental standards, German manufacturers gained new export
opportunities. In contrast, Britain has generally treated regulatory costs as lost income rather
than as industrial investment (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1990).
Regardless of whether these examples are called 'preventive' or 'precautionary', they suggest
how some economic or market rationale may overcome disagreements over adequate evidence
of environmental harm. Thus non-environmental factors may facilitate or even guide
environmental protection.
1.2 GMOs: product- vs process-based regulation
As in the previous examples, environmental safety measures have generally restricted the use
or disposal of substances deemed harmful. For GMO releases, however, their conceptual
status was in dispute. Not only were they designed to persist in the environment, but they
were also suspected pollutants, in several senses of the word.
Early on, international meetings had apparently agreed upon 'progressively decreasing
physical containment' of a GMO; this 'allows a logical, incremental step-wise process whereby
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safety and performance data are collected' (OECD, 1986: 29). This 'step-by-step' principle
left open the way for sharp disagreements on the following questions: What would be the
scientific criteria for applying precautions in the first place, and then for relaxing them? What
would be the proper scientific and legal basis for the state's role? And, less explicitly, how
would safety regulation affect the stigmatized image of GMOs?
Regulatory proposals included the following: to use only the existing product-based
regulation, also called 'vertical' regulation; or to establish a 'process-based' regulatory system
specially for GMOs, also called 'horizontal'; and/or to strengthen all product regulation, so
that it could encompass a broader range of environmental problems. In arguments over the
proper basis for regulating GMO releases, actors cited different scientific accounts of the
genetic novelty which may arise from the genetic modification process. This section briefly
surveys such accounts, in turn (see also my Chapter 3, section 1; Taft and Levidow, 1992;
Krimsky, 1991, Chapter 8).
According to an early key document, 'the means for assessing rDNA organisms can be
approached by analogy with the existing data base gained from the extensive use of
traditionally modified organisms in agriculture and the environment generally' (OECD, 1986:
29). This account both accepted and reinforced a prevalent view among laboratory scientists;
they portrayed GMOs as modest, precise extensions of the familiar domesticated organisms
which were undergoing the recombinant DNA process. Indeed, the inserted gene would
enhance behavioural predictability, or even reduce the GMO's fitness, according to the 'excess
baggage' hypothesis (e.g. Davis, 1987; Sussman et al., 1988: 296). According to prestigious
reports, genetic modification could not make a crop more weed-like (NAS, 1987: 14; NRC,
1989: 37-53; OECD, 1990b: 16-17; OECD, 1992: 36).
With their counter-polemics, ecologists warned that the genetic novelty could inadvertently
enhance a GMO's competitive advantage, by analogy to some non-indigenous organisms or to
some crops which had become weeds (e.g. Regal, 1985, 1990; Williamson, 1988; Fitter et al.,
1990). Leading ecologists foresaw GMOs causing unpredictable ecological effects, due to
their genetic novelty. That is, 'because many novel combinations of properties can be
achieved only by molecular and cellular techniques, products of these techniques may often be
subject to greater scrutiny than the products of traditional techniques' (Tiedje et al., 1989:
302).
Moreover, various biologists anticipated direct or indirect harm arising from the agronomic
context of GMOs. For example, GMO biopesticides might harm non-target organisms and/or
generate resistant pests (e.g. Pimentel et al., 1989). Others argued that weed-crop hybrids had
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already disrupted agriculture, in ways which some GMOs could intensify (Ellstrand and
Hoffman, 1990). Although not unique to GMOs, these hazards went beyond scenarios
anticipated by existing product regulation.
Such arguments were selectively appropriated for justifying quite different statutory
frameworks in the USA and European Community. In brief, the USA adapted existing
product legislation, classifying GMOs according to their product category. The EC enacted
new legislation specifically for GMOs, which were classified together, according to the
recombinant DNA process which produced them. These were widely labelled as the 'US
product-based' versus the 'EC process-based' frameworks.
However, the 'product vs process' labels were misleading, for several reasons:
* The genetic modification process as such was already subject to regulations for GMOs in
contained use; the new debate concerned how such organisms would be identified and
classified for the purpose of regulating their intentional release (Tait and Levidow, 1992:
224).
* In many cases a GMO release was already subject to some regulation, for example,
because it was a pesticide or contained parts of a plant pathogen. The new issue was its
'additional' regulation as a GMO. Indeed, with this term 'additional', regulators could deny
imposing 'special regulation' (as in interviews with DoE, 10 August 1990; USDA, 8
November 1990).
* The regulatory procedure considered risk-assessment criteria relating to both the product
and process: the issue was how they are considered, not whether.
In the 'product versus process' debate around GMO regulation, neither the US nor the EC
authorities cited the precautionary principle as relevant (though the British authorities did so;
see Chapter 5, section 2). Nevertheless, as will be argued later, the EC process-based system
encouraged a precautionary approach, unlike the US product-based system. Precaution has
been implicitly at stake in disputes over the following issues: what 'perceived risks' should be
investigated as potentially real, what warranted the effort of identifying and preventing such
risks, how they could be identified scientifically, what administrative system was most
appropriate for doing so, as well as for protecting biotechnology R&D from political
disruption.
The subsequent two sections will outline how all these issues arose in developing the US and
EC regulatory frameworks.
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2.0 USA: 'Risk-based regulation'
The US government took its existing product legislation as an adequate basis for regulating
GMO releases, starting with small-scale field trials. It justified that basis as 'rational' and
'scientifically sound', by specifying 'product characteristics' which could warrant subjecting an
organism to 'additional' regulation.
This section on the US regulatory system will sketch some difficulties encountered in
implementing those formal principles, particularly during 1989-92, the period of this study.
(The interviews cited below were all conducted in the same month, November 1990, but the
interview material is cited where relevant to policy changes over time.)
2.1 Co-ordinated Framework
After sporadic local protest over GMO releases in the mid-1980s, both the US government
and industry recognized the need for a comprehensive regulatory policy. Firms wanted clear
regulatory procedures and agency responsibility; they regarded 'national consistency and
international harmonization' as essential for the US industry's competitiveness (Krimsky,
1991: 193-94). According to the Industrial Biotechnology Association, industry feared the
prospect of 'local restrictive regimes coupled with Federal indecisiveness'; on the other hand,
it suspected the Federal agencies of excessive regulatory ambitions (Mackler, 1987: 33 1-32).
In response to these pressures, the US government established a Biotechnology Science
Coordinating Committee (BSCC); this recommended a 'Co-ordinated Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology', in turn promoted by the President's Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP, 1986). In administrative terms, the Framework assigned
regulatory responsibility to named Federal agencies according to a GMO's product use, and
within existing statutory powers. The three agencies were: the US Department of Agriculture
(USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA); each would operate its own scientific advisory committee. Of these
three agencies, the USDA and FDA also had a remit to promote products, while the EPA did
not.
In the Co-ordinated Framework, 'product-based' regulation had several meanings: not only the
product use, but also the biological characteristics of a GMO. The OSTP proposed two main
criteria which a Federal agency could invoke for subjecting a particular GMO to additional
regulatory oversight. The first was 'intergeneric organisms', that is, those containing DNA
from species of different taxonomic genera, which by definition could not naturally
interbreed; it was suggested that any resulting hazards could be identified and ranked, roughly
59
according to the taxonomic distance between the donor and recipient of DNA in an
'intergeneric' (transgenic) organism. The second main criterion was organisms which belong
to a pathogenic species or which contain genetic material from a pathogenic organism (OSTP,
1986).
The BSCC's chairman retrospectively celebrated the Co-ordinated Framework as follows: The
[BSCCIOSTP] policy guidelines are based on widely accepted scientific principles and
provide a stringent, yet rational, basis for regulation.' The guidelines would help Federal
agencies answer the central question of 'what [rDNA] products constitute a potential hazard,
based on a sound analysis of their genetic makeup'. On this scientific basis, 'the potential
hazards posed by recombinant-DNA technology may be identified with little difficulty and
may be managed easily at the early research stage' (Kingsbury, 1990).
However, Federal agencies encountered more than a 'little difficulty' in justifying the
nominally initial step of risk identification. A closer look at the USDA and EPA will
illustrate their problems in implementing 'rational' regulation as defined by the OSTP. (The
following account omits the FDA because it had no regulatory authority for any live GMOs
being released during this period, 1989-92.)
2.1.1 US Department of Agriculture (USDA): screening plant pests
The OSTP criterion of 'plant pathogen' had particular relevance to USDA regulation of plant
pests under the Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA) and Plant Quarantine Act (PQA). The USDA
applied the Co-ordinated Framework to those laws by issuing new rules. As the USDA
defensively argued, these were not 'process' based, and so were not subjecting GMOs as such
to different treatment. Rather, these new regulations were needed in order to define a
'regulated article', e.g. a potential plant pest, based on objective scientific standards. The new
rules defmed a plant pest as any infectious agent which can damage a plant; the USDA
provided a long taxonomic list of micro-organisms, potentially subject to 'additional'
regulation (USDA/APHIS, 1987).
Already a narrow basis for regulating GMO releases, this was further constrained by scientific
and economic assumptions. The USDA denied that novel traits could result from inserting
DNA from a 'well-characterized, non-coding regulatory region', given 'the absolute
understanding of the underlying molecular genetic mechanisms...'. With such language it
claimed an omniscient rationale for exempting such organisms. USDA also argued that its
new rules would have no significant economic effect on prices, competition, employment,
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etc.; thus the rules would comply with the cost-benefit criteria of a 1981 Executive Order
(ibid.; cf. Jasanoff 1990: 190).
Although the 1987 USDA rules were formally product-based, their substantive content
derived from the recombinant DNA process, which generally used plasmids from plant pests
as vectors for inserting genes; only in the late 1980s were other processes developed for
constructing GMOs. According to the USDA, 'When the plasmid is from a known pathogen,
such as the Ti plasmid of Agrobacterium tumefaciens, we must be able to certify that the
plasmid has been effectively disarmed' (interview, 8 November 1990). USDA officials saw
their role mainly as preventing the spread of any plant pest 'which constitutes a threat to
agriculture'. That preventive task required verifying that 'the pathogenic potential... [from
vector materialJ has been removed or will be contained' (McCammon and Medley, 1990a). In
that sense, the USDA described its regulations as 'risk based and process specific' (Medley,
1989: 4), by analogy to known hazards of plant pests, though no GMO had manifest such
hazards.
In applying the criterion of 'plant pathogen', the USDA emphasized predictability:
From our data in the literature search, if well-characterized, non-coding regulatory
DNA was inserted into a microorganism, it was not going to produce a new protein, so
there wasn't a [safety] problem. For plants, however, the most common inserted
promoter [regulatory DNA] is the S35 from cauliflower mosaic virus -- a plant
pathogen -- so we would exercise oversight on that.... More generally, if the inserted
DNA regulates expression of a protein which in itself is not a dangerous substance,
then it's not a problem (interview, 8 November 1990).
In this way, the USDA was accepting geneticists' claims that genetic precision enhances
phenotypic predictability; it was also endorsing the OSTP proposal to exempt GMOs with
'well-characterized, non-coding regulatory DNA'. Thus it ignored warnings, from ecologists
and environmentalists, that pleiotropic effects could change an organism's behaviour (e.g.
Tiedje et al., 1989; Krimsky, 1991: 198-99).
For hazards other than plant pathogens, USDA officials confidently cited first principles and
the absence of alarming evidence. In particular, they appealed to the 'excess baggage'
hypothesis, for reassurance that an inserted gene could not inadvertantly give a competitive
advantage to a GMO:
I haven't seen anywhere in the scientific literature that the addition of one gene or one
trait is going to totally alter a receiving organism... With biotechnology the real
problem is not creating a superplant that's going to over-express; by adding genetic
material, you actually make the plant weaker... (interview 8 November 1990). If you
tinker [genetically] with bacteria, they somehow lose their competitive ability
(interview 15 November 1990).
For the risk factor of unintended gene transfer from plants, safety assurances or precautions
could reduce the need for regulatory oversight and monitoring, according to the USDA:
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If one can demonstrate safety in terms of male sterility or reproductive isolation, your
monitoring might be as simplistic as visual inspection of the phenotypic changes that
might occur in the plant. The local safety committee might feel that built-in
limitations like that would lessen the oversight that they would need to do on the
researcher's experiment (interview 8 November 1990).
USDA stated that its trial-release permits require 'standard conditions to be met, one of which
involves the collection and submission of test data.., to build a data base upon which to make
future assessments' (McCammon and Medley, 1990a). However, by 1990 there was little sign
of such anticipation. According to an academic study, the USDA generally accepted whatever
safety arguments, safety precautions and monitoring was proposed by the applicant. Of all the
ecological risk factors mentioned by applicants, they offered empirical data for only one factor
-- to rule out the potential for unintended dissemination of the inserted gene -- and virtually all
such data came from already published literature. Most applicants did not propose, nor did
the USDA suggest, monitoring the trial releases for gene flow, much less for other ecological
risk factors (Wrubel et al., 1992).
Of course, containment measures might have rendered these risk factors negligible in small-
scale trial releases. Yet the releases were not designed to test the efficacy of the containment
measures. Much less were they designed 'to build a database upon which to make future
assessments', as the USDA had claimed. The agency hardly acknowledged less identifiable
hazards -- such as gene transfer, much less pleiotropic effects and wider ecological
interactions -- which concerned many ecologists (e.g. Regal, 1985; Alexander, 1985; Tiedje et
al., 1989).
Thus the USDA initially regulated GMOs according to an aspect of the genetic modification
process which just happened to fall under existing legislation. USDA saw its task mainly as
preventing 'plant pest' hazards to agriculture, though no GMO was known to have manifest
such hazards. In that sense, the Co-ordinated Framework might have proven adequate for the
USDA's self-perceived role, though not for satisfying wider environmental concerns.
2.1.2 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): screening genetic novelty
Like the USDA, the EPA could find some authority in existing legislation for regulating GMO
releases. In particular, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
placed upon the applicant the burden of demonstrating that the benefits of product use
outweigh the risks. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) authorized the EPA to require
safety information on 'chemical substances' and new combinations thereof, so that the agency
could identify potentially harmful ones before commercial use; 'new' substances may undergo
a special approval procedure (Milewski, 1988).
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Applying the 1986 OSTP guidelines, the EPA announced that the 'intergeneric' criterion
provided a definition of 'new' under TSCA and could be applied under FIFRA to describe a
category of microbial pesticides. Also under TSCA, the EPA would classify GMOs as
containing new chemicals, i.e. recombinant DNA (Milewski, 1990: 327). Under TSCA the
EPA had usually permitted a regulatory exemption for 'small-scale' tests of new substances;
however, the EPA argued that living micro-organisms did not meet the 'small-scale' criterion,
given their capacity to reproduce and disseminate (EPA interview, 8 November 1990; cf. Dull
et al., 1987: 312). Similarly, the EPA regarded the 'small-scale' exemption as inappropriate
for microbial pesticides and non-indigenous organisms (Betz et al., 1987: 316).
Unlike the USDA, the EPA included ecologists in its advisory committee and generally
attempted to accommodate environmentalists' concerns in its procedures. As a leading official
explained, Without such involvement, public fear of the unknown could derail the whole
process and delay the testing through extensive administrative and judicial manoeuvres'
(Milewski, 1990: 335).
According to an academic survey of the EPA's own risk assessments on proposed GMO
releases between 1984-88, the agency emphasized broad ecological considerations, such as
dispersal, competitive advantage and genetic transfer. However, the EPA's data requirements
related mainly to toxicity and pathogenicity; this was partly because the requirements derived
from existing legislation, intended for regulating chemicals and naturally occurring microbial
pesticides (Akcakaya and Ginzburg, 1991).
The earlier risk-assessment criteria allowed the EPA only a limited authority to request
additional information from applicants for GMO releases. According to the academic
researchers, this gap between GMO risk assessment and regulation arose because the latter
was lagging behind ecological science and new technological hazards (ibid.: 286). However,
this gap arose for more fundamental reasons: it was difficult for regulators to justify data
requirements for hypothetical hazards, i.e. prior to evidence of harm from the GMO or from
the unmodified organism.
As a related problem, the EPA encountered difficulty in implementing the OSTP criterion of
'intergeneric' organisms. The criterion could not straightforwardly apply to micro-organisms,
given that taxonomic genera remained imprecise in microbiology -- a problem which the
President's Office later acknowledged (OSTP, 1990: 31119). Instead the EPA drafted
regulations based upon other criteria: first, inserted DNA which imparts the ability to express
characteristics outside the normal phenotypic range of that organism; and second, the potential
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for an organism to transfer genetic material, e.g. through the use of vectors not naturally
present in the organism (EPA interview, 8 November 1990).
In this way, the EPA attempted to base its regulatory scope upon 'product characteristics',
though for different reasons than did the USDA or OSTP:
We have already seen an example of an organism where it had an ecological behaviour
that we did not predict for it, probably as a result of its [genetic] modification....
Particularly in microbial ecology, our information bases are rather thin. We need a
system that can respond to novel organisms and to new processes which can perform
even better movements of genetic material. That has always been one of the problems
with a process-based approach [i.e. based upon pre-specified techniques]. So we try to
make regulations which are flexible (EPA interview, 8 November 1990).
Thus the EPA emphasized inadequate knowledge for predicting GMOs' behaviour. The EPA
attributed greater ecological uncertainty to genetic novelty, regardless of the specific genetic
change within the 'product', and regardless of the techniques used to create it.
2.2 Disputed 'Scope'
According to proponents of the Co-ordinated Framework, its scientific basis lay in the
uniform criteria for identifying any risks, i.e. 'intergeneric' and 'pathogenic' organisms (OSTP,
1986; Kingsbury, 1990). Yet these criteria were turning out to delay agency regulations and
to intensify conflicts, within and outside government. Each agency was developing
biotechnology regulation under laws not designed for that purpose, and hardly amenable to a
uniform set of scientific definitions (Krimsky, 1991: 199).
As part of the original Co-ordinated Framework, the EPA had published a list of scientific
criteria for assessing proposed GMO releases (OSTP, 1986), but it did not yet publish
additional regulations. The USDA did so, but mainly in order to regulate 'plant pests' (as
discussed earlier, USDA/APHIS, 1987). By early 1990, neither the EPA nor USDA had
clarified what additional safety testing they might require. The third relevant agency, the
FDA, had no responsibility for preventing environmental hazards, but the FDA's overt
disputes with the USDA and EPA further undermined any rational image of a harmonious
'Co-ordinated Framework' (e.g. Miller et al., 1990). Meanwhile, industry was urging the
Federal government to adopt comprehensive regulations, partly because state governments
were beginning to fill the breach (Crawford, 1990).
Finally the OSTP proposed to replace its 1986 guidelines with a new 'Scope' document in July
1990. The OSTP acknowledged that 'Federal agencies experienced unanticipated difficulty
developing operational definitions for regulatory purposes'. It now proposed different criteria
for specifying the 'scope' of organisms which Federal agencies could subject to additional
regulation. The document linguistically abolished GMOs by coining a new phrase, 'organisms
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with modified hereditary traits'. The OSTP substituted that new term in order 'to avoid the
incorrect implication that the use of any particular genetic modification process per se makes a
modified organism of greater risk than its unmodified parent' (OSTP, 1990).
When defining the regulatory scope as 'organisms with modified hereditary traits', regardless
of how they were modified, the document specified broad categories of exclusion. These
invoked the principle of sufficient 'familiarity' which permits assessing the introduction as
'similar to previous safe introductions'. Moreover, the OSTP proposed that organisms shall
not be subject to regulatory oversight 'unless information concerning the risk posed by the
introduction indicates that oversight is necessary' (ibid.).
This 'information' requirement weakened agencies' authority to request safety data. Indeed, its
circular logic reinforced the general presumption of GMOs' predictability. By proclaiming
'the risk-based approach', the OSTP was echoing recent scientific reports which suggested that
any risks of GMO releases could be readily identified according to their 'product'
characteristics (NAS, 1987; NRC, 1989), though that claim had been disputed by ecologists
(e.g. Tiedje et al., 1989).
Given the difficulties around the OSTP's 1986 criteria, its 1990 'Scope' document met a
guardedly positive response from environmentalists. For example, it was welcomed by the
National Wildlife Fund 'because it casts a wide regulatory net with exclusions based on
experience'. However, the NWF opposed some of the exclusions. In the case of micro-
organisms altered by traditional laboratory techniques, the OSTP had assumed that the same
genetic combinations also occur in nature, such that the laboratory could create no genetic
novelty. In another proposed exclusion, the wording had no practical basis in the experience
of GMOs: 'organisms with a new phenotypic trait(s) conferring no greater risk to the target
environment than the parental strain, which is considered to be safe'. Moreover, as the NWF
sardonically commented, some OSTP exclusions cited familiar processes, such as traditional
breeding techniques, rather than familiar 'product characteristics' (NWF, 1990; OSTP, 1990).
Such criticisms highlighted the confident assumptions underlying this putatively 'risk-based'
approach, which accepted first principles as a substitute for case-by-case environmental
testing. Also at issue was the significance of genetic novelty: Which past or future experience
would warrant classifying GMOs as similar to familiar organisms? Some regulators claimed
to go beyond the the 'product vs process' debate (e.g. Medley, 1990), yet the earlier dispute
now found a new venue: instead of specifying GMOs, they were specifying exclusions.
Metaphorically speaking, the issues shifted from the type of regulatory 'net' to the type of
holes in a broad net (cf. Regal, 1989).
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2.2.1 US Departnent ofAgriculture: 'sound scientific' euphemisms
The broad-net approach also had a symbolic importance. One USDA official acknowledged
the perceptual shift implicit in the new OSTP phrase, 'organisms with modified heritable
traits':
It didn't change the organisms that you're talking about; scientifically, it was not very
different. But I think the drafters were trying to get away from a pejorative label
[GMO], from misconceptions that people might have (interview, 8 November 1990).
In that same period, the USDA adopted the OSTP 'risk-based' language, denoting
predictability. The USDA sought 'to maintain a regulatory structure based on risk, not
process' (Medley, 1990; cf. McCammon and Medley, 1990b: 108).
Citing the 'familiarity' principle from recent documents (NRC, 1989; OSTP, 1990), a USDA
official explained that the principle meant assessing the organism in terms of past familiar
releases, and thus categorizing it in terms of a qualitative risk type. The priority for regulatory
oversight was 'to look at unfamiliar organisms, where you don't have enough information to
judge the safety or risk'. The USDA felt it could use this risk-assessment system 'to make a
very rational decision' about the initial trial-release introduction into the environment. A plant
genetically modified for enhanced virus resistance, or for endogenous Bt (an insect toxin), for
example, is 'similar to previous safe introductions'; accordingly, its behaviour would lie within
a familiar range of impacts. Only such a risk-based approach would be 'scientifically
defensible' (interview 8 November 1990).
That basis often meant presuming adequate information and/or accepting first principles for
anticipating any hazards. As a further example, although the USDA had included Rhizobium
in its long list of potential plant pathogens (USDA/APHIS, 1987), it now routinely exempted
genetically modified Rhizobium from regulatory oversight:
We do. not do full-scale environmental assessment at all on it [Rhizobium]. We write
letters back to the applicant, saying that we won't regulate it because we know the safe
history of introduction of conventional Rhizobium (interview 15 November 1990).
Confident safety assumptions became more explicit for unintended gene transfer. At a
November 1990 conference, USDA speakers acknowledged that published data on isolation
distance were developed to assure seed purity, not to avoid gene flowfrom the crop, and that
the standard isolation distances in agriculture presume some unintended interbreeding. To
prevent outward gene flow, then, 'supporting data is recommended and normally twice the
recommended distance is used in field testing'. The speakers also suggested that, for larger-
scale trials, 'the emphasis would shift for certain issues': the potential for weediness and other
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biosafety factors would become more important criteria (McCammon and Medley, 1990b:
112-13). Thus they compensated for uncertainty with a rule-of-thumb, while hardly using the
trial releases themselves to reduce that uncertainty for the future.
For moving beyond small-scale tests, 'the inserted genes and their resulting phenotype [will]
begin to dominate the analysis of these plants' (USDA/APHIS, 1990). Accordingly, in
February 1991 the USDA finally applied the 1990 OSTP scope principles to wider ecological
concerns, as follows: The new guidelines suggested procedures for classifying any proposed
release into a 'level of safety concern', which would warrant a corresponding 'confinement
level'. Invoking 'sound scientific judgement', the procedure emphasized familiar
characteristics of the unmodified parental organism, as well as the precise genetic
modification, which would allow better predictability of the modified organism's behaviour
(USDA, 1991). This document extended earlier euphemisms: rather than 'risk regulation' of
'GMO releases', the USDA now offered voluntary guidelines for 'safety concerns' about
'organisms with deliberately modified hereditary traits', with no USDA oversight.
In summary, then, the 1990 OSTP guidelines served to justify the USDA policy of applying
'additional' regulation only in cases of suspected plant pest risks or 'lack of familiarity', in turn
defined narrowly. Thus the USDA 'risk-based' slogan made more explicit the assumptions of
the earlier 'product-based' slogan, by treating safety as a readily knowable property of a GMO
'product'.
2.2.2 Environmental Protection Agency: stretching the scope
By contrast to the USDA, the EPA's regulatory role and perspective conflicted with the 'risk-
based' assumptions. Particularly difficult was the OSTP criterion -- 'unless information...
indicates that oversight is necessary'. In effect, this criterion placed the burden of evidence for
risk upon any agency which imposed 'additional' regulation.
Even some industrialists regarded that basis as inadequate for legitimizing their trial releases
as safe. Having sought EPA regulation, one company argued that the OSTP criterion ('unless
information...') was tautological, because even a review of risk information would constitute
'oversight' if done by a regulatory agency. Moreover, warned the company, the OSTP
criterion might allow only 'self-regulation', which would not be viewed favourably by the
public. Rather, industry needed a routine notification system for all GMO releases, so that
each agency could then decide whether further review was necessary (BTI, 1990).
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When the EPA's advisory committee discussed how to incorporate the OSTP guidelines, the
committee interpreted the risk 'information' requirement in a broad way. It proposed
screening all organisms with 'new' behaviours under TSCA, and all organisms with
'intentionally modified pesticidal properties' under FIFRA. Although naming some possible
exclusions, the committee implied that any type of genetic novelty would constitute the
relevant 'information' which warranted initial oversight. Moreover, EPA's committee posed
awkward questions about 'the most scientifically sound way' to interpret the criteria found in
the OSTP document; thus members cast doubt upon whether such criteria could guide
'objectively determinable, rather than subjective, concepts and terms' (B SAC/EPA, 1990).
In describing its own 'objective review process', the EPA emphasized uncertainty rather than
familiarity: 'As uncertainty or the potential for adverse effects increases, monitoring intensity
should also increase to asssure that adverse effects are identified and limited.' The EPA
sometimes requested laboratory tests as a precondition for small-scale trial releases, whose
monitoring in turn should detect whether the GMO differs from the unmodified organism --
for example, regarding its competitive advantage or dissemination (Anderson and Betz, 1990).
Also by contrast to the USDA, the EPA generally did not regard the experience of
conventional organisms as an adequate basis for classifying a OMO as familiar. Some testing
was necessary before routinizing small-scale releases: 'Once we have done three or four field
tests of this [genetically modified] organism, we may feel that it is sufficiently familiar, to
exempt it [from extra oversight] for small-scale releases' (EPA interview, 15 November
1990).
For the EPA, then, precise genetic changes in a GMO did not guarantee predictable behaviour.
Rather, the EPA regarded genetic novelty itself as 'information' which warranted notifying
OMO releases to the agency, and which warranted requesting still more data in order to assess
risk. In making such proposals, it was stretching the terms of the 1990 OSTP document.
However, further OSTP moves would precluded this precautionary version of a 'sound
scientific basis', with its subtle negotiations in the EPA's advisory committee.
2.2.3 Scope revised: GMOs 'innocent until proven guilty'
Disagreement persisted over how the 1990 OSTP proposal would be finalized and
implemented by Federal agencies. In February 1991 the President's Council on
Competitiveness, chaired by Vice-President Dan Quayle, issued a report reiterating the need
for 'risk-based regulation', in order to 'avoid excessive restrictions that would curtail the
benefits of biotechnology to society'. It urged government to finalize the 1990 OSTP
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proposal, so that Federal agencies could clarify which field tests require prior regulatory
scrutiny (BWG/Quayle, 1991).
In May 1991 the OSTP circulated for comment a revised 'Scope' proposal, which further
strengthened the burden of evidence upon Federal agencies for demonstrating risk. Agencies
could not exercise additional regulatory oversight without 'substantial evidence that a
significant and unreasonable risk may be posed by the introduction and is not addressed by
other risk-management mechanisms' (OSTP, 1991: 20-21). Although describing this approach
as 'scientifically sound', the 1991 proposal said little about its scientific rationale.
Objections to the 1991 OSTP proposal came from many quarters. As the Environmental
Defense Fund sarcastically paraphrased it, 'Only organisms we already know to be dangerous
should receive any oversight' (EDF, 1991). ICI Americas warned that the new formulation
would further delay agreement and would risk 'regulatory chaos'. The EPA expressed
suspicions that the Council on Competitiveness was seeking to block the draft regulations that
the agency had been developing under the 1990 OSTP document, as those would have
required initial notification of all GMO releases (Charles, 1991).
Two years after its first 'Scope' document, in February 1992 the OSTP issued a final version.
It allowed for varying degrees of oversight, which
'... will be exercised only where the risk posed by the introduction is unreasonable, that
is, when the value of the reduction in risk obtained by additional oversight is greater
than the cost thereby imposed.... Any information requests should be designed to
maximize their benefits and minimize their costs by soliciting only the most useful
information in the least costly manner' (OSTP, 1992).
Alvin Young, directory of the USDA Office of Biotechnology, noted approvingly that
biotechnology products were now considered 'innocent until proven guilty' (Anon, 1992).
On the one hand, the finalized OSTP rule could permit agencies to require advance
notification, or even to exercise some initial oversight, without strong evidence of risk.
Permitting flexible degrees of oversight, the wording accommodated some concerns of
environmentalist groups and industry (e.g. Fox, 1992). Yet the rule required an agency to
justify any such measure as quantifiably reducing risk, in a context where safety sceptics
denied that GMOs could be classified according to qualitative hazards, much less according to
quantifiable risk. Thus the new rule limited agencies' capacity to identify any hazards not yet
documented for GMOs or for the unmodified organism.
Such constraints on Federal agencies had been foresaged a month earlier (January 1992),
when President Bush announced a 90-day moratorium on all new safety regulations. By then,
biotechnology regulations had been finalized only for the Federal Plant Pest Act in 1987; none
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of the other promised regulations had been issued, not even in draft. Given that they were
moving ahead so slowly, the President's further blockage was hardly 'deregulation'.
Nevertheless, the moratorium reinforced the rhetorical imperative of economic
competitiveness, by implying that the USA's prolonged recession was due to excessive
regulation.
Throughout this episode, the OSTP sought 'scientifically sound' criteria for identifying in
advance which GMOs warranted 'additional' regulation, without stigmatizing the recombinant
DNA process. In effect, this meant that Federal agencies held the burden of evidence for
citing adequate 'risk information' prior to 'risk identification'. By imposing this requirement,
the OSTP favoured a presumption of ecological predictability over uncertainty, and so
constrained any precautionary approach, especially by the EPA. Moreover, even the USDA's
modest role came under challenge: citing the 1992 OSTP principles, industry soon argued that
a 'scientifically sound' risk-based approach justified relaxing USDA oversight, given that no
plant GMO had ever exhibited 'plant pest' behaviour associated with the plasmid vector
(Huttner et al., 1992).
In summary: As its official slogan shifted from 'product-based' to 'risk-based' regulation, the
OSTP guidelines brought Federal agencies no closer to a consensual basis for specifying
which organisms warrant additional regulation. Even when the OSTP dissolved GMOs
conceptually into a wider category -- 'organisms with modified hereditary traits' -- the earlier -
regulatory issues remained no less contentious. Both industry and environmentalists, in
different ways, disputed the scientific rationale for the Federal agencies' approaches.
Nevertheless a 'rational', idealized image of the USA's product-based regulatory system was
being deployed to attack the EC's process-based framework (as described in the following
section and Chapter 9, section 1).
3.0 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: 'Uncertainty-based' regulation
In contrast to the USA, the European Community adopted new legislation: the 1990
Deliberate Release Directive. The Directive regulated all GMO releases, i.e. all products of
the genetic modification process. Also unlike the 'risk-based' language of USA, the Directive
was informally called 'uncertainty-based regulation' (e.g. DGXII official, interview 18 July
1991; Dutch Environment Ministry official, at Biotechnology Europe conference, 24 June
1992). Nevertheless this ambiguous phrase did not accommodate divergent views on whether
a process-based Directive was necessary.
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In the ensuing disputes over the Directive, implicitly at stake was its precautionary content.
This section will outline its precautionary features, trace its origins, and analyse related
conflicts within the European Commission. (Wider EC conflicts, especially over the terms of
market approval for GMOs, are described in Chapter 9, section 1.)
3.1 EC Directive: precautionary features
The EC Deliberate Release Directive was consistently described as a 'preventive' measure,
rather than as 'precautionary'. It cited the Treaty of Rome, which had asserted the principle of
'preventive action'. Quoting its legal base, Treaty article lOOa, the Directive emphasized that
completion of the internal market must be based on 'a high level of [environmental]
protection' (EEC, 1990: 15). The lead agency (chef defile) for the Directive was the
Environment Directorate, DGXI, whose officials located the Directive within 'a preventive
approach that the Community is taking on environmental and other issues' (CBC, 1990: 18).
However, in substance the Directive was more than merely 'preventive'. It had the following
precautionary features (EEC, 1990):
* The preamble justified the mandatory measures by warning that living organisms may
reproduce, cross national frontiers, and cause 'irreversible' effects. Thus, unable to cite
harmful effects from GMO releases, the preamble implicitly drew an analogy to non-
indigenous organisms.
* The regulatory scope encompassed all GMOs -- that is, 'all organisms in which the genetic
material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or by natural
recombination'. These were specified as products of named techniques, as listed in Annex I
(ibid.: 22); accordingly, GMOs included all products of recombinant DNA, and even some
products of traditional techniques, such as cell fusion. In effect the genetic modification
'process' denoted a presumption of, and screening for, artificial genetic novelty.
* Prior to GMO release, the applicant had to carry out an environmental risk assessment,
applying specified criteria, as listed in Annex II (ibid.: 23-27). These included, for example,
'likelihood of post-release selection leading to the expression of unexpected and/or undesirable
traits', 'likelihood of post-release shifts in biological interactions', etc. Unlike the USA's
OSTP rules, then, the EC Directive subjected all OMO releases to wide-ranging risk-
assessment criteria. These were drawn from the 'blue book' (OECD, 1986: 48-49), though
both documents implied some discretion in whether or how to apply the criteria to each
proposed release.
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* The Directive imposed upon member states the responsibility 'to avoid adverse effects on
human health and the environment' from all GMO releases, and to certify their safety. Each
release required a prior consent from the designated 'competent authority' of the country in
which it takes place; this requirement encouraged each 'authority' to accumulate experience of
GMO releases in general.
* At the stage of market approval of a GMO product, an EC-wide procedure allowed for
objections from any member state. However, final approval would then apply to all member
states. This procedure fulfilled the Directive's legal base, Article lOOa, on completing the
internal market.
* A GMO product could not obtain market approval unless it had undergone safety tests
according to the risk-assessment criteria of the Directive. Products could be exempted only on
procedural grounds, not substantive grounds: the Directive would 'not apply to any products
covered by Community legislation which provides for a specific environmental risk
assessment similar to that laid down in this Directive' (ibid.: 18).
3.2 Shaping the Directive
Having achieved a process-based framework, DGXI attempted to downplay any substantive
difference between the Directive and US regulation. According to a DGXI official, the
Directive was 'largely based on the 1986 OECD report' and therefore 'based firmly on the
international consensus of how this area should be regulated' (CBC, 1990: 19). However, the
report had clearly asserted that 'There is no scientific basis for specific legislation for the
implementation of rDNA techniques and applications' (OECD, 1986: 41). The report had
recommended a case-by-case, step-by-step procedure, but only as the basis of a notification
and monitoring system. The EC went far beyond that limited intent by adopting process-
based legislation. How did the EC's divergence come about?
Advocates of the EC Directive had been able to cite the imperative of harmonizing disparate
regulatory regimes. These regimes were arising partly in response to organized protest; in
various ways, some member states were subjecting GMO releases to process-based
restrictions, potentially jeopardizing any EC internal market for GMO products. As early as
1986, public opposition led the Danish Parliament to enact the Environment & Gene
Technology Act, which imposed stringent limits on GMO releases there (Shackley and
Hodgson, 1991).
The same year in Germany, public concern about GMO releases was articulated in a
Commission of Inquiry, initiated by the Greens and Social Democrats; the Commission
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ultimately recommended a five-year moratorium on releasing GMOs (Bundestag, 1986),
though the Parliament did not accept that proposaL Industry portrayed GMOs as modest,
precise, benign extensions of natural processes, but that account was ideologically
deconstructed by German critics; they portrayed genetic modification as fundamentally
interfering with nature, and so bearing potentially disastrous, unpredictable consequences
(Gottweis, 1995). A subsequent court case there ruled in the protestors' favour; it interpreted
the country's Basic Law as forbidding GMO releases unless specifically permitted by some
supplementary legislation, which was eventually provided by the 1990 Gene Technology Act
(Fritsch and Haverkamp, 1991).
Amidst considerable public unease over biotechnology, not just in Germany and Denmark,
some EC countries were developing less stringent regulation, while some had no regulatory
policy at all (RCEP, 1989: 65-66; OECD, 1990a: 15-29). A DGXI official later reiterated the
market rationale in the Directive's preamble: that is, a situation of divergent regulatory
regimes 'was not going to help the harmonious development of biotechnology in Europe and
would hamper access, in fact, to the entire Community market of 1992' (CBC, 1990: 18; cf.
EEC, 1990: 15). Partly for that reason, industry reluctantly accepted the need for an EC
Directive, despite the extra regulatory burden (Lake, 1991; see also Chapter 9, section 1).
How, then, would new legislation define the risk problem?
An early DGXI-commissioned report had suggested a scientific rationale for new legislation:
the author attributed ecological uncertainties to the novel genetic combinations generated by
the recombinant DNA process. He regarded 'agriculture and other human-created systems' as
particularly vulnerable to disruption; this was partly by analogy to introduced exotic
organisms, and partly by analogy to past agricultural problems associated with reduced
biodiversity, pathogen invasions, pest resistance, herbicide resistance, etc. The report
proposed a case-by-case environmental risk assessment before releasing any 'new or exotic
micro-organisms'; it also proposed further ecological research on the safety of novel
organisms more generally (Mantegazzini, 1986).
Similarly the EC's Fourth Environmental Action Programme acknowledged possible
environmental risks from 'genetically altered or exotic organisms'. It argued that 'no
fundamental distinction can be made between the type of risks' which arise from various
organisms according to how they are produced, i.e. whether by laboratory techniques or
selective breeding. The great variety and quantity of new uses being developed for GMOs,
however, 'could increase the scale of risks from these uses unless their development takes.
place in a well-defined regulatory environment'. Such regulation was necessary also 'to
protect the common market against unilateral national regulations' (EEC, 1987: 26-28). Thus
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the EAP advocated additional legislation in order to prevent familiar hazards from novel
organisms and to avoid regulatory disharmony.
In the European Commission, regulatory responsibility was taken on by DGXI, the
Environment Directorate, by agreement with DGIII, Directorate for Internal Trade. Initial
deliberations considered regulating not only GMOs but also a wide range of biological agents.
However, DGVI (the Agriculture Directorate) opposed any additional environmental
regulation of 'naturally occurring organisms', such as exotic organisms and traditional
breeding, for which it wanted to keep responsibility. Thus DGIII and DGVI supported DGXI
in drafting new legislation only for GMOs, defined as organisms produced by novel
techniques (Shackley et al., 1992). In effect this focus upon GMOs downplayed the systemic
agricultural hazards which were cited in the DGXI-funded report (i.e. Mantegazzini, 1986: 76-
80, cited above).
The European Commission published the first draft of the Deliberate Release Directive in
1988. Its Part B on trial releases covered all GMOs. Part C, on market approval, exempted a
named list of product categories, such as pesticides, if they were 'covered by Community
legislation which includes a specific risk assessment' (CEC, 1988: 7-8). However, two years
later the final version made no specific exemptions; instead it permitted exempting any GMO
product which was subject to a 'similar' risk assessment in another product directive (EEC,
1990: 18). Thus the Directive potentially extended the precautionary criteria to the market
approval stage of all GMOs. How, then, was Part C strengthened?
The more stringent process-based version resulted partly from public unease and
environmentalist lobbying, expressed through the European Parliament. Indeed, its
Environment Committee initially opposed derogating any GMO products from the Deliberate
Release Directive; the Committee insisted that market approval of every GMO should remain
subject to the Directive, regardless of any separate product legislation. The Parliament's
second reading gave that proposal a simple majority of those MEPs voting, though not an
absolute majority of the members, which would have strengthened the Parliament's bargaining
position in EC consultation procedures (Lake, 1991). The anti-derogation proposal initially
received support even from the Christian Democratic Group of MEPs, mainly because its
German members were responding to public and environmental concerns; ultimately,
however, 'their fears about overly strict regulation overcame their fears about dangers to the
environment', according to one Parliament official (Environment Cttee interview, 17 July
1991).
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The Parliament communicated its anti-derogation stance to the European Commission in May,
one month before Green parties significantly increased their vote in the 1989 European
Parliament elections. Industry backed DGXII in supporting the original version, which
mandated derogating GMO products (e.g. GIBiP, 1990: 56); yet that version was opposed by
Denmark, DGXI and the Parliament (Lake, 1991). In November the European Commission
successfully put a compromise proposal before the Council of Ministers: Part C would allow
derogating a GMO product to separate legislation, provided that the relevant product directive
had a 'similar' risk assessment (EC: The Council, 1989). In effect the fmal wording was a
compromise -- between either prohibiting derogation, or mandating it for entire product
categories.
In summary, organized protest became translated into process-based regulation of GMOs,
initially in some EC countries and ultimately for an EC-wide framework, even for the stage of
market approval. Nominally 'preventive', the Directive had many precautionary features.
This framework was intended to accommodate both public unease and ecological
uncertainties, while establishing rules for an internal market.
3.3 An efficient Directive?
Before and after the Deliberate Release Directive was finalized, its process-based framework
was opposed by DGXII, the Directorate-General for Science, Research and Development.
DGXII repeatedly questioned the 'rational' basis for any safety rules specific to recombinant
DNA techniques per se (e.g. Cantley, 1992: 23-25). It preferred simply a notification and
monitoring scheme, as proposed by the 1986 OECD report. Although accepting that some
EC-wide regulation was necessary, DGXII advocated new legislation only for GMOs which
did not come under existing product regulation, e.g. nitrogen-fixing bacteria (DGXII
interview, 18 July 1991). DGXII had lost the argument by the time the Commission
published its 1988 draft Directive, though it later succeeded in rallying industry lobbyists and
isolating DGXI (see Chapter 9, section 1).
The conflict within the Commission, particularly between DGXII and DGXI, arose partly
from those Directorates' different roles. The relevant section of DGXII, the Concertation Unit
on Biotechnology in Europe (CUBE), funded biotechnology promotion and research
(Vassarotti and Magnien, 1990; Cantley, 1992). Not simply serving industry's perceived
interests, DGXII redefined them by arguing that product-based regulation of biotechnology
would best serve the cause of enhancing the EC's industrial innovation and thus socio-
economic progress. CUBE's chief, Mark Cantley, regularly gave public talks celebrating•
biotechnology as the vanguard of 'molecularisation, informatisation and globalisation' (e.g. at
the May 1992 Citizens' Audit on Biotechnology).
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DGXI is the lead agency (chef defile) for environmental regulation. It holds responsibility for
devising and monitoring directives acceptable to both the European Parliament and Council of
Ministers, and capable of harmonizing regulation among the EC-member countries. Within
that dual constraint and opportunity, DGXI formulated a distinctive rationale for process-
based regulation of GMO releases; unlike DGXII, it put forward no grand vision for what
biotechnology should be, notwithstanding the EC commitment to 'ecological modernisation'
(see this chapter, section 1.1).
In this conflict, DGXII and DGXI each defended their respective regulatory stance as the truly
rational, efficient one. Perhaps not merely rhetorical, a distinct rationality can be inferred
from each DG's views, at three related levels: the type of hazard, the regulatory role of
science, and regulatory effects. (See Shackley et al., 1992, for a more detailed account,
starting from the mid-1980s. The following quotations are from my interviews of 18 July
1991, unless otherwise noted.)
** Type of hazard
Regarding the type and predictability of any hazard, DGXII regarded biotechnological safety
as having been already vindicated by the laboratory experience of genetic modification. An
official emphasized 'the absence of specific adverse effects attributable to the [rDNA]
techniques'; in fact, these techniques make GMOs' behaviour even more predictable. DGXII
described itself as 'funding risk-assessment research to establish whether there are any risks
associated specifically with these techniques', i.e., rDNA. In this regard, for example, 'there is
ongoing research on the management of the Bt gene' [the toxin gene from a microbial
pesticide]. Regarding the environmental safety of agricultural GMOs, DGXII also cited 'our
understanding of the robustness and interactions in nature' -- unlike 'highly artificial crops
stripped of their capacity to survive without the continued efforts of the farmer'.
For DGXI, by contrast, genetic novelty presents an inherent ecological uncertainty, even a risk
of 'ecological imbalances' (exemplifying the 'irreversible effects' cited in the Directive).
'Genetic modification technology creates the real novelty, so process-based regulation focuses
on the area of most potential concern, as well as avoiding unnecessary concern.' For example,
'There is more in common among herbicide-resistance genes in different plants; we are
looking for specific aspects resulting from the genetic novelty.' For DGXI, then, process-
based regulation helps scientific research to learn what kinds of hazards might materialize and
what additional expertise would be needed to avert them.
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** Science-based regulation
DGXII felt that regulators should resist the external political pressures which had led to a
process-based Directive, and which were now obstructing the environmental potential of
biotechnology:
Biotechnology was crossing the road from the lab to the marketplace when this bus of
environmental enthusiasm was coming along. And instead of being on board the bus,
where it belongs, biotechnology has been hit by it and is now in the hospital of public
opinion. This is an unfortunate accident which we are trying to repair.
Formulation of the Directive had involved a clear choice 'between political opportunism and
scientific advice', where DGXI had chosen the former option. DXII resented the symbolic
effect: 'Some sectors of industry have taken a beating, and scientists in Europe have seen safe
techniques with a 100% track record being stigmatized' (cited in Baiter, 1990). Given the
proven safety record of biotechnology, process-based regulation was 'not rational or
necessary'. Argued DGXII, 'We can learn faster from making mistakes, where we lack the
foresight to prevent them'; thus any unexpected damage would help indicate whatever hazards
warrant taking precautions.
By contrast, DGXI regarded public unease as partly justified by ecologists' concerns about
GMO releases. Those concerns presented an opportunity to go beyond the existing knowledge
of product categories, to develop a new interdisciplinary expertise. For DGXI, process-based
(horizontal) regulation offered a sensible use of resources: 'with a horizontal system, each risk
assessment can benefit from the experience of different GMOs, considered by the same group
of experts'. For DGXI, 'It is more efficient to have the same experts assessing all releases of
the organism, [from trial release] through to product approval; there are logical, rational
advantages of horizontal regulation... And there is not yet any general scientific basis for
making the transition to vertical [product-based] regulation; it can only be done case by case'.
** Regulatory effects
Regarding the wider effects of safety regulation, DGXII foresaw the Directive putting
European biotechnology at a competitive disadvantage. It questioned whether hypothetical
hazards warranted 'a rational allocation of resources, given the existence of other known
problems'. Society's resources were needed to reap the expected benefits of biotechnology
and to avert familiar hazards of traditional products, such as naturally occurring carcinogens
in food. After all, faced with continued famine in the Third World, 'We are in a race against
time in which we [Western societies] are handicapping the most relevant technologies.'
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By contrast, DGXI regarded the Directive as providing a uniform, stable framework for
European industry. Safety regulation could not be blamed for holding back the biotechnology
industry, 'provided that regulation is predictable, broadly reasonable and stable', argued the
DGXI Director General (quoted in Dickson, 1990b).
** Reconcilable differences?
Superficially, the two DGs were disputing the most 'efficient' means of regulating GMO
releases and of facilitating innovation. Yet they did so from incompatible cognitive
frameworks; each Directorate justified its stance by citing different structural uncertainties.
For example, they portrayed the environment either as threatening agriculture, or as
potentially threatened by agricultural products; they regarded public unease either as a
problem, or as an opportunity. To some extent, the two Directorates exemplified the
'individualist-market' versus 'hierarchist' political cultures (as theorized by Schwarz and
Thompson, 1990). Their standpoints can be summarized as follows:
DGXII advocated classifying GMOs within existing product regulation. Its arguments
conflated process and product safety, by citing the safe experience of GMOs in contained use;
it presumed a precise genetic-level control over product characteristics and thus over
environmental effects. DGXII posited a robust environment which not only endures
perturbations but also threatens agricultural yield and thus food security. If GMOs did cause
any damage, presumably minimal or reversible, then this would facilitate efficient learning by
trial-and-error. Faster innovation, towards a genetically reprogrammed nature, would yield up
nature's cornucopia for the common good.
By contrast, DGXI advocated classifying all GMOs together for regulatory purposes. Its
arguments drew selectively upon scientists' warnings that some cases of genetic novelty might
cause ecological instability. This unacceptable consequence, which presumed an
environmental vulnerability, warranted imposing a case-by-case scrutiny upon all GMOs, and
developing an interdisciplinary expertise for assessing their safety. Only such efforts could
test the hypothetical hazards cited in public debate.
How could the EC accommodate these different stances? Faced with sharp disagreements
over the safety and ethics of biotechnology at a 1988 conference, DGXII's Mark Cantley had
commented, 'I think that reconciling apparently irreconcilable differences is our daily business
in Brussels' (Wheale and McNally, 1990: 265). Rather than reconcile them, the Deliberate
Release Directive decisively favoured a process-based regulatory system.
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Politically, however, process-based regulation depended upon the claim that it was essential
for completing the EC's internal market and thus facilitating innovation. This market
imperative left the Directive vulnerable to further political pressure, especially towards
narrowing the range of ecological uncertainty deemed relevant (as described in Chapter 9).
4.0 CONCLUSIONS: 'RATIONAL' DILEMMAS
In conclusion, when state authorities formalized risk-management procedures for GMO
releases, they were responding to political threats: i.e., actual or potential protest, the
stigmatized image of GMOs, and political obstacles to an eventual biotechnology market.
With the administrative term 'additional regulation', regulators denied they were treating
GMOs as a special problem. Moreover, the safety measures marginalized the systemic 'risk'
which had featured in public debate, such as issues of environmental control and intensive
monoculture (see Chapter 3). Safety measures were designed to anticipate any direct,
physically measurable harm from GMOs or from their inserted genes. Within this account of
the risk problem, the 'product versus process' debate concerned how to classify GMOs for
regulatory purposes.
The US government adopted a product-based regulatory system, which gave several meanings
to the term 'product'. Under the 1986 Co-ordinated Framework, new administrative rules
classified GMOs according to their ultimate product use and assigned them to Federal
agencies under existing product legislation. The rules specified 'product characteristics' which
would warrant a Federal agency in imposing 'additional' regulation, beyond that which
otherwise applied to the unmodified organism. This policy took for granted a benign analogy
between GMOs and familiar products.
This product-based regulation was also called 'risk-based'. With such language, rulemakers
largely presumed that existing knowledge was adequate to predict the significance of any
genetic novelty and thus to identify any risks. However, by the late 1980s, Federal agencies
had encountered political and scientific difficulties in implementing the original criteria for
risk identification.
In response, the government linguistically abolished 'GMOs', by dissolving them into a
broader regulatory net -- 'organisms with modified hereditary traits' -- while specifying
exclusions, e.g. on grounds of 'familiarity' from past experience. Further rules specified cost-
benefit criteria for any 'additional regulation', thus imposing a greater burden of evidence.
upon regulators. With these constraints, the US 'product-based' system allowed Federal
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agencies to do little more than prevent some hazards already documented; it pre-empted issues
of risk assessment and risk evaluation, especially the consequences of any hypothetical harm.
Earlier the 'product versus process' debate had disputed risk-identification criteria; the same
issues were now shifted to a dispute over which organisms to exclude from the a broad
regulatory net. In the name of 'rational' regulation, the US government had attempted to
standardize a scientific basis for imposing risk-management procedures upon GMO releases;
yet, paradoxically, this attempt made regulatory science appear even more political (as had
happened earlier in regulating hazardous chemicals, e.g. Jasanoff, 1986: 26-27, 72). The
OSTP's rules intensified public controversy, highlighted conceptual differences among the
Federal agencies, and constrained the Environmental Protection Agency in particular.
Executive-level pressures were disrupting EPA moves towards a stable, expert-based 'science
policy', of the sort which characterized other regulatory areas in the late 1980s (cf. Jasanoff,
1990).
In contrast to the USA, the EC adopted a process-based regulatory system, covering all
products of the genetic modification process. Although the 1990 EC Deliberate Release
Directive was called 'preventive', it had several precautionary features. It subjected all GMO
releases to risk-management procedures, which required a prior consent and risk assessment,
applying broad ecological criteria. In effect, this framework deferred the issues of risk
identification until the regulatory procedures could develop some method from experience; in
the meantime, applicants held the burden of evidence for demonstrating safety.
Regulators justified this broad regulatory scope by citing the potential for 'irreversible'
environmental damage, i.e. the unacceptability of hypothetical harm. They attributed greater
uncertainty to the genetic novelty of GMOs, partly by analogy to some non-indigenous
organisms which had caused environmental damage. Informally, some officials called this
'uncertainty-based' regulation, thus acknowledging indeterminate cause-effect models of
potential harm.
The opportunity for this legislation arose from several sources: a regulatory division of labour
within the European Commission, an environmentalist unease over biotechnology, the
process-based regulation adopted by some EC member states, and the EC's commitment
harmonized regulation. These somewhat contradictory sources were manifest in formulating
the Directive, particularly in extending process-based regulation to the market approval stage
of GMO products.
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Moreover the EC Directive came under political attack on several grounds: for stigmatizing
the genetic modification process, for encouraging public unease over unreal risks, and for
hampering a benign innovation. In this conflict, arising initially within the European
Commission, DGXI and DGXII invoked incompatible accounts of the relevant scientific
uncertainty and of environmental threats. Their stances somewhat illustrate antagonistic
political cultures, e.g. 'hierarchist' versus 'individualist-niarket', respectively (as theorized by
Schwarz & Thompson, 1990); however, DGXI had to manoeuvre within the project of
completing the EC's internal market.
Indeed, GMO regulation embodied market imperatives in several ways. The US system did
so crudely, by imposing a cost-benefit analysis upon any 'additional' regulation. More
fundamentally, both the US and EC-UK frameworks responded to industry demands for a
safety imprimatur; GMO regulation was designed to establish the political conditions for
biotechnology R&D and an eventual international market. By abstracting 'risk' from the
context of intensive monoculture, regulatory procedures could standardize testable
uncertainties of prospective commodities.
In summary, the US and EC frameworks can be analysed in a two-fold way: as encountering
difficulties around the rational stereotype of safety regulation, yet also constructing a
procedural rationality, capable of legitimizing its decisions. The US product-based system
invoked first principles for demarcating between reallperceived risks in advance; this claim
provoked political conflict over the detailed scientific criteria for imposing risk-management
measures. By contrast, the EC's process-based system suspended any boundary between
real/perceived risks, so as to negotiate a more credible one through the regulatory procedures,
case by case; this precautionary approach came under attack as 'irrational'.
Each in their own way, US and EC regulators faced difficulties in justifying risk-management
rules as warranted by a prior risk-identification method. When both critics and rulemakers
advocated science-based regulation, each promoted a different cognitive framework, i.e. a
model of the scientific uncertainty and its potential consequences, thus politicizing any
'science-based' policy. Regulators also faced the dilemma over how their 'additional
regulation' could acknowledge the stigma associated with GMOs in a way which could
overcome it.
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Chapter 5
BRITAIN' S PRECAUTIONARY LEGISLATION
The EC Directive required each member state to incorporate its provisions into national law.
Britain did so through the Environmental Protection Act 1990, whose Part VI regulated both
the contained use and deliberate release of GMOs, from the R&D stage onwards. This was
enacted before there could have been evidence of harm from GMOs designed for release, so
the 1990 Act set a precedent for precautionary legislation in Britain.
Exactly how did the British government incorporate the process-based EC Directive into
national law? How did the government specify and justify its precautionary features? How
did the new statutory basis affect Britain's regulatory style?
This chapter will analyse:
* precedents and forces which shaped Britain's new legislation (section 1).
* its precautionary features (section 2);
* limits of GMO regulation (section 3); and
* dilemmas manifest in the statutory measures (section 4).
This chapter will refer to the Environmental Protection Act Part VI as 'the 1990 Act' in the
main text, or as 'EPA' in bibliographic citations -- not to be confused with the USA's 	 -
Environmental Protection Agency, analysed in Chapter 4. Some aspects are discussed in more
detail elsewhere (Levidow and Tait, 1992).
1.0 SHAPING THE LEGISLATION
When Britain established a statutory framework for regulating GMO releases, it extended and
integrated certain precedents. These included: a changed meaning for the code-word 'sound
science'; voluntary self-regulation of GMO releases; and the dual role of those regulatory
procedures, in anticipating both hazards and public fears.
1.1 Shift in 'sound science'
In British environmental policy, the concept of 'sound science' has served as a rhetorical
device to justify setting stringent criteria for adequate evidence of harm. The government has
often deferred environmental protection by citing economic considerations and counterposing
82
them to unproven environmental damage. Indeed, in the name of science-based regulation,
Britain has often resisted EC regulatory proposals as 'threats imposed by unreasonable
foreigners acting counter to scientific and economic rationality' (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1992:
22).
For example, at the 1972 UNEP Stockholm conference, the British government defended its
policy of allowing waste emissions to utilize fully the 'waste-absorbing capacity' of the
environment; this capacity was inferred from a dose-effect model. The criterion of 'best
practicable means' (BPM) implicitly incorporated cost considerations, regarding whether
reduced emissions warranted the higher cost of a less-polluting alternative means. However,
other European countries opposed BPM with the criterion of 'best available technology' for
minimizing waste emissions, thus subordinating cost criteria (Holdgate, 1983: 12-13).
For such EC countries, as well as the USA, the term 'best available technology' (or 'best
technical means') was intended to force major technological improvements, beyond currently
available standards. By contrast, Britain's consensual approach encouraged only incremental
improvements (Vogel, 1986: 76--81). Often EC policy devised a compromise between those
two approaches (Peachey and Macrory, 1983: 88).
Britain's traditional stance has been increasingly disputed within EC policy debates (e.g.
Weale, 1992), and even within Britain, especially by the Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution. When the RCEP (1976) first proposed the 'Best Practicable Environmental Option',
the BPEO was a procedure for extending the BPM criterion to integrated pollution control;
this required considering systemic costs and benefits for the entire environment, rather than
shift costs from one part to another. In its 11th report, the RCEP (1988) went beyond BPM,
by giving BPEO a precautionary meaning: progressively reducing pollution through technical
improvements, making value judgements explicit throughout a transparent decision-making
procedure, recording those judgements for later review, and acknowledging some
environmental costs irreducible to economic calculation. In a modest way, some measures for
integrated pollution control were incorporated into the 1990 Environmental Protection Act.
In that Act, as in recent EC documents on environmental protection, BATNEEC has largely
superseded the criterion of 'best practicable means'. BPM had been seen to imply an
ambiguous balance between risk and cost (CBC, 1990: 10). BAI'NEEC can be interpreted as
emphasizing either side and/or as balancing the two. The crucial change is not the specific
inclusion of cost considerations, but rather the requirement to make all assumptions explicit,
especially if decided via a BPEO procedure (RCEP, 1988: 21). Given that different
protagonists may selectively emphasize either best technology or minimal costs, BATNEEC
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offers a 'more contested and participatory approach'; it could challenge Britain's traditionally
consensual, discretionary approach to risk regulation. It can also strengthen proposals for
regulation to act as 'technology forcing' environmental improvements (O'Riordan, 1989: 116-
17).
Also in 1990 the British government issued a White Paper on environmental policy, which
offered a real-estate metaphor as a rationale for preserving natural resources: 'we do not hold a
freehold on our world, but only a full repairing lease'. We must protect the environment 'by
basing our actions on sound science and by taking precautionary action where justified', e.g.
by anticipating the effects of new products and processes: 'This precautionary principle applies
particularly where there are good grounds for judging either that action taken promptly at
comparatively low cost may avoid more costly damage later, or that irreversible effects may
follow if action is delayed' (HMG, 1990: 10-12).
With the latter phrase, 'irreversible effects', the government echoed the words of the EC
Deliberate Release Directive (EEC, 1990: 15; cf. Smith, 1992: 9). By citing unacceptable
consequences of hypothetical hazards, it signalled a more general tendency to anticipate and
avert systemic damage; 'sound science' had taken on a more flexible meaning. As promoted
by the DoE, this shift provided a conceptual precursor of GMO regulation.
1.2 Doubly precautionary
In Britain as elsewhere, public unease provided both the political necessity and scientific
opportunity for efforts at anticipating hypothetical hazards from biotechnology. At a major
conference on biotechnology regulation, the HSE emphasized the perceptual aspects. An
official noted the relatively weak public opposition to GMO releases in Britain but warned,
'Nonetheless, there is public concern and there is a potential for greater public concern. The
public want reassurance that there is a safe system of [genetic modification] work' (CBC,
1990: 14).
Such considerations had also influenced government in regulating the contained use of GMOs
through the 1970s and '80s, mainly in medical laboratories (Wright, 1986; Bennett et al.,
1986). By the mid-1980s the focus of public suspicion and safety debate had shifted to GMO
releases, particularly as developed by agrichemical companies. The dual character of
precautionary regulation was also extended, initially within voluntary procedures, and later
given a statutory basis by the 1990 Act.
In the 1980s, the HSE had taken responsibility for regulating GMOs on the basis of the Health
and Safety at Work Act etc. 1974 (e.g. ACGM/HSE, 1986, 1990; HSE, 1989). For GMO
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releases, the HSWA could be extended to cover human health aspects, but not environmental
aspects. When the HSE scrutinized the latter aspects of GMO releases, it was really mediating
a voluntary self-regulation by the re1easrs:
Thus a new law would be needed for statutory protection of the environment, for which the
HSE left the initiative to the DoE. Indeed, the HSE argued for exempting GMOs at the
market stage if there was already sectoral product regulation, e.g. for medicines and pesticides
(HSC, 1989). The HSE saw 'no scientific logic' in separately regulating GMOs (interview, 26
September 1991).
By contrast, the Department of the Environment developed scientific and political arguments
for process-based regulation. Before drafting the Environmental Protection Bill (HC14,
1989), the DoE issued a consultation document on GMO regulation, which led to Part VT of
the Bill. The document cited the potential for GMOs to become harmful 'pests', starting from
the earliest trial releases. It also emphasized that public fear of GMOs may threaten wealth
creation; it argued that extra costs of GMO regulation would be offset by the value to industry
from increased public confidence. Without such regulation, 'A distrust of the industry by the
general public could lead, as it apparently has in the USA and Germany, to the development
of potentially wealth-creating products being held up by action on the part of concerned
members of the public' (DoE, 1989: 19, 23).
The document proposed introducing a statutory system of consents with a duty of care (see
section 2 below); this system formalizing the case-by-case, step-by-step procedure which
industry was already developing through voluntary regulation. As DoE staff privately
acknowledged, the extra administrative costs of obeying the new regulations might deter small
firms and individual academic researchers; these were regarded as less likely to think through
the safety and perceptual consequences, or to afford the cost of remedying any damage
(interview, 15 February 1990). Thus civil servants did not entirely regret this regulatory
barrier to entry into biotechnology.
In commenting on the DoE consultation paper, industry criticized some provisions as
implying that GMOs pose exceptional risks; in this regard, industry privately expressed
apprehensions about the DoE's greater role in regulating agricultural products. Nevertheless
industry's written submissions broadly supported the proposed statutory system, partly in
order to reassure the public. In our interviews, they cited the need 'to keep out the cowboys',
whose behaviour might discredit biotechnology in general. Thus a hypothetical intruder
served as a rationale for self-discipline, as well as for policing admission to the 'club' of GMO
releasers.
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Submissions to the DoE from various quarters illustrated the problem of stigma, which was to
arise again in the Parliamentary debate. Industry officials complained that the DoE document
implicitly associated GMOs with pollution, particularly when invoking 'the polluter pays'
principle (CBI, 1989; CIA, 1989; cf. DoE, 1989: 11). In contrast, non-industry submissions
expressed distrust towards the agrichemical companies which were producing GMOs, as well
as towards the DoE for its failure to control pollution and its inexperience with biotechnology.
Public-interest groups largely welcomed the proposed statutory basis for regulation, though
they expressed reservations about its adequacy -- particularly for public access and market
approval of GMO products.
In drafting the legislation, a key reference point was a long-awaited report on GMO releases
from the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. It emphasized that OMO products
offered potential environmental benefits 'which could be frustrated by public opposition
motivated by fear of the unknown' (RCEP, 1989: 62). It also gave more scientific credence to
potential harm from GMO releases, by drawing an analogy between GMOs and non-
indigenous organisms which have become pests; this analogy was being downplayed or denied
by other relevant bodies (NAS, 1987: 14; NRC, 1989: 37-53; OECD, 1990b: 16-17; OECD,
1992: 36). The RCEP recommended more stringent control measures and more public access
than did the DoE paper or the subsequent 1990 Act.
Although the RCEP denied any inconsistency between its own report and the DoE paper,
different emphases were perceived by many commentators. Cross-industry bodies stated, for
example, that the DoE paper 'provides a more realistic and balanced approach to the proposed
legislation', while the RCEP proposals on public involvement 'appear unnecessarily complex
and wide-ranging'. On the other side, public-interest groups repeatedly cited the RCEP report
when arguing for amendents to strengthen the the Environmental Protection Bill, as did some
academics (e.g. Shackley and Sharp, 1989).
2.0 PRECAUTIONARY FEATURES
When the Environmental Protection Bill was passing through Parliament, Britain still had
little sign of public controversy about GMO releases. The main features of Part VI found a
broad acceptance among interested constituencies. The Opposition accepted Part VI as
establishing a responsible regulatory regime, rather than contest the entire matter as a party-
political issue, though its proposal for a Public Biotechnology Commission highlighted
political choices involved in defining the environmental issues (see section 3).
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The Opposition amendments were prompted by the Green Alliance in particular, backed up by
some mass-media reports. In the final stage of the Bill's passage, the government conceded to
such pressures by introducing major new clauses. One provided statutory backing for the
government's advisory committee, ACRE (see chapter 6; Levidow and Taft, 1993: 198). The
other new clauses established public registers of information for GMO releases, though with
significant exemptions to the disclosure requirements (see section 2.7).
In other amendments proposed from the floor, Opposition MPs and Conservative
backbenchers proposed to make existing clauses either more stringent or lax, respectively. In
response, the government repeatedly emphasized that the Bill provided only 'enabling (or
primary) legislation'. It tried to reassure MPs that the precise implementation would be
clarified in the subsequent 'secondary legislation', later issued as draft regulations (DoEIHSC,
1991, 1992). These could be changed more easily than by amending primary legislation, and
with less Parliamentary debate.
These disputes over the wording had two related sources. First, there were difficulties in
translating regulatory lore into a precise technical-legal language. The latter invariably
conflicted with the British consensual style and intensified industry suspicion of the DoE.
Shortly after the 1990 Act passed through Parliament, a leading industrialist complained that
this legislation would jeopardize the 'British pragmatic approach' which biotechnologists had
been developing with the HSE, prior to statutory regulation. At the same time, he expressed
impatience at the requirement 'to spend your time thinking about problems that might arise',
because such an obligation 'would stop the science and product development' (interview, 22
March 1991).
Second, there were inherent difficulties in legislating against hypothetical hazards, as well as
handling the perceived stigma of GMOs. Several precautionary features had an ambiguous
scientific meaning or conflicted with the usual regulatory meaning of 'sound science'. This
section analyses such conflicts -- around how to define GMOs, environmental damage,
consents (licences), risk, the duty of care, and liability; and how to provide information
disclosure.
2.1 Defining GMOs
In order to define GMOs, both the EC Directive and the British legislation distinguished
between artificial techniques and natural processes. Although both documents named
recombinant DNA as an artificial technique, they differed somewhat on other techniques. In
particular, the Directive excluded plant cell fusion 'where the resulting organism can also be
produced by traditional breeding methods', and excluded mutagenesis (EEC, 1990: 22). In
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contrast, the Bill (and EPA, 1990: 116) took a broader scope, by not explicitly exempting any
type of cell fusion, and by including the products of 'mutation-inducing agents'. An HSE
official justified that wide scope by citing both process and product considerations: where
planned release is concerned, 'the definition is further extended to cover in vitro techniques
that would enable the construction of organisms with novel combinations of genes' (CBC,
1990: 13).
Some regulatory advisors felt that there was no scientific basis for the Bill to include
mutagenesis; after all, this was a spontaneous natural process, which by definition could not
be regulated anyway. Industry argued for recognizing the inherent safety of the additional
techniques included in the Bill. In its submission to the RCEP and in discussions with ACRE,
one company argued that its cell fusion products should be exempted from regulation, on the
grounds that the products 'are not significantly different' from those produced by traditional
breeding methods (Nickerson International, 1988).
In response to the published Bill, industry lobbied for amendments that would exclude
mutagenesis and certain types of cell fusion, among other traditional techniques (CBI, 1990;
CIA, 1990). Another amendment cited international guidelines on Good Industrial Large-
Scale Practice for the safe use of GMOs (OECD, 1986: 34-35), in order to propose excluding
GILSP organisms; otherwise, the regulation of GMO releases would apply to effluent from
familiar industrial processes using micro-organisms, especially if the process of mutagenesis
were cited to define an organism as a GMO. For the CBI, inclusion of GILSP organisms
exemplified the negative tone of Part VI, which 'appears to be based on the premise that all
GMOs are dangerous' (cf. CBC, 1990: 31). In interviews, industry complained that such a
broad scope would waste their time and disadvantage them competitively, as well as extending
the perceived stigma of recombinant DNA to other techniques.
When the industry amendments were debated in Parliament, a Conservative member argued
against the broad definition of GMOs as unnecessary, especially because 'the commercial
penalty would be too high a price to pay'. The government acknowledged that the definition
of GMOs was wider in the Bill than in the DoE paper, but argued that it exemplified 'the
precautionary principle at work, particularly as it seeks to control potentially new risks to our
environment'; for example, the definition of the GILSP category might change over time
(Hansard, 6 March 1990: 947-49; 2 July: 1954-56).
Key actors mentioned other reasons for the Bill's wide definition of GMOs. For example,
'The UK position to date is that it is better to cast the net too wide at this stage than to be too
lax.... [This] indicates the problems that will constantly arise in relation to the role of public
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opinion....', according to the chairman of ACRE (Beringer, 1991: 62). According to another
ACRE member, the government had included all possible techniques in order to avoid having
to explain to the public why any were excluded. Likewise, according to members of ACRE's
predecessor committee, there had been reasons of safety and public reassurance for wanting
the voluntary regulation to encompass all 'processes which artificially generate genetic
novelty', such as inter-species cell fusion (Shackley, 1989: 217). One ecologist member had
cited environmental problems even from the products of naturally occurring cell fusion
(Williamson, 1988).
Thus, when the statutory definition of 'GMO' went further than prevailing scientific concepts
of 'artificial techniques', this wording could find some warrant in ecological concepts of
genetic novelty. It also acknowledged the stigma of any process perceived as unnatural.
2.2 Defining environmental damage
During the DoE's consultation period, industry expressed concern that GMO regulation might
impose an endless burden of proof, e.g., by requiring applicants to 'eliminate concerns in
relation to an open-ended, unsubstantiated series of effects' (BSPB, 1989; cf. ICI Seeds,
1989). Perhaps confirming that apprehension, the published Bill defined environmental
damage not only as actual harm, but also as the mere presence of GMOs which are 'capable of
causing harm to the living organisms supported by the environment'. Such 'harm'
encompassed 'interference with the ecological systems' of which those organisms form a part
(HC14: 85; EPA, 1990: 117).
Industry proposed changing this 'emotive and insensitive' wording to denote only actual harm,
mainly 'to avoid the premise that damage to the environment necessarily follows from the
presence of GMOs' (CBI, 1990). It argued that such an impression of government policy
would discourage biotechnology investment in Britain, including foreign investors, who might
misinterpret the government's intention.
The government defended the original wording on grounds that the regulation must be
'anticipatory in every respect'. Labour MP Ann Taylor took the argument further by asserting
that the burden of proof of safety lies on those who want to use GMOs (Hansard, 6 March
1999: 96 1-965). By adopting a precautionary definition of environmental damage, the Act
potentially imposed such a burden of evidence and provisionally stigmatized GMOs as
suspected pollutants.
Indeed, some DoE staff identified with the pollution analogy, in the sense that the introduction
of any novel organism can cause environmental perturbations. They sought more ecological
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knowledge, so as to seta normal baseline from which one could detect deviations and assess
environmental damage. The statutory wording, 'interference with ecological systems', could
later be cited to make open-ended requests for evidence of safety.
The broad definition of environmental damage raised the practical problem that it could be
construed as prohibiting the use of pesticidal biotechnology products. A Conservative
backbencher coined the phrase 'beneficial damage' to denote the intended effect of
biopesticides (Hansard, 6 March 1990: 963). In response, the government amended the
relevant clause to permit exempting specified effects from the prohibition on environmental
damage (EPA, 1990: 117). The additional wording presumed that any effect is harmful unless
it is specifically declared not harmful; thus, despite permitting exemptions, the 1990 Act
remained precautionary.
2.3 Consents for releases
Under the pre-existing voluntary system, releasers notified the HSE of each proposed GMO
release and then reached agreement on appropriate conditions. As an HSE official stated, its
notification system had already been operating 'as if it were a consent system' (CBC, 1990:
13). In effect the voluntary system issued negative consents: as the HSE routinely reported,
'there is no objection in principle to the proposed projects [GMO releases] with particular
respect to the genetic modifications involved' (e.g., HSE letter to Rothamsted Experimental
Station, 26 May 1987).
The 1990 Act formalized that procedure, by establishing positive consents, which accepted
state responsibility for the safety of GMO releases. After submitting a risk assessment for the
proposed GMO release, a notifier is told if a consent is required. If so, then the consent would
specify conditions for the release, such as the experimental design (EPA, 1990: 118-23).
The Green Alliance lobbied Parliament for an amendment requiring a consent for every
release, as recommended by the RCEP report and as required by the EC Directive. In the
Parliamentary debate, a Labour MP tried to amend the Bill 'so that all work with prohibited
organisms would require a consent' (Hansard, 6 March 1990: 986-87); in this argument, the
statutory phrase 'prohibited acts' became 'prohibited organisms', thus confirming and
formalizing the stigma upon all GMOs. In the House of Lords, a RCEP member supported
the amendment by warning that any harm from a GMO release 'could be a recipe for disaster
in the future', in terms of public worry (Hansard, 2 July 1990: 1973). The government
retained the Bill's original wording, in order to maintain a more 'flexible approach', though the
Environment Minister promised that the subsequent regulations would require a consent for
every release (Wilkie, 1990).
90
According to our interviews, industry opposed formalizing such a standard requirement in the
1990 Act itself, because it would block the Tast track' that they sought to establish eventually
for some GMOs. Accommodating that aim, the subsequent regulations provided for a consent
to authorize a series of similar releases over several years (DoEIMAFF, 1992).
In the Parliamentary debate, then, the legal requirement for a consent took on symbolic
meanings about confirming or overcoming the stigma attached to GMOs. The government
was put on the defensive to promise that the regulatory net would in fact catch all releases of
'prohibited organisms'.
2.4 Defining risk and the duty
 of care
In specifying the duty of care, the Bill defined 'risk' in a contentious way. Its wording
prohibited a range of activities with GMOs if 'there is a risk of damage to the environment'
(HC14: 89; EPA, 1990: 120). In an interview, an industry lobbyist criticized that phrase for
compelling applicants to claim that a proposed release is safer than the available information
may warrant. Industry proposed that the legislation instead prohibit 'an unacceptable' or 'an
unreasonable' risk, arguing that all activities entail risks, and that any low risks could be
balanced with large benefits from biotechnology products (CBI, 1990; CIA, 1990).
In the House of Lords, a Conservative Peer argued for the industry amendment as follows:
'The balance of advantage [benefit] over risk calls for very nice judgement. We ought not to
make that nice judgement impossible by putting an unqualified ban on whatever may contain
[entail] an aspect of risk.' Evading that argument, the government emphasized the need 'to
eliminate the risk to the point where it becomes too trivial to warrant further action' (Hansard,
2 July 1990: 198 1-82).
Thus the government reply justified the original wording as permitting only a de minimis risk,
as well as overcoming any stigma of special risk from GMOs. In any case, the DoE's lawyers
had recommended wording the Act to prohibit 'a risk', rather than 'an unacceptable risk' -- lest
the government find itself on weak grounds whenever taking an offender to court. However,
even the most stringent language could not clarify what 'risk' is being prohibited, relative to
what baseline of normality.
Specifying the duty of care for GMO releases, both the EC Directive and DoE paper had
required taking 'reasonably practicable measures' to avoid environmental risks. Similarly; the
published Bill required releasers to 'take all reasonable steps' to know what are the risks and to
take any appropriate precautions. But it also required releasers to use BATNEEC, 'the best
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available technique not entailing excessive cost', except where the release is 'the subject of
conditions attached to the consent'; in such cases, those conditions were to supersede
BATNEEC (HC14: 89).
In the Parliamentary debate, disputes arose over the relevance of BATNEEC. The Opposition
put forward an amendment to delete the BATNEEC provision for all GMO releases, in order
to 'impose the duty of care, regardless of cost, on those who choose to release manipulated
organisms' (Hansard, 6 March 1990: 988-89). The Opposition also suspected that the
BATNEEC criterion might be cited retrospectively, to limit the releaser's legal liability for
environmental damage (Hansard, 30 April 1990: 816).
The government did change the Bill's wording, but in the opposite direction to that demanded
by the Opposition: the final Act applied BATNEEC to all GMO releases, including those
subject to a consent (EPA, 1990: 123). Here the government emphasized the 'best available
technique', thus rhetorically strengthening the duty of care and implying a more stringent
meaning of BATNEEC.
What was its precautionary content? According to my interviews, regulatory actors held quite
different views on how the BATNEEC principle might influence cost considerations, and the
experimental design of GMO releases. For example, BATNEEC could mean tightly
containing a release and/or carefully monitoring a less contained release, in order to obtain
data relevant to the risk-assessment of subsequent ones (Levidow and Tait, 1992: 101). These
ambiguities arose from the problem of legislating against unidentified hazards, prior to any
consensus on what standard precautions might avoid or even detect them.
2.5 Liability for environmental damage
The government rejected environmentalists' demands to impose strict liability upon GMO
releases, but the 1990 Act did establish two kinds of liability. First, the government could
prosecute anyone for violating the regulatory procedures -- in which case the defendant would
hold the burden of proof for compliance with the consent procedure and terms, in addition to
compliance with the BATNEEC criterion, imposed on all GMO activities. Second, if a
violation has resulted in environmental damage, then the releaser could be ordered to take
remedial steps or to reimburse the government for doing so (EPA, 1990: 127-3 1).
With a series of 'probing amendments' -- none of them adopted -- the Opposition argued for
strengthening liability. A releaser convicted of an offence and causing environmental damage
should be liable under legal action initiated by a third party, not just by the government.
Moreover, there should be strict liability for any damage -- that is, regardless of whether the
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releaser violated any regulatory procedures; thus the releaser would have to prove non-
negligence, rather than the plaintiff bearing the burden of proof. There were also calls for
mandatory insurance to cover any such damage. As Ann Taylor MP argued, 'Opposition
Members believe that the polluter should pay, though that is a somewhat simplistic principle
when applied to genetically modified organisms' (Hansard, 6 March 1990: 993). In effect, her
proposal was treating any GMO release as an exceptional or abnormal act (Levidow and Tait,
1992: 102).
Parallel with the 1990 Act, British case law could also consider GMO releases as subject to
civil liability, which covers only damage to persons or their property. The government
suggested that such case law would impose strict liability upon a GMO if there is some
'special us& entailing increased danger. Extending that argument, Lord Clinton-Davis noted
that the RCEP considered any use of a GMO as 'potentially at least a special use which can
bring substantial consequential risks'. For the purpose of liability, he asked, which types of
GMO use should be considered special? (Hansard, 15 October 1990: 704).
There were sharply divergent views about liability, in written submissions and in my
interviews. Linking this issue to the others discussed above, advocates of strict liability cited
special risks of GMO releases, as well as special fears that might make them publicly
unacceptable in the absence of such liability. There were also concerns about how to correlate
any damage with a particular release; it was proposed to require incorporation of a unique
genetic labelling sequence into all GMOs designed for release.
Industry felt that the published Bill adequately provided that all applicants would bear the
regulatory costs of avoiding environmental damage, but it resented mention of the 'polluter
pays' principle: after all, 'no pollution is involved' in GMO releases. Moreover, strict liability
would present great difficulties for insurance premiums -- perhaps very expensive or even
incalculable; for example, one company doubted that releasers would be able to obtain
'insurance cover against "unspecified risks to the environment". On the other side, public-
interest groups doubted that a releaser would have the technical or financial capacity to
remedy any damage. Yet strict liability might once again equate GMOs with pollution. Like
other features of the 1990 Act, the liability issue illustrates dilemmas inherent in precautionary
regulation of GMO releases.
2.6 Public information registers
The published Bill included no provision for information disclosure; the government
undertook to satisfy such requirements of the EC Directive in the subsequent regulations.
However, Opposition MPs and Lords pressed for a statutory provision, as the Environmental
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Protection Bill had done for water pollution, and as the RCEP had recommended. One RCEP
member warned that the potential benefits of GMOs may be Trustrated by public opposition
motivated by fear of the unknown unless that information is available' (Hansard, 18 May
1990: 538).
Opposition demands found backing in the national press, especially the New Scientist, whose
articles deployed pollution analogies. Science journalists posed the question of 'why these
organisms are being treated differently from other risks' (Watts, 1990). This was an 'anomaly'
because the Bill included 'major concessions for other aspects of pollution' - e.g., rivers - but
yet allowed 'secrecy' for GMOs (Mime and Watts, 1990).
At the final stage of the Bill's passage, the government conceded by introducing two new
clauses on public registers of information. The first one incorporated the minimum
requirements of the EC Directive (EEC, 1990: 20). However, contrary to the Directive, the
second amendment permitted any detail to be excluded on three different grounds --
commercial confidentiality, potential environmental damage, and national security (EPA,
1990: 13 1-32); the first two grounds accommodated industry demands. Let us consider each
exclusion in turn.
** Commercial confidentiality: Many participants regarded the method of gene insertion, the
'precise genetic construct', as the most confidential information. However, some public-
interest groups considered such knowledge about the genetic modification process as essential
for judging safety. Some industrialists privately acknowledged that this information would no
longer be a trade secret by the time a GMO reached the stage of trial release. Moreover, as
ACRE members, potential competitors had full access to release applications (see Chapter 6).
Thus 'commercial confidentiality' could serve as a pretext for restricting substantive access to
the risk-assessment procedure; on the other hand, such secrecy could aggravate the stigma of
GMOs as suspected pollutants.
** Environmental damage: This referred to the prospect of politically motivated vandalism,
where disruption of physical containment could mean 'damaging the environment' (Hansard,
30 October 1990: 901). The 1990 Act permitted withholding the site on these grounds. Yet
such secrecy could stigmatize the GMO as hazardous.
** National security: Presumably this referred to biological warfare, an area where the
putative distinction between offensive and defensive research has been contentious (Wright,
1990). As a science journalist noted, 'The national security clause is bound to encourage the
belief that germ warfare products are being tested on an unsuspecting public, scarcely the
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image the biotechnology industiy wants to project' (Ince, 1992). Thus, even if this exemption
were never implemented, it stigmatizes GMOs in general.
With the statutory register of information, the British government extended a general tendency
to establish licencing systems which can authorize and justify hazardous activities. That is,
wherever they grant licences with specific conditions, regulatory agencies are expected to
explain the rationale behind decisions and to explain it to a wider audience than previously
(Macrory, 1986: 68). In this vein, the government conceded to demands for guaranteed
information disclosure on GMO releases. The broad statutory grounds for withholding
information, however, ifiustrated pervasive dilemmas: how to handle the stigma of GMOs,
and how to use information disclosure for minimizing public conflict.
3.0 LIMITS OF REGULATION
As described above, disputes over the technical-legal language remained formally within the
'risk' problem of preventing physically measurable harm from GMOs or their inserted genes.
This scenario excluded broader accounts of the environmental issues, as manifest in public
debate (see Chapter 3). For this reason, some pressure groups sought a Public Biotechnology
(or Ethics) Commission in order to assess GMO products in terms of environmental benefit
and/or socio-economic need.
This proposal met mixed responses. Some regulatory advisors saw such a body as helpful for
clarifying policy issues outside ACRE's remit, or even controversial defmitions of
environmental harm relevant to the risk assessment itself. Other advisors doubted whether it
could reconcile the different viewpoints being represented. Industrialists felt apprehensive
about any Public Biotechnology Commission, though more amenable to an Ethics
Commission -- perhaps because its remit could separate ethical from environmental issues,
which could then remain the preserve of technical experts.
In the Parliamentary debate, Opposition MPs supported creating a public body additional to
ACRE. As Bryan Gould argued,
'We can easily imagine the impact that GMOs might have in the hands of self-
centred, multinational companies with laser-beam objectives... It calls into play
the increasingly familiar worries about the moral propriety of mankind playing
God... some people will be able to manipulate life for their own specific
purposes' (Hansard, 6 March 1990: 952-53).
Another warned about 'some people latching on to the idea that we can fix the environment
and that GMOs could solve our problems' (ibid.: 956). A colleague argued that the proposed
Commission would provide reassurance for the public about 'over-commercial objectives and
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over-rapid development' (ibid.: 977). Thus its proponents reconnected ethical, environmental
and strategic R&D issues.
The government rejected the proposed Commission, with three main arguments. First, it
would create 'a quango-lilce body interfering with the actions of the Secretary of State, who is
answerable to Parliament and the people' (ibid.: 977). Second, it would obstruct technological
advance and thus socio-economic progress (ibid: 955). Third, any environmental assessment
remained separable from ethical questions; as the Environment Minister acknowledged, he
took for granted 'separating ethics from the environment, and the environment from patents'
(ibid.: 971).
In a subsequent round of debate, the Opposition challenged those separations by emphasizing
'the environmental impact of plants which have been manipulated to be resistant to herbicides,
allowing broader application of those herbicides'. The government replied by exaggerating
the remit of its scientific advisory committees: for example, 'the committee will be able to
advise on pesticide development' (Hansard, 16 October 1990: 699-702). As ACRE later
learned, that remit turned out to mean advising on GMO biopesticides, rather than the
herbicide implications which were raised raised in public debate.
Thus the government devised several ways of handling environmental concerns which ran
beyond ACRE's remit and perhaps beyond government regulation. It rhetorically stretched
that remit, while appealing to ACRE's moral authority. It also relegated wider environmental
concerns to some vague realm of 'ethics', as distinct from a testable realm of 'product safety',
whose regulation might legitimize an otherwise contentious development. At issue here was
not simply acceptable risk, but acceptable strategic purposes and forms of environmental
control. (See also discussion of the Fourth Hurdle in Chapter 9, section 1.1.)
4.0 CONCLUSION: STATUTORY DILEMMAS
Britain adopted new legislation designed to provide a legitimate safety imprimatur for GMO
releases. Previously GMO releases came under a voluntary system operated by the HSE,
which saw no scientific basis for regulating them separately. Unlike the HSE, the DoE now
articulated an explicitly precautionary rationale for doing so.
The new process-based legislation incorporated the dual aims of anticipating hazards and
public unease about them; these aspects were not clearly separable, given that regulatory
actors could cite divergent scientific accounts of plausible hazards. For its dual anticipatory
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role, new legislation gave the DoE broad enabling powers, within which it could negotiate
appropriate controls, case by case.
In particular, the 1990 Environmental Protection Act authorized the state to specify and
enforce conditions for each GMO release, while flexibly allowing for different levels of
control. Industry regarded such a licensing system as essential, both for restricting access to
the 'club' of GMO releasers and for making their activities publicly acceptable. Although
wary of extra regulatory costs, it regarded these as a necessary investment in political stability,
as the government had argued.
Although biotechnology regulators claimed to base their policy upon 'sound science', its usual
meaning was now altered, by shifting the burden of evidence onto the applicant. This shift
was backed up by a stringent technical-legal language, which went beyond even the
precautionary features of the EC Deliberate Release Directive. For example, the British law
adopted an even broader process-based definition of GMOs, prohibited any release entailing 'a
risk', and defined environmental damage as the mere presence of organisms 'capable of
causing it. The government defended this language as essential features of a precautionary
approach.
Industry attacked the statutory language -- on grounds that it encompassed naturally occurring
mutations, lacked any scientific basis, stigmatized GMOs as pollutants, and might require
proof of zero risk for a range of unspecified hazards. This conflict arose partly from
difficulties in legislating against hypothetical hazards, prior to any agreed risk-assessment
method or cause-effect model of potential harm. The conflict also arose from industry fears
that the DoE would jeopardize the consultative relation which biotechnologists had developed
with the HSE, as in other regulatory areas (e.g. Weale, 1992: 104).
The statutory duty of care imposed the BATNEEC criterion, 'best available technology not
entailing excessive cost'. As developed within pollution control, this criterion meant an
explicit trade-off between cost and risk reduction, for example, by imposing costs to force
technological improvements (O'Riordan, 1989; RCEP, 1988: 6). BATNIEEC had a more
ambiguous meaning when extended to GMO regulation, which lacked any agreed basis for
deciding what hypothetical hazards warrant preventive measures, much less how to prevent
them. At the same time, by making assumptions explicit, the BATNEEC criterion potentially
offered an opportunity for public participation, especially if coupled with information
disclosure.
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Some aspects of the 1990 Act exemplify a more widespread tension, such as in regulating
pollution or hazardous chemicals. Intended to facilitate long-term investment decisions,
licencing systems attempt to provide clear safety standards, yet they do so by adopting a
standard scientific language to encompass diverse types of pollution hazards (O'Riordan and
Wynne, 1987: 394). This technical-legal integration often results in legal texts 'where the
language employed appears to be scientific terminology but which in fact compromises to a
significant degree the scientific approach' (Macrory, 1986: 70). For pollution or chemical
hazards, symbolic language conveys an omniscient control, thus concealing or even denying
the practical, case-by-case complexities of risk management.
In the case of GMO releases, Britain's new legislation likewise carried a symbolic language of
safe control, yet its terms undermined the usual regulatory pretence of following 'the scientific
approach'. In other areas, British regulators have negotiated appropriate controls, flexibly and
discreetly, thus keeping the scientific basis implicit and apparently neutral (Jasanoff, 1986:
28-32, 80-8 1). For GMO releases, however, legislation adopted a broad technical-legal
language which could encompass all hypothetical hazards, authorize regulators to request
more evidence of safety, and hold releasers liable for any damage. This precautionary
framework strained the 'rational' British image of science-based regulation; indeed, it
implicitly acknowledged ignorance about cause-effect models of harm, even stigmatizing
GMOs as suspected pollutants.
There was a related problem in defining legal liability: the government rejected proposals to
impose strict liability, which might have resulted in incalculably high insurance premiums and
conferred greater stigma upon GMOs. On the one hand, the 1990 Act authorized penalties
only against GMO releasers who violate safety procedures, and authorized the state to remedy
damage resulting from such violations; the state would act as a last-resort insurer, as in other
industrial sectors (Lowi, 1990: 30). On the other hand, the 1990 Act allowed releasers to
avoid liability for damage by demonstrating that they had complied with the duty of care, i.e.
with all written conditions and the BATNEEC criterion; in this respect, the law might protect
activities which turn out to cause harm (as in earlier pollution cases, e.g. Macrory, 1983: 161-
62).
By imposing only limited liability for environmental damage, the 1990 Act left biotechnology
more vulnerable to public suspicion of incalculable risks, as some government advisors had
warned. Not only accidents, but even the suspicion of them, can undermine the regulatory
facade of security. Historically, insurance measures have provided a consensual 'social -
compact against industrially produced hazards and damages', yet such measures can less
credibly accommodate the incalculable risks of nuclear power, chemical industry and
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biotechnology -- technologies which 'have suspended the principle of insurance' (Beck, 1992b:
100-105). In this regard, the 1990 Act had a limited capacity for legitimizing biotechnology:
it authorized stringent government controls to prevent and even remedy harm from GMO
releases, yet it limited legal liability to foreseeable harm.
Further limits to legitimacy were manifest in Parliamentary debate over how broadly to define
the environmental issues. The precautionary remit of the 1990 Act was designed to anticipate
how GMOs might cause physically measurable harm, but not how their use might aggravate
systemic agricultural hazards. The latter concern partly motivated calls to establish a Public
Biotechnology Commission, yet the British government rejected this proposal by simply
equating technological advance with socio-economic progress.
This government stance made explicit the working assumption which underlay the procedural
rationality of safety regulation. That is, it treated biotechnological 'risk' as a scientifically
testable property of organisms, analytically separable from the benign environmental control
provided by biotechnology. Thus, as the Parliamentary debate revealed, safety regulation had
the problematic role of substituting for any consensus on 'progress', which normally gets
defined by a private sub-politics, beyond state control (Beck, 1992a: 209).
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Chapter 6
BRITAIN'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Incorporating the EC Deliberate Release Directive into British law, the Department of the
Environment oversaw enactment of process-based legislation, as the Environmental
Protection Act Part VI. In parallel, the government established the Advisory Committee
on Releases to the Environment (ACRE). This move focused arguments on the
appropriate administrative control and scientific rationale for regulating GMO releases.
How did the government designate the 'competent authority' for GMO regulation? How
did it Set ACRE's remit and composition? How did it define the relevant expertise for risk
assessment? How was ACRE structured to handle underlying value conflicts? How did
these changes relate to Britain's consultative style of safety regulation?
This chapter analyses how ACRE was constituted; it sets the stage for analysing ACRE's
operation in subsequent chapters. This one discusses, in turn:
* ACRE's origins within the pre-existing regulatory system (section 1);
* ACRE's combined remit for both GMOs and non-indigenous organisms (section 2);
* ACRE's composition, representing diverse perspectives and interests (section 3); and
* tensions around ACRE's role (section 4).
Note: This chapter is developed from a paper which contains more detail on certain
aspects, especially on ACRE's precursors and its statutory basis (Levidow and Tait, 1993:
195-98).
1.0 ACRE'S ORIGINS
A series of advisory committees has accompanied the transition from the contained use to
the intentional release of GMOs (see Table 6.1). In the mid-1970s, concerns focused upon
hypothetical health hazards from the laboratory process of genetic modification and the
resulting organisms, particularly any escapes from the laboratory. For regulating the
laboratory experiments, in 1977 the UK government established the Genetic Manipulation
Advisory Group (GMAG), attached to the Department of Education and Science (DES).
In constituting GMAG, the government faced some conflict between public concerns over
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R&D priorities and the committee's limited terms of reference (Levidow and Tait, 1993:
195).
When GMAG was replaced in 1984 by the Advisory Committee on Genetic Manipulation
(ACGM), the change signalled that public unease had subsided over GMOs in contained
use. They were expected to enter large-scale industrial production; genetic manipulation
would now be treated as a routine aspect of human health and safety, for which the
Department of Employment, particularly the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), had
statutory responsibility under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act (HSWA) 1974.
Within the standard tripartite structure of HSE committees, the TUC enlarged its
representation on the ACGM but lost the argument for the new committee's remit to
include ethical issues, which in any case lay beyond the terms of the HSWA 1974.
Table 6.1: ACREs ORIGINS
DES: (1977) GMAG
\
HSE: (1984) ACGM - PRSC/IISC (1986)
N 
ACRE (1990)
Do E:	 IACI (1989)
Key to abbreviations (in alphabetical order)
ACGM: Advisory Committee on Genetic Manipulation
ACRE: Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment
DES:	 Department of Education and Science
DoE:	 Department of the Environment
GMAG: Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group
HSE:	 Health and Safety Executive
IACI:	 Interim Advisory Committee on Introductions
USC:	 lntetional Introductions Sub-Committee
PRSC: Planned Release Sub-Committee
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1.1 Release committees
In 1986 the ACGM set up a subcommittee anticipating a new stage, the intentional release
of GMOs, even before that prospect had generated much public concern in Britain.
Initially named the Planned Release Sub-Committee, it was soon renamed the Intentional
Introductions Sub-Committee (IISC). Subsidiary to the ACGM, operating within the
HSE, the IISC followed the tripartite model of health & safety committees. Its 'specialist
members' included a CBI nominee, a TUC nominee, and scientific experts drawn from
academia and government-run research bodies. IISC included representatives from other
government-funded bodies, such as the Nature Conservancy Council and the Association
of Metropolitan Authorities; the latter was represented by an Environmental Health
Officer.
Even in the case of TUC and CBI nominees, IISC members were appointed for their
individual expertise, though this was flexibly defined. Worker safety has been the
ostensible rationale for trade-union involvement in HSE committees, yet little concern was
expressed about GMO releases posing health hazards, except for allergenic reactions to
pollen. Some committee members informally described the TUC nominees on the ACGM
and uSC as the 'public-interest' side. As an HSE official stated in retrospect, the HSE
didn't think about getting representation from 'public-interest groups' on uSC, because the
TUC played that role by representing workers (interview, 26 September 1991).
In addition to the 'specialist members', the committee included representatives of relevant
departments, mainly the HSE, DoE, MAFF, DTI and DHSS. Previously such individuals
had attended ACGM meetings; now their role was formalized as 'assessors' on IISC. The
assessors did not officially shape the committee's advice but could influence their
department's policy. Formally speaking, the HSE secretariat channeled the IISC's advice
through the ACGM to the Employment Minister, though ACGM rarely discussed the
advice in detail.
By the late 1980s, various pressures were mounting to broaden the IISC's composition.
According to another study, most members thought the committee had sufficient
ecological expertise, even though only two or three members were considered 'card-
carrying' ecologists; one regarded himself as 'the only cautious ecologist' who regularly
attended IISC meetings. Interested organizations outside the committee proposed that its
ecological component be expanded, and that the DoE become the lead agency for
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regulating GMO releases, so as to safeguard environmental concerns (Shackley, 1988: 79-
81; 1989: 214).
By 1989 the DoE was receiving advice on the same GMO release applications from a
temporary DoE committee, the Interim Advisory Committee on Introductions (TAd),
whose membership included several ecologists. Set up in 1989, that committee also
advised the DoE on proposals to introduce non-indigenous organisms, for which the DoE
had statutory responsibility under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. For GMO
regulation, the DoE had only an indirect role.
ACRE was now separated from its original parent body, the ACGM. The new committee
assumed responsibility for advising on proposed releases of both GMOs and non-
indigenous organisms. In this way, ACRE replaced both the uSC and IACI, respectively.
1.2 ACRE's Joint Secretariat (HSE/DoE
In April 1990, the government created a new committee, ACRE, in parallel with statutory
regulation of GMO releases. ACRE was constituted by combining all key features of its
predecessor committees: that is, both the HSE and DoE; both human and environmental
safety; and both GMOs and non-indigenous organisms, thus replacing both the IISC and
JACI (see Table 6.1). How to involve their former host departments, the HSE and DoE,
was an awkward political question, whose answer -- a Joint Secretariat -- found a scientific
rationale.
During the regulatory transition period, the DoE proposed that the government continue
'the present arrangements which channel the advice on genetic manipulation... through a
single committee (ACGM)'; it implied that the Environment Minister should take over full
responsibility for regulating GMO releases (DoE, 1989: 8, 10). Meanwhile the Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution recommended that the advisory committee
should be 'constituted as a committee in its own right', linked to the ACGM through an
overlapping membership and joint secretariat, and replacing both the IISC and TACI
(RCEP, 1989: 59-6 1). Similar proposals arose in various submissions replying to the 1989
DoE consultation paper.
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Eventually the government clarified the arrangements for the new committee: ACRE was
to be located in the HSE, financed by the DoE, and handled by a Joint Secretariat
involving both departments. Most importantly, the Environment Minister would take all
decisions; in a slip of the tongue, the government speaker clarified that the
Department of Employment 'will have no direct responsibility for any releases of pollution
into the environment' (Hansard, 6 March 1990: 996).
Industry had preferred to keep the relevant committee within the HSE. In interviews, one
industrialist complained that the DoE had neglected to consult industiy before setting up
the IACI, which included no industry representatives; he was concerned to avoid any
difficulties with the DoE. Consequently (see Map 6.1, left-hand side), he preferred that
the 'IISC continue dealing with GMO releases, operating within the HSE, rather than have
the DoE set up its own committee for GMOs'; that way, applicants would 'get a single post
box located within the HSE, rather than have to notify the DoE as well'. (For a guide to
the cognitive maps, see Chapter 2, section 5.)
This industrialist also expected that 'regulators would nurture a better rapport with
industry' through the HSE, than through the DoE. That preference reflected the
comfortable working relationship that applicants had developed with the HSC and the HSE
through the experience of voluntary regulation. Industry's concern about the DoE's
expertise, much more than a technical matter, implied misgivings about the DoE's
environmental perspective.
An industry lobbyist (individual code 12) gave similar reasons. In an HSE-based
committee, moreover, 'members would have a background in genetic modification from
the ACGM', in contrast to a DoE committee; thus ACRE would have adequate expertise to
'reject any release lacking sufficient control to prevent a gene from escaping'. In the name
of careful safety precautions, this rationale privileged laboratory-based over ecological
expertise. In preferring the HSE over the DoE, industrialists cited ostensibly scientific
reasons which narrowly defined the risk problem.
A related issue was whether to combine the environmental and health aspects. During
1989 civil servants were discussing proposals to separate them. That is, the DoE's IACI
would expand its role by taking on all the environmental considerations for GMO releases,
as well as for non-indigenous organisms. Meanwhile the HSE's uSC would consider only
the human health aspects (DoE interview, 15 February 1990).
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Ultimately, the government favoured minimizing the number of committees, partly for
administrative convenience, as did industry (see Maps 6.1 and 6.2). In this vein, the
Health & Safety Commission advocated combining consideration of human health and
environmental safety: to separate them 'would be unacceptable to industry and inefficient
in terms of the machinery of goverment' (HSC, 1989) -- even though these aspects were in
fact separated in other regulatory areas. As a scientific rationale, an HSE official later
reflected, 'We recognized that there are environmental considerations in contained use, and
they [DoE] recognized that there are health and safety implications in releases' (interview,
26 September 1991).
Underlying that issue was a more substantive one: which Minister would grant consents
for GMO releases. 'We suggest that the authority co-ordinating these adminisirative
aspects should be the HSE, which is already running the existing notification system',
argued the Health and Safety Commission (HSC, 1989). Perhaps as a compromise, it
suggested forming an HSEIDoE Joint Secretariat, which was needed 'to publicly signal the
involvement of the DoE in these structures and the responsibility of their Minister' (HSC,
1989).
However, other advisors regarded the DoE's leading role as essential for fulfilling the
perceptual and safety aims of precautionary regulation. The DoE's symbolic importance
was emphasized by the chair of uSC (and subsequently of ACRE), John Beringer, in his
commentary on the 1989 DoE consultation paper: 'it is important for the "Department of
the Environment" to be seen to be concerned about the Environment'. In an interview, an
RCEP member likewise remarked that the Environment Minister must be made
responsible for GMO releases, in order for the regulatory system to have public credibility.
By designating the DoE as the responsible authority, within a Joint Secretariat for ACRE,
the government could fulfill several aims: it provided continuity with the IISC and HSE,
enhanced the DoE's role, combined environmental with human health considerations, and
gave applicants a 'single postbox'. ACRE provided a framework for reconciling the
different perspectives of the HSE and DoE, for accommodating public and industry
concerns, and for negotiating any conflicts within confidential procedures. This move had
a scientific rationale which could also serve as an ex-post justification for an administrative
compromise.
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2.0 GMOs AS 'NOVEL ORGANISMS'
When the formation of ACRE was announced in April 1990, the committee's remit was
defined as follows: 'to advise on all aspects of the human and environmental health and
safety of the introduction into the UK environment of genetically modified and other novel
organisms; and in particular to advise on proposals for specific introductions, on research
needs, and on proposed regulations and written guidance' (DoEIHSE, 1990). Each of
those aspects provided opportunities for the committee to develop a precautionary
approach. Its content was both justified and circumscribed by the key term, 'other novel
organisms', which implied a naturalistic framework for the risk problem, somewhat
abstracted from intensive monoculture.
In particular, 'novel organisms' lent support to the analogy between releasing GMOs and
introducing non-indigenous organisms into Britain. Similarly, ACRE's parent committee
had noted that 'the deliberate release of novel types to foreign habitats could occasionally
disturb the natural equilibrium of those habitats' (ACGM/HSE, 1990: 5). A DoE official
later made the analogy more explicit: 'Since a GMO is regarded as a "novel" organism,
parallels have sometimes been drawn with the introduction of non-indigenous or exotic
organisms into the environment, some of which have caused harm to the environment in
the past' (Smith, 1992: 9).
Although the government was not officially classifying GMOs as 'novel organisms', there
was wide agreement upon initially regulating their intentional release as if they were such.
Here the novelty denoted new genetic combinations which were made possible by the
genetic modification process. On this rationale, the regulatory procedure would require
similar scientific expertise for assessing both GMOs and non-indigenous organisms
proposed for release.
Industry welcomed the combined remit for ACRE. As one CBI nominee on ACRE stated
(see Map 6.2, right-hand side), the government should combine the existing committees
and their remits in order to 'go through similar thought processes about potential
environmental impact' for both types of organism. Provisionally accommodating the
analogy, (Map 6.1, right-hand side), industry should 'accept that GMOs are novel
organisms', so that government can 'combine regulation of GMOs with non-indigenous
organisms', so that industry would obtain a 'regulation convenient for companies trading
between sites', as well as the advantages of dealing with the HSE for both categories.
Through such means, this industrialist sought ultimately to 'cut down on bureaucracy' and
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'avoid an increased regulatory burden' on industry. Similarly, an industry lobbyist (12)
favoured a combined remit, preferably within the HSE; otherwise the industry would face
regulatory 'chaos'.
Moreover, by citing the analogy to non-indigenous organisms, regulators could more
readily justify process-based GMO regulation in scientific terms. For example, a TUC
representative on ACRE spoke for many other members when he later wrote,
There is no inherent danger in an organism produced by genetic modification, or
any other technique which changes the genetic material. There may be a danger
associated with the introduction of an alien organism into a new environment
(Kinderlerer, 1992: 23).
In this sense, he regarded a process-based approach as warranted only insofar as the
genetic modification process might turn familiar organisms into 'alien' ones.
Similarly, as ACRE members stated in my research interviews, they saw a scientific basis
for imposing a special regulatory procedure -- not for GMOs as such, but for genetic
novelty, regardless of its source, whether genetically modified or non-indigenous.
ACRE's combined remit for both kinds of 'novel organisms' provided, in their view, a
better scientific rationale for the committee's existence than would regulating GMOs alone.
For them, the process of genetic modification served as a signal for genetic novelty, and
thus for ecological uncertainty, not for any inherent hazards from the process as such.
For the DoE, the genetic novelty of GMOs warranted imposing additional regulation, for
reasons manifest in the published risk-assessment criteria: reproduction methods, host
range, etc. (ACGM/HSE, 1986). In their view, any genetic change could generate an
ecological perturbation, which regulators must try to anticipate. Ecologist members and
some DoE staff particularly favoured ACRE's combined remit for 'novel organisms'
because it would facilitate scrutinizing GMOs for enhanced selective advantage, a problem
already manifest by some non-indigenous organisms introduced into Britain.
By treating GMOs as 'novel organisms', the DoE could cite potential weediness as a
relevant, documented phenomenon for that overall category of organisms; thus the
regulatory system could describe itself as preventing familiar as well as novel hazards.
With that analogy to documented hazards of non-indigenous organisms, the DoE could
better justify its precautionary approach, which nevertheless was anticipating hazards not
already documented for GMOs. Such anticipation, seeking evidence of safety, might be
more difficult to justify in terms of scientific rationality.
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Like the DoE, the HSE also favoured replacing two committees with one, but mainly for
administrative reasons, not particularly in order to combine GMOs with non-indigenous
organisms. The combined remit 'was nothing to do with us', stated an HSE official
(interview, 26 September 1991). Nor could the HSE easily imagine the analogy to non-
indigenous organisms being confirmed, especially for plant crops. With its statutory
responsibility for human health, the HSE was most concerned to scrutinize genetically
modified vaccines based on live viruses, perhaps shortly to be tested on people. For such
vaccines, however, the HSE could not imagine an analogy with non-indigenous organisms.
Industry accepted the conceptual similarity between GMOs and non-indigenous organisms,
but did so in order ultimately to prove their dissimilarity. In the present political climate,
'You can't really get away from the fact that GMOs are novel organisms', acknowledged
one industrialist (code Ii). While regretting the stigma thereby attached, industry expected
the case-by-case assessment procedure would eventually remove the stigma: according to a
CBI nominee (Cl) on ACRE, the procedure would exonerate GMOs derived from familiar
crops, while confirming that the special risk assessment is warranted mainly for non-
indigenous organisms. At a symbolic level, the hypothetical analogy acknowledged the
stigma associated with GMOs, in a way which could overcome it; given the spectre of
GMOs running out of control, the regulatory procedure could translate this into scientific
terms.
In this way, ACRE's combined remit could provisionally reconcile process-based
regulation with its industry critics. This remit accommodated conflicting views, regarding
whether or why GMO regulation was scientifically warranted. These conflicts could now
be negotiated within a common framework for risk assessment of 'novel organisms'; thus a
hypothetical scientific analogy served to avoid a political-administrative impasse.
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3.0 ACRE's COMPOSITION
During the Parliamentary debate on the Environmental Protection Bill, Part VII, the
government came under pressure to demonstrate the independence of safety regulation
from commercial pressures. In response, it repeatedly cited the high reputation of its
advisory committee; this claim partly explains why the government ultimately amended
the Bill to make the committee statutory (Levidow and Tait, 1993: 198). For similar
reasons of legitimacy, the government gave ACRE a broad composition; it sought a
membership which would incorporate public concerns yet achieve an apparent consensus,
thus protecting the neutral image of regulatory science. Constituted with these aims,
ACRE embodied an inherent tension between its expert basis and its implicitly social
remit.
In numerical terms, ACRE's membership totaled 22, as compared to the uSC's 13, apart
from the officials representing various government departments (see Levidow and Tait,
1993: 202). Expanding on the HSE tripartite structure, the Joint Secretariat increased the
number of ecologists, and increased the CBI and TUC nominees from one to three each.
Two of the latter had no specific scientific expertise, as was the case for two other
appointees -- a 'farmer' and an 'environmentalist'. This meant stretching the 'expert'
category beyond scientific disciplines.
3.1 Scientific expertise
En terms of scientists, ACREs composition included more ecologists and a lower
proportion of members engaged in genetic modification work, as compared to IISC.
ACRE included some ex-members of IACI, the DoE committee which had considered
mainly non-indigenous organisms. By adding expertise in plant agronomy and ecology
(including population biology, population genetics and virology), the DoE was responding
to the increased number of plant GMOs being released.
The ecologists' role was enhanced amidst an international controversy on hypothetical
hazards, with conflicting risk perceptions among scientific disciplines (see Chapter 1,
section 1.2; Chapter 4, section 1.2). In this context, ACRE's broad composition could
better explore ecological uncertainties and legitimize regulatory decisions. As one
ecologist member noted, 'We are here' as a result of government sensitivity to public
unease about GMO releases (interview, 26 June 1991). For similar reasons of public
perception, industry too had advocated adding 'independent environmental scientists', in
commenting on the 1989 DoE consultation paper.
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Yet industry also sought a diverse expertise as a safeguard against unreasonable requests.
According to one industrialist, 'the regulation should be run by non-industry people who
understand industry'. As shown in the cognitive map (see Map 6.3, left-hand side), the
government should 'use a tripartite structure for ACRE', including ecologists, so as to 'put
together a body whose collective expertise satisfies all concerns', within which industry
could 'try to counterbalance the excesses of over-enthusiastic dons', presumably meaning
over-regulation. Such a balanced composition would help to 'base ACRE's decisions upon
good-quality science'.
Likewise, according to a CBI nominee on ACRE (see Map 6.4, right-hand side), the
government should 'include a balance of expertise on ACRE', whose diverse composition
would help regulators to 'avoid scientifically nonsensical requests to the releaser'. Industry
would 'get sensible and balanced safeguards', which would both 'remove unnecessary
burdens and delays' and 'prevent anything untoward from happening'. Similarly, an HSE
official regarded such 'industrial realism' as an essential part of ACRE's composition and
risk-assessment discussions. However, the notion of a 'balanced judgement' stood in
tension with efforts to represent public concerns, suggesting that more than science was
involved.
3.2 Representing the Public
In public debate on the new committee's composition, some proposals had gone beyond
adding ecologists. When public-interest organizations had lobbied Parliament to put
forward amendents making ACRE statutory, their proposed wording would have also
guaranteed that the committee represent a wide range of expertise and interests (Levidow
and Tait, 1993: 198). In particular, the Association of Metropolitan Authorities sought to
ensure a role for its Environmental Health Officers, who were already represented on
ACRE; the Green Alliance sought representation for 'wider environmentalist interests'.
When the Environment Minister initially rejected any such amendment, he stated that 'I
have stopped short of putting anyone on the Committee from any green lobby' (Hansard, 6
March 1990: 976). Nevertheless, ACRE's Joint Secretariat largely followed the
Opposition's proposed categories when appointing the membership, announced only six
weeks later. Accordingly, the government appointments encompassed diverse expertise
and views, and expanded the implicit public-interest representation, including an
'environmentalist'. What might have led to that shift?
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Donna Haber, a TUC nominee on ACGM and later on ACRE, had urged broadening the
composition as a way to handle public unease. Appealing to industry, she proposed that
public-interest groups be invited to raise their concerns in the advisory committee.
Otherwise, she warned, they will do so 'in the press and outside the committee and other
places, where perhaps unnecessary controversy will be caused, which in turn will do
damage to your industry' (CBC, 1990: 43).
Although Haber also expected greater safety to result from such representation, industry
apparently accepted her proposal more in terms of public perception. In the DoE (1989)
consultation exercise, before ACRE's formation, industry submissions had emphasized the
importance of winning public confidence: for example, 'the legitimate concerns of the
public must be addressed in a way that allays their fears'. Accordingly, the committee's
membership should include 'independent environmental scientists', as well as 'non-experts
(wise men)' or 'laypersons'. One company even proposed including 'representatives of
environmental and consumer groups acting on behalf of the general public'.
In subsequent interviews, industrialists elaborated upon their reasons. As one said (see
Map 6.3, left-hand side), 'We need to see ACRE from two standpoints: as a regulatory
body and the public perception of it.' Given that the trade unions claim to represent a large
proportion of the public, including farmworkers, TUC nominees would help the committee
to consider public perception, more than scientists alone would do. Decision-making
would then 'allow the public to feel comfortable with GMO releases'. Moreover, he noted,
a widened composition would help avoid the risk of an appeal against ACRE's advice.
These comments illustrate the dual meaning of precautionary regulation for GMO releases.
While largely welcoming ACRE's diverse composition, industry expressed unease that an
excessively wide participation could undermine the committee's grounding in specialist
expertise. In particular, industry opposed the explicit 'public-interest representation'
advocated by some pressure groups. One CBI nominee on ACRE argued, for example,
that such an official designation would usurp the Environment Minister's authority as the
elected official responsible to Parliament and therefore his public-interest authority. That
objection expressed a dilemma about how to widen the committee's membership, while
restricting its remit and the non-scientists' role on the committee.
If not 'public-interest' representatives, then why not appoint additional ACRE members
nominated by a particular constituency? The TUC's Donna Haber had advocated such a
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basis, so that such members would feel secure in their position on the committee.
Reflecting on GMAG's role in regulating the contained use of GMOs, she noted that the
'public-interest representatives', appointed as individuals, had lacked authority by not
formally representing a constituency (CBC, 1990: 43). In effect, Haber's proposal would
have more formally extended a feature of Britain's traditional regulatory approach, by
using advisory committees to encompass representatives of relevant constituencies.
However, most ACRE members and civil servants felt that committee members should
primarily represent diverse backgrounds and expertise, rather than organizations as such.
Although the ACRE Secretariat solicited nominees from the CBI and TUC, it saw no
rationale for choosing a particular organization to nominate a public-interest
representative, who anyway would have little means for consulting a relevant constituency.
All those arguments coalesced in the decision to appoint a 'fanner' and an
'environmentalist' -- as individuals, not as organizational representatives.
3.3 'Environmentalist'
As Parliamentary officer of the Green Alliance, Julie Hill was the only person from an
environmentalist organization who had requested a meeting with DoE staff to discuss
details of the Environmental Protection Bill. In so doing, the Green Alliance demonstrated
its interest in the technical-legal issues of the Bill, similar in form to the procedural
rationality of ACRE itself. In representing the Green Alliance at a key public conference
(CBC, 1990), she had raised various issues which the DoE in particular expected ACRE to
discuss.
Before the government decided to appoint her, an HSE interviewee had expressed some
ambivalence about choosing someone from 'an environmental pressure group' (15
February 1990). After her appointment, another HSE official described the decision in
more positive terms: she was appointed not as a representative but 'as a specialist who has
access to a more general environmental constituency', by analogy to TUC members of
scientific advisory committees: 'Because they're not so closely associated with the science
of the issue, they can often get to the heart of the matter much better than scientists can.'
In this view, ACRE most needed someone 'who had a greater feel for broad-brush
environmental issues', stated an HSE official (interview, 26 September 1991).
According to Julie Hill, her membership was solicited mainly by DoE officials, who
acknowledged that the issues are not just those for science (interview 24 July 1991). They
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wanted her to bring 'a broader environmental view', one not conditioned by directly
representing a particular constituency. She was expected 'to ask the awkward questions',
meaning not technical questions but second-order questions about how far the scientific
uncertainties have been considered.
For the Green Alliance, a lobbying rather than campaigning organization, such
participation in ACRE seemed not to conflict with any other action it might want to take.
Before accepting her appointment, Hill raised the issue of co-optation with various
environmentalist groups, which on balance thought her participation in ACRE would help
promote their aims. In particular, given that the committee's remit includes advising on
regulations, she expected her membership could help promote public access to information
(cf. Mime and Watts, 1990: 22). They foresaw such access as strengthening the position
of the more cautious committee members.
Hill's appointment met approval by some industry figures, apparently sharing Donna
Haber's trade-union view. According to one industrialist (see Map 6.5), government
should appoint ACRE members because of their interest in the environmental aspects of
genetic modification. Industry should welcome in particular an 'environmentalist from an
independent body, rather than react against the "Green" label'; thus the committee could
'include a representative not under official control', by implicit contrast to the government-
funded Nature Conservancy Council. Such wide environmental representation would help
regulators to 'reassure people', to 'ask questions that would be asked anyway at a later
stage'; thus they could 'overcome public alarm at an early stage'.
According to a similar industry view (Map 6.3, middle), ACRE should invite an
environmentalist to judge the evidence on GMOs; her role would help 'avoid any public
perception that industry steamrollers the committee or gives backhanders to the trade
unions'. More positively, she would 'represent the small proportion of people who follow
the issue and who might influence public opinion'. Moreover, a scientifically untrained
mind could 'apply real creativity, rather than simply think in a straight line'.
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One CBI nominee on ACRE (Map 6.6) supported including this environmentalist who, as
the Green Alliance lobbyist, 'had made a sensible input into the Environmental Protection
Bill'. Thus ACRE would 'represent the concerns of a particularly relevant group, rather
than be criticized for omitting them'. Lay members would 'bring in public perception
more than scientists alone would do'; regulators could then 'advise the Minister on public
fears'.
However, her appointment met disapproval from other industry figures. Another CBI
nominee on ACRE (individual code Cl, map not shown) favoured including
environmentalists 'only if they try to understand ecology objectively' and thus contribute a
different scientific perception. He saw this appointee as mainly a political lobbyist, not
representing any constituency or adding an environmentalist understanding.
Similarly, another industrialist (Map 6.7, right-hand side) favoured appointing only
'practicing scientists, not members of the public'. He expected that scientists, as members
of the public, would adequately consider the public's view of GMO releases. Only they
could 'speak from scientific knowledge about the likely environmental impact of GMO
releases' -- unlike lay members, who might 'try to push the committee's remit as far as they
can', even using non-scientific reasons to block releases. Such comments presumed that
ACRE's advice clearly distinguished between scientific and policy matters; yet, in practice,
the government had drawn no such distinction for ACRE -- notwithstanding earlier
government arguments against establishing a Public Biotechnology Commission (see
Chapter 5, section 3). In any case, a credible precautionary approach could not pre-empt
how to define the risk-generating system and the relevant science.
Indeed, if specialist scientific expertise was the main criterion for ACRE membership, then
why include TUC nominees? The industry official quoted above (Map 6.7, left-hand
side), who was particularly anxious to restrict ACRE's remit, assumed that the TIJC
nominees would enter only those discussions which concerned the Health and Safety at
Work etc. Act (HSWA) or the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH); that
basis would 'set clear borders within which trade unions could say no' to a proposed
release. Besides, these particular 11JC nominees were known for taking a 'pragmatic,
sensible view' of biotechnology; their participation would help industry to 'get on with
releases while maintaining safeguards'. Similarly, said the CBI nominee quoted above
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(Cl), the TUC nominees had a 'common-sense' expertise, presumably unlike an
environmentalist lacking industrial experience.
Thus, in drawing such distinctions between trade-union and environmentalist members of
ACRE, industry interpreted its remit as less about scientific expertise than about a
'pragmatic' approach to regulatory practicalities.
3.4 ACRE members' aims
According to my interviews with various ACRE members, they expected that the
committee's broadened expertise would help clarify what precautions are warranted for
GMO releases. As compared to the USC, the new membership had relatively less vested
interest in promoting GMO releases, so they could better reflect the public mindset and
public interest -- rather than, for example, rely upon a contentious quantitative risk
assessment for safety assurances. However, as one member lamented, government
expenditure cuts have made academic staff rely more upon industry finance, which
generally favours molecular biology: in his view, such dependency hinders biology
departments from developing ecological expertise and from providing truly independent
members for an advisory committee.
Although some members were wary of including an 'environmentalist', there was wide
support for including 'lay' persons, whose presence would encourage the committee to
'think as if they were members of the public' and would encourage scientists to explain
their views to non-scientists. This dynamic would help the committee to reach a broad
consensus and to keep releases publicly acceptable (see Map 6.8, ACRE composite map).
However, these comments downplay awkward conflict between public versus scientific
perceptions of risk, or between wide participation and industry's needs.
Such tension appeared more clearly in comments from CBI nominees on ACRE. One
(Map 6.4, left-hand side) accepted the need to include lay persons and avert hazards, but
he preferred to 'avoid involving too many individuals in the regulation', so as to 'take
regulatory decisions within 90 days' and allow a company to conduct a release within the
'seasonal window'.
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According to another CBI nominee, the committee should incorporate public opinion,
rather than leave itself vulnerable to criticism (Map 6.6, right-hand side). Yet the tripartite
arrangement would help regulators to 'get an industry viewpoint on marketable products',
so that the advisory committee could 'look at competitiveness' vis a vis the Japanese and
US biotechnology industries (Map 6.6, left-hand side). He acknowledged some difficulties
in reconciling all these aims within the regulatory procedure.
Also reflected within ACRE was a tension around the purpose of information disclosure.
ACRE members regarded public-access measures as a way to 'carry the public with you',
lest public unease 'turn indifference into hostility' and impose 'unnecessarily strict
regulation'. By avoiding such obstacles, safe releases could go ahead, and society could
benefit from new products (see composite map, Map 6.9, left-hand side). These views
echoed the advice that 'secrecy breeds fear' (Hansard, 2 July 1990: 1978; cf. RCEP, 1989:
62); this simple slogan also implied the converse, i.e. that popular consent would be
reliably achieved through greater transparency.
Yet some members wanted public-access measures to influence R&D agendas, and not
only on safety grounds. For example, information disclosure was essential so that 'a
technical society can function democratically'. Advance information on prospective
products could 'open the door for the environmental lobby', pushing industry to 'wear an
environment-friendly hat' (see Map 6.9, right-hand side). These comments may
substantiate industry fears that some ACRE members might 'push their remit', though the
committee had no formal role in public-access measures and little scope for deterring
apparently safe releases. In any case, the statutory measures on information disclosure did
not come into effect until February 1993 (DoE/MAFF, 1992).
4.0 CONCLUSIONS: ACRE'S POTENTIAL ROLE
The British government constituted ACRE in a way which could legitimize regulatory
decisions. With ACRE's statutory basis and mandatory disclosure of its advice, the
committee could gain credibility for its own independence. By accommodating and
negotiating potential conflicts within confidential regulatory procedures, the government
could more effectively avoid external challenges to its authority. In key features of its
remit and composition, ACRE embodied the dual character of precautionary regulation --
anticipating hypothetical hazards and public unease about them. At the same time, ACRE
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contained a tension between its scientific expertise and policy issues irreducible to
technical evidence.
ACRE held a central importance to the social legitimacy and consultative character of
GMO regulation, as manifest in the restructuring of Ministerial links around the
committee. ACRE combined the main features of the predecessor committees which it
replaced: that is, by considering both human and environmental safety, by regulating both
GMOs and non-indigenous organisms, and by joining both the HSE and DoE in a new
Secretariat, along with representatives from other Ministries. Although regulators justified
this structure in scientific terms, it had several political rationales: under a Joint
Secretariat, ACRE could continue industry's congenial working relation with the HSE,
could lend the DoE's imprimatur to this new area of environmental regulation, and could
reconcile the different safety perspectives of those two departments.
With its remit for 'novel organisms', ACRE provided a common framework for exploring
the hypothetical analogy which ecologists had drawn between GMOs and non-indigenous
organisms. ACRE members welcomed this remit as providing a scientific basis for
regulating GMO releases -- on grounds of genetic novelty rather than the genetic
modification process as such. Although biotechnologists had earlier dismissed the
analogy to non-indigenous introductions, British industrialists now favoured constituting
ACRE on this basis; this was partly for reasons of administrative convenience, though
industry also recognized the political need for credibly disproving the analogy.
Symbolically, the term 'novel organisms' acknowledged the stigma associated with GMOs,
in a way which could overcome it through regulatory experience; risk-management
procedures could be initially imposed upon all GMOs, without stigmatizing the genetic
modification process as such. In this way, ACRE's remit offered a compromise route
around the 'process versus product' debate (see Chapter 4, section 1.2).
In giving safety assurances about GMO regulation, the government often cited the high
reputation of its advisory committee -- a claim which became fulfilled in the new
committee's composition. In extending the HSE's tripartite model from the IISC to ACRE,
the Joint Secretariat also stretched the notion of 'expertise'. As well as adding more
ecologists, it expanded the implicit 'public-interest' representation, with more TUC
nominees and in particular an 'environmentalist' from the Green Alliance. Other ACRE
members welcomed the presence of lay people who could provide a broader environmental
perspective and forewarn the regulatory system of public sensitivities.
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Thus with ACRE the British government extended its earlier strategy of 'responsible co-
optation', offering consultation as a privilege to 'respectable' organizations, whose leaders
could be expected to behave 'reasonably' (Vogel, 1986: 5 1-52). The participation of the
Green Alliance replicated that pattern but tamed no activism, given the organization's
previously limited role as a Parliamentary lobby. Its potential role on ACRE was double-
edged: on the one hand, in concert with ecologists, it could press 'awkward questions'
about environmental uncertainties; on the other hand, its presence could legitimize the
project of translating value conflicts into technical criteria (see Chapter 3, section 2.2). It
remained to be seen whether, as in chemicals regulation, non-technical members of
advisory committees would exercise little influence on the group's deliberations (Jasanoff,
1986: 58-59).
Also ambiguous was ACRE's remit for 'all aspects of safety', as regards any putative
boundary between science and policy, such as environmental or ethical issues which lay
beyond testable uncertainties of GMOs. This ambiguity was convenient for a government
prone to exaggerating ACRE's remit. It faced public expectations that some legitimate
authority would act as 'clerk-of-works to the New Creation', not simply make our future
safe (Levidow and Tait, 1992: 103; cf. Wynne, 1982: 172). Although ACRE had no such
power, it could influence R&D by disputing whether evidence of safety was adequate or
relevant; some members sought information disclosure as a means of strengthening public
pressure for more beneficial forms of biotechnological innovation.
In this sensitive political context, some industry officials invoked a sharp boundary
between regulatory science and policy. On this basis, they argued that ACRE's
membership should have been restricted to a scientifically defined 'expertise', and feared
that lay members would 'push its remit' into policy matters. At the same time, industry
welcomed 'reasonable' lay members of ACRE -- especially TUC nominees -- who
understood the practical problems of observing the safety procedures and getting
competitive products onto the international market.
In all these ways, ACRE incorporated conflicting imperatives. Although nominally
evaluating uncertainties and assessing safety, its procedure could also accommodate public
unease and market pressures. These tensions arose not only among regulatory actors but
also within each actor, as depicted in the cognitive maps (e.g. Maps 6.4, 6.6 and 6.7).
Such tensions add a twist to an earlier analysis of British regulatory culture, often called a•
consultative or consensual model. European countries such as Britain rely upon 'pluralistic
123
advisory committees that can resolve both technical and political issues... The effect of this
institutional approach is to protect the image of science as a neutral and rational decision-
making tool...' (Brickman et a!., 1985: 310; cf. Jasanoff, 1986: 66).
GMO regulation replicated this pattern by stretching the definition of 'specialist' expertise,
and by provisionally adopting a hypothetical analogy to documented harm from 'novel
organisms'. This cognitive framework broadened the range of 'perceived risks' which
should be investigated as if they might be real. In this way, paradoxically, the government
could construct a procedural rationality which maintains the neutral image of regulatory
science and legitimizes its decisions.
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Chapter 7
CONTAINING PERCEIVED RISKS
The previous three chapters analysed the institutional frameworks devised for regulating
GMO releases. A putative international consensus, on permitting a step-by-step relaxation of
containment, was cited as the basis for markedly different regulatory systems. Unlike the
USA, the EC & UK's process-based system subjected all GMOs releases to a risk-management
procedure; Britain justified this precautionary approach partly by drawing a naturalistic
analogy between GMOs and exotic introduced organisms.
In practice, then, how did the step-wise procedure relate scientific and public perceptions?
What range of perceived risks was treated as potentially real? In devising safety measures,
how did risk management follow from risk assessment -- or perhaps vice versa? What risk
perceptions were accommodated, deferred or excluded?
Focusing on Britain, this chapter analyses control measures as symbolically 'containing
perceived risks', in several senses: accommodating images of GMOs as nature potentially out
of control; demonstrating safe control of a carefully managed 'step'; and thus deferring wider
issues. The chapter discusses:
* diverse ways of constructing some boundary between 'real/perceived risk' (section 1);
* how Britain's regulatory procedures symbolically contained perceived risks, towards
ritually normalizing GMOs (section 2);
* how pollution imagery was evoked by two particular types of GMO releases: a herbicide-
resistant crop (section 3) and a viral insecticide (section 4);
* in summary, how the stepwise procedure encountered difficulties of social legitimacy
(section 5).
A terminological note: Henceforth, as in common regulatory parlance, some GMOs shall be
called 'gm' or 'transgenic' organisms. Microbial GMOs may be called GEMs, an early
acronym for 'genetically engineered micro-organisms'.
1.0 REAL VERSUS PERCEIVED RISKS?
According to the standard dichotomy, 'real risks' are the remit of risk management, while
'perceived risks' are a problem for public education, e.g. by popularizing scientific risk
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assessment. For the intentional release of GMOs, this dichotomy was reiterated by many
biotechnologists, especially in the USA (e.g. in Batra and Kiassen, 1987: 168; Huttner, 1991).
However, scientific disputes fuelled wider public debate over how 'real' risk should be defined
and investigated.
For overcoming these disputes, the OECD proposed a stepwise procedure: that is,
'progressively decreasing physical containment', through a 'logical, incremental step-wise
process whereby safety and performance data are collected'. More controversially, however, it
suggested that the risk assessment 'can be approached by analogy with the existing data base
gained from the extensive use of traditionally modified organisms in agriculture and the
environment generally' (OECD, 1986: 29, 41). With that analogy, the OECD downplayed
ecologists' analogy to non-indigenous organisms, while implying that any familiar hazards
already came under adequate regulation.
Both the US and EC regulatory systems claimed to follow the OECD recommendations, but
they differed sharply over the basis for imposing risk-management procedures upon GMOs.
Emphasizing predictability, the OSTP in particular constructed an a priori boundary between
'real/perceived risks'; by contrast, the EC initially left open such a boundary (see Chapter 4).
Each approach entailed practical dilemmas for how the regulatory procedure would establish a
credible boundary.
This problem was mooted at an international conference on 'biosafety results', its title
emphasizing the presumed evidence of safety (MacKenzie and Henry, eds, 1990). A leading
research manager echoed the OECD's reassuring analogy to agricultural experience. He
foresaw no environmental risks from transgenic products, because they could cause harm only
to agriculture, if at all; thus he conceptually excluded agriculture from the environment. This
perspective justified restricting demands for evidence of safety:
The amount of information [provided by the applicant] can be realistic, based on the
relevant experience base, or it can be open-ended or 'what-if. A 'what-if approach
will preclude commercialization of many GEOs [GMOs] because of the cost to obtain
the information and the prolonged time to approval and market introduction. (Hardy,
1990: 239, 245)
However, other conference participants emphasized the opposite problem: that inadequate
safety data might jeopardize the commercialization stage. As USDA speakers argued, 'The
real versus perceived risks of biotechnology products may prove to be a difficult factor as
these products enter the marketplace.' Biotechnologists had to overcome perceived risks
through safety science, not simply through educating the public about the technology and its
benefits: 'It is therefore imperative that risk assessment efforts go beyond that which is merely
sufficient, to provide solid evidence of acceptable risk that can be communicated to the public
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at large with scientific assuredness and without vaccillation' (MacKenzie and Henry, 1990:
278, 273).
Thus, paradoxically, the USDA warned industry that an official safety imprimatur might
remain politically inadequate. This dilemma arose from a putatively 'risk-based' regulatory
system, which pre-empted the boundary between real vs perceived risks, for the sake of
denying the stigma popularly associated with GMOs.
The dilemma took a different form within the EC regulatory framework, which initially
regulated all UMO releases. A leading European biotechnologist acknowledged that 'the
regulations must not only be technically adequate, but must also be perceived by members of
the public as an adequate response to their concerns, which are linked to their perception of
the technology'. Yet, he lamented, process-based regulation 'creates a perception of inherent
riskiness of biotechnology, thereby leading to reinforcement of the demands of the public for
further regulatory constraints' (de Greef, 1991). That is, regulatory scrutiny might intensify
rather than overcome the stigma popularly associated with GMOs.
A similar dilemma was described for Britain's regulatory system, even for the earlier stage of
GMOs in contained use. ACRE's chairman, John Beringer, publicly acknowledged that some
academic institutions were ignoring the legal requirement to keep full records or to notify
local biosafety committees of all laboratory work on GMOs. Legally speaking, they should
treat their laboratory work 'as though the organisms were dangerous', but he doubted that that
most academics would do so; he regretfully advocated 'a draconian system of punishment for
people not following regulations' (CBC, 1990: 47). As he later clarified, exemplary
prosecutions were warranted in order to show that the regulatory authorities take safety
seriously -- even where the laboratory work was considered safe and routine. 'Then, again,
the [political] risk would be in making people think that this [genetic modification] is a major
threat.' On balance, though, he foresaw greater public alarm resulting from lax enforcement
(interview, 19 April 1990).
Beringer also acknowledged that biosafety research entails an ambiguity between
real/perceived risks. After all, reassuring the public 'is perhaps the most important goal' for
the biotechnology sector of safety research funded by the European Community. Indeed,
'This [goal] can be met simply by throwing money at projects with appropriate sounding titles.
There has been some criticism of the sector on this basis -- [criticism] which has not been
entirely groundless' (Beringer, 1990: 75). However, 'appropriate' research could be defined in
different ways, depending upon how one evaluates ecological uncertainties.
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A similar ambiguity extended to the types of GMO releases being carried out. In testing
GMOs, trial releases have self-consciously tested both the regulatory system and public
reaction. At an international biotechnology conference, 'The general feeling was that we
should make a number of obviously "safe" releases (e.g. engineered maize) as soon as
possible, in order that release of genetically engineered organisms is not perceived as being
inherently dangerous', reported a British ecologist (Crawley, 1988: S2). Similarly, in
interviews with industrialists and regulators, they preferred limiting early GMO releases to
minor, benign modifications of familiar crops; for some interviewees, that meant avoiding
micro-organisms, which posed greater ecological uncertainty, and herbicide-resistant crops,
which conveyed the wrong image for biotechnology, though such crops did go ahead anyway
(see this chapter, section 3).
By 1991, trial releases in Britain had included genetically modified strains of the 'lead crops',
e.g. sugarbeet, oilseed rape, tomatoes, potatoes. Crop releases tested for the efficacy, stability
and/or unintended transfer of the inserted gene, or for any selective advantage. Transgenic
crops had inserted genes which were expected to make no behavioural difference, except in
the sense of a selectable marker gene, such as resistance to a herbicide or to the antibiotic
kanamycin (see this chapter, section 3). A viral insecticide had been genetically modified or
reduced persistence before its release in 1986 (see this chapter, section 4). Releases of
nitrogen-fixing Rhizobium underwent the regulatory procedure, though they had been
modified in vivo and so were not generally regarded as GMOs.
On the negative side, when an academic scientist proposed to conduct a trial release of
Drosophila flies with a genetic marker in 1988, the regulatory system effectively discouraged
the release by requesting additional information. Some advisory committee members felt that
the applicant showed little sign of having considered safety or public alarm; that the
experimental design allowed no way to ensure the insects could be eliminated once released;
and that unmodified flies could have been used instead to achieve the experimental purpose of
tracking the flies (according to personal communications from IISC/ACRE member, 10 July
1989, 7 January 1993). ACRE members probed scientific uncertainties which encompassed
diverse risk perceptions, without necessarily identifying a specific hazard.
In general, broad uncertainties were also accommodated by the design of releases which did
obtain regulatory approval. According to interviews with members of ACRE's predecessor
committee in 1987-88, 'many committee members feel that a number of the precautions
recommended appear to have been taken to reassure the public rather than for purely scientific
reasons' (Shackley, 1989: 218). More subtly, the initial precautions allowed regulators to
avoid disputes over how to define 'purely scientific reasons'.
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Consider for example Prosamo, a biosafety research project in Britain (see further Chapter 8,
section 1). A published paper cited scientific grounds for having incorporated safety measures
into the experimental protocol, as well as subsequent evidence of safety as grounds for
relaxing those measures (Dale et al., 1992: 74). However, they also had a symbolic role, as
the project leader acknowledged:
There are certain things which mainly MAFF asked us to do which we felt do not have
a good scientific basis. [In 1987] we went along with them because they argued that
we should do it because of public perception, or [at least] their perception of public
perception. That includes the sterilisation of boots and tools that we used. And they
wanted us to deflower the potato plants every day, even though you can prevent pollen
dissemination by debudding every five days, if you do it early enough... For the 1988
release, we persuaded MAFF that sterilisation was not warranted (Philip Dale,
interview 27 June 1991).
On the other hand, the original experimental design did not incorporate some other
precautions, again partly for symbolic reasons. For its stated scientific purpose of tracking
gene flow from the crop, the Prosamo experiment could have used a non-GMO, e.g. a crop
strain with a naturally occurring pigmentation marker. Indeed, the advisory committee had
cited such an argument when discouraging the Drosophila proposal (see above); in contrast,
the committee regarded the Prosamo experiment as an opportunity to clarify scientific
uncertainties, while carrying along the public with a GMO release:
The regulators want to be challenged, to think about the question of what [GMOs] go
out and what the problems are. So we decided to use transgenic plants because that's
what Prosamo is about. Putting [transgenic] plants Out in the field is a way of
informing the community, of explaining the releases, so that people become
comfortable with them (ibid.).
Thus, by using a genetically modified marker, this release could push forward the regulatory
system, in ways which had both a scientific and symbolic content.
2.0 SHAPING RISK PERCEPTIONS
As analysed above, the stepwise procedure had various symbolic roles: to demonstrate safe
control, to accommodate public perception, to carry the public with the regulatory system, etc.
While some participants felt that precautions exceeded any scientific basis, the stepwise
procedure permitted regulators to defer drawing any sharp boundary between real/perceived
risks. How, then, did ACRE negotiate diverse risk perceptions? To answer that question, this
section draws upon interviews with ACRE members, who are identified according to the
following code: C1-C4 (CBI nominees), T1-T2 (TUC nominees), S1-S12 (other specialist
members), D1-D7 (departmental assessors); see also Chapter 2, section 4.
ACRE members generally foresaw the most serious risks from non-commercial GMOs, such
as selective biological weapons (1'2) or 'a Pandora's box of real horrors', such as genetically
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modified insects (D3). Few members mentioned significant environmental risks from the
sorts of GMO products that they expected industry to develop, especially those derived from
the lead crops. For such releases, some members suggested that the negative impact may be
more perceptual than environmental; for example, 'the risks are more apparent than real' (Dl),
or 'worry about public acceptance, rather than the technology itself' (T2).
In this vein, members acknowledged the dual purposes of safety measures. The committee
'may want to show that there are robust precautions, but we may want to prevent escape
anyway' (S 11). That is, the experiment may contain the GMO and/or its pollen for a
combination of reasons, without necessarily distinguishing them.
Regarding that 'containment', by biological and/or physical means, several members regarded
the term as misleading. 'By definition, a release cannot be truly contained, or even semi-
contained' (S8). 'You can only limit the spread of an organism, not entirely contain it; we
should refer to the experimental design, or to the inherent characteristics of the organism, not
"containment", which is a catchy public-affairs term' (Cl). Regulators should 'acknowledge
difficulties in defining containment, as well as the environment' (D4). Given this ambiguity,
'containment' can be understood as a symbolic framework for negotiating diverse risk
perceptions, as the following sub-section illustrates.
2.1 Containing perceived risks [cognitive map]
The composite cognitive map, 'Containing Perceived Risks', shows how regulatory advisors
related scientific and symbolic aspects of risk regulation. Here all actions lead to the goal,
'reassure the public'; for many interviewees, that leads to a higher goal, 'avoid obstacles to
genetic modification work and product development'. Otherwise, they feared, all of
biotechnology might be impeded (Ti), there might be a ban on releases (T2,S2), regulations
might become unnecessarily strict (D9), and beneficial products might not go ahead (Si), such
as biological control of plant pests (Sli).
The map includes many measures which could be understood or justified as necessary to avert
potential environmental harm, but whose rationale may be ambiguous, even in the regulators'
minds. All the measures are grouped together under the following penultimate goals:
* maintain confidence in the regulatory system;
* avoid perceived risk;
* avoid/minimize environmental damage.
Let us consider each of these penultimate goals in turn, moving from left to right on the map.
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Maintain confidence in the regulatory system'
Certain prominent measures were considered necessary in order to maintain confidence in the
regulatory system. At least two members (S5,T2) emphasized the need to enforce the control
system, in order to 'get the public behind you' (T2); that complemented the chair's public call
for exemplary prosecutions of anyone who violates the regulatory procedures. One member
mentioned a perceptual reason for providing the special regulation of GMOs with statutory
backing: so that 'risk assessment is seen to be done' (S7). The system should apply the
regulations to all GMOs and so 'avoid any difficulty in explaining exemptions to the public';
thus the system will 'be seen to take every possible precaution' (T2).
A public-relations rationale was mentioned for the decision to use the term 'genetic
modification' rather than 'engineering' or 'manipulation'. According to one member (1)6), the
chosen term helps clarify that the Environmental Protection Bill really does implement the EC
Directives, presumably in the sense of being seen to provide an adequate control system -- at
the same time as avoiding 'negative' connotations of the earlier terms.
Several members regarded the control system as complementing the need to 'build up public
trust in ACRE', 'win public confidence', etc. One saw the government as having structurally
accommodated public perception by broadening the committee membership, especially its
ecological expertise: 'After all, we are here' (S 10).
One member (S2) wanted GMOs to continue undergoing separate regulation, even at the
commercial product stage; such control would help regulators to 'regain public trust', to
overcome a legacy of arrogant technofixes disbelieved by the public. Although he expressed
concern about genetic fluidity and the unintentional creation of human pathogens, his basic
rationale was to anticipate 'the unknown that may come Out and bite you', more than to avert
any specific identifiable risk.
'Avoid perceived risk':
In justifying precautions, several members mentioned the need to 'avoid perceived risk',
particularly by accommodating 'the 1990s green public', 'the green-minded public', 'the
greening of public opinion', or the 'extra dimension of public environmental awareness' (e.g.
D4,R2,Sl,S7). It could do so, for example, by testing the extent to which recombinant DNA
transfers to other organisms (D4). Acknowledging great scientific uncertainty, one member
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even suggested that 'public disagreement among experts' could helpfully 'provide a safety
valve in case of a mishap' (S6).
How, then, could the regulation avoid perceived risk? 'Request more information from the
applicant, get more experimental data on file, and thus reduce perceived uncertainty before a
release' (C3,S 1). Given that we should 'anticipate a greater perceptual impact than
environmental impact', said one member (Dl), the regulation should 'take a slow, deliberate
approach'. For similar perceptual reasons, the regulation should 'try to find a problem for each
new gm variety' and thus 'convince the public you're doing the regulation properly' (C 1).
Reducing scientific uncertainty was considered more important for potentially sensitive
releases. For a genetically modified baker's yeast, one member drew a hypothetical analogy to
Candida, thrush-causing yeast. Only by getting more data could regulators really know that
the gm yeast behaves the same as the unmodified yeast, rather than merely think that it does
(Si).
The regulation should 'err on the side of caution, guarantee safety, and so give the public
confidence', or else the regulators would 'meet retribution' (C2). For all the CBI nominees,
among others, this task meant evaluating similar risks for GMOs and non-indigenous
organisms, in order 'to show that all relevant questions have been asked' (C2), as one of them
put it.
Members cited ambiguous reasons for containment measures. Some acknowledged that they
take into account the possibility of physical disruption when assessing potential risks (e.g,
C3); that is, safety should not depend mainly upon physical containment (S9). In another
view, the design may 'use containment to lower the risk from any intrinsic hazard, and so keep
the risk within an acceptable level'; but the committee may also 'anticipate public reaction in
order to modify the experimental design and/or prepare a fact-based reply' (57). They should
'rely upon the interplay of diverse expertise and lay positions, e.g. tighten containment if the
public perceives a risk, and so remain within the bounds of what society accepts' (S6).
Likewise, the committee may 'balance [match] risks and perceived risks with control
measures, in order to set appropriate containment'; they should 'feed public concerns back into
the regulatory mechanisms; develop a pragmatic, proactive approach; and thus show the
Green-1990s public that the technology is properly controlled' (D4). The regulation should
'control releases more strictly than would be warranted on scientific grounds alone' (T2);.
regarding unintended gene transfer, this could mean removing plant buds far more frequently
than flowers could appear. Eventually it would be necessary to 'assess potential hybrids with
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genetically modified plants on a world scale', in order to 'reassure the public that all
precautions have been taken' (S5).
In some cases, such precautions can go as far as to 'request more information or refer to
unknown risks', in order to delay or discourage a release that might alarm the public. One
member (S8) suggested that the genetically modified Drosophila had been blocked, in effect,
'to avoid irrational fear of mobile creepy crawlies' [see this chapter, section 1.0]. Regulators
should 'balance benefits against publicly perceived risks', and so 'avoid unjustified releases
likely to cause public outcry' (D9). In these ways, regulators could indirectly limit releases to
'benign' ones, such as familiar crops and Rhizobium, a nitrogen-fixing bacteria (S8).
Some regulators mentioned concerns beyond environmental risk as such, partly for perceptual
reasons. The regulation should somehow consider effects on nutrition and on Third World
exports, by screening prospective products at an early stage, so as to avoid a 'negative
breakthrough in public perception' (D3, S4). [For disputes over a 'Fourth Hurdle' beyond risk
regulation, see chapter 5, section 4; and chapter 9].
Genetically modified (or transgenic) mammals presented a special case; ACRE had not
considered such applications because no one proposed to 'release' them. However, some
interviewees participated in other advisory committees which considered the ethical and health
aspects of creating transgenic animals. One member (D5) was concerned to avoid harming
the experimental animals; with more graphic language, another was concerned to avoid
creating 'a deleterious mutant' (S6), presumably meaning harm to the animals. Regulators
should exercise 'great caution'; for example, the regulation should withhold transgenic animals
and even the control animals from the food chain in order to avoid any perceived risk (C4,
D5). Particularly in this ethical context, but also more generally, few members distinguished
'perceived' from 'real' risk.
'Avoid/minimize environmental damage':
In the right-hand section of the composite map are shown measures which some regulators
consider adequate or necessary to avert potential environmental damage.
It was proposed to 'require containment if there is a perceptible risk' (T2), a term implying real
risk -- for example, to prevent GMOs 'going out of control', or to lower risk to an acceptable
level (S7). The strongest examples cited were problem organisms which had not yet gone
beyond experiments in fully contained conditions; ACRE had not assessed hazards of their
intentional release. One member (D5) was concerned to avoid creating a 'super-pest',
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particularly from transgenic animals. There was also concern about animal hazards from
using viral vectors (S6) or live viral vaccines, which might be high risk (D5).
A common assurance was that GMO releases were being largely restricted to single-gene
changes in well-known crops (S5,Cl), which were not expected to present environmental
problems. In particular, long-established non-indigenous crops were unlikely to be frost-
hardy or to have weedy relatives, thus precluding problems of unintentional propagation or
gene transfer. More generally, 'It is more difficult to maintain something in the environment
than to envisage it becoming rampant' (S7); some saw the environment as a threat to
transgenic crops, more than vice versa.
However, some members had worries about current releases of GMOs derived from familiar
organisms which they regarded as inherently problematic. Given that kanamycin has been
used in human therapeutics, one (D2) expressed unease at kanamycin-resistant genetic
markers being used in sugarbeets, which produce pollen and have weedy relatives in Britain,
unlike potatoes. For some GMOs, a member (Si) felt applicants couldn't adequately answer
all the committee's questions without doing large-scale releases, at which point it might be too
late to catch the organism 'before it goes', presumably out of control, such as a superweed;
partly for that reason, he preferred to ban any transgenic versions of crops known to have a
weedy potential, such as oilseed rape. That view contrasted with assurances from others (eg
S5,C 1) that oilseed rape grows wild on roadside verges only because they are 'disturbed
environments'.
Lastly, there was some disagreement about whether some potential effects should be defmed
as environmental damage, such as increased problems for farmers. Some members advocated
taking 'a broad definition of environmental damage' (Si, S8), again partly for perceptual
reasons: the environment includes farmland. Other members regarded some undesirable
effects as remediable: for example, if weeds were unintentionally to acquire herbicide
resistance, then farmers could simply switch to another herbicide (e.g. Cl). Another
expressed indifference about damage to farmland as such, except insofar as 'factory farming'
might damage the 'semi-managed environment' beyond it (Si 1).
2.2 Whose perceived risks?
In summary the composite map reveals members' cautious attitude towards environmental
harm and public perception. These were not necessarily distinguished, when agreeing upon
safety measures, as suggested by the cognitive map. Beyond the logic depicted there,
members also expressed more ambivalent or divergent views.
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ACRE's chairman commented in 1990, 'The committee has no policy on how to deal with
public perception. I'm expecting some comment [from the government] on what we should
do.' True, there was no official or formal policy. However, other members indicated that
informal policies on public perception were already in operation: 'It is taken terribly seriously.
In fact you sometimes get the impression that the whole thing isn't an exercise in
environmental protection, but that it's an exercise in public opinion.' He (S8) drew an analogy
to a court which unrealistically asks jurors somehow to forget a piece of inadmissable
evidence. Likewise with the committee, he said, 'One can have no idea of the extent to which
the things they talked about in their widest discussion would influence their eventual decision.'
According to another member (Si i), the special regulatory procedures exist...
because GMOs are unpredictable and irretrievable, but also because of public
perception, which may have a completely unrational basis. Because of the political
aspect, the precautionary principle could mean that you never develop anything; it's a
difficult balance to make, in scientific and political terms... GMO regulation is
different because of lower confidence in your conclusions and because public
perception colours the risk assessment -- rightly, in my view.
In 1991 an ecologist (S 10) reflected back on 1989, when the same release applications were
being considered by ACRE's precursor committees, both of which anticipated public unease:
There was a reinforcing mechanism between IACI and IISC, with each
anticipating what [precautions] the other committee might come up with. That
initially led to tight constraints on releases, when I couldn't conceive what the
risk was. ACRE has now arrived at the position where I was at several years
ago.
In contrast to the those quoted above, three ACRE members dissociated the committee's
advice from public perception. For a civil servant (D6), the committee respected a putative
boundary between scientific advice and policy: 'The Minister is our expert in public
perception.' A CBI nominee (Cl) insisted that 'no public-affairs person would claim to know
what the public think; it would be arrogant for us to do so.' Although emphasizing scientific
uncertainty, another member said (S9): 'If ACRE were to stop a release or impose stringent
conditions solely because of public perception, that would undermine the committee's
credibility to make scientific judgements.'
Thus, unlike some other ACRE members, those three portrayed the committee's advice as
exclusively scientific. Their comments can be interpreted not simply as defensive, but also as
expressing a tension within ACRE's role: namely, how to translate diverse values and risk
perceptions into technical criteria. What made this translation possible?
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2.3 Regulation as judicial ritual
Speaking self-confidently about minimal 'real risk', an ACGM member (S 12) feared that
ACRE would attempt to 'pacify unreal environmental considerations [and thus] impede a good
working relationship with the government'. He distinguished ACRE from its predecessor
committee by emphasizing its Green role: 'In the title it is the E [environment] part which is
different.' He also emphasized symbolic control:
If you see a royal salute fired in Hyde Park to mark the Queen's birthday, there's a
chap standing in the back stiffly at attention behind the guns. Well, he has always
been there because it was his job to hold the horses' heads. The fact that there haven't
been any horses for years is irrelevant. We hold horses' heads all the time.
His analogy compared GMOs to the imaginary threat of a wild creature going out of control,
and its ritual containment. The analogy can be taken as more than a humorous aside, if we
understand ritual itself as more than a repetitive, empty or superstitious ceremony.
As a social anthropologist has argued, the term 'ritual' denotes 'actions and beliefs in the
symbolic order', toward mediating 'the gulf between personal meanings and public meanings'.
Many societies enact rituals in 'expressive action specialized and apart from instrumental
action'. In secular society, however, often 'the symbolic meanings are implicit in [the]
instrumental action' (Douglas, 1973: 20, 38).
In that vein, GMO regulation has symbolic meanings which may bridge a gulf between
concepts of risk, e..g risk as a technical measure versus cultural danger (see Chapter 3). The
latter aspect was acknowledged by HSE Director-General John Rimington: 'The really
important ethical question concerns the business of human beings messing about with too
much power -- the Faustian question.' He drew an analogy to the nuclear programme, where
'the feeling that people were messing about with too much power unfortunately coincided with
a number of other indications that all might not be entirely well' (CBC, 1990: 8).
Similarly, one regulatory advisor (S 10) articulated the intangible ethical concerns bound up in
risk perception:
People assume there is greater potential risk when tinkering with the nature of species;
there is a worry about what plant breeders are doing, and ethical questions. A fear of
the unknown, rather than a worry about environmental safety, has led to it [the risk
regulation], which is something that can be solidly done.
A cultural anthropologist has also emphasized the psychological rupture of crossing the
species boundary: 'Because biotechnology breaks new ground and disturbs established
presumptions, there is a need both for careful definition of issues (through debate) and for
ritual normalization of acceptable positions...' (Fleising, 1989: 52). Risk assessment, even
'solidly done', cannot avoid the perceived abnormality of GMOs and their normalization.
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The stigma was implied by the precautionary language of Britain's 1990 Environmental
Protection Act (see Chapter 5, section 2). As one industry lobbying group had complained,
'The implication is that each GMO is guilty of a range of undefined offences against the
environment until proved innocent'; thus the releaser might face a 'requirement to eliminate
concerns in relation to an open-ended, unsubstantiated series of effects [environmental
hazards]' (BSPB, 1989).
Industry's worst fears may have been realized by the adversarial language of an ACRE
member (T2), 'We consider novel organisms [e.g. GMOs] as guilty until proven innocent.'
Another member (Si) chose a more consultative type of judicial metaphor:
'The procedure is inquisitorial, not adversarial; we're trying to be friendly and arrive at
the truth.... A proposed release is not presumed to be safe or unsafe, but you are
required to prove that it's safe -- perhaps the equivalent of the presumption that it's not
safe.'
That presumption was codified by provisionally classifying GMOs as novel organisms.
Rather than simply put the applicant on the defensive, the analogy imposed a suspicion of risk
which the risk-assessment procedure could confirm or allay, while helping the committee
members to clarify their own views.
That is, the discussion helps to translate an otherwise inchoate unease into terms amenable to
scientific evidence. As an extreme case, the 'environmentalist' on ACRE preferred that people
did not 'feel the need to throw around GMOs in the environment' (quoted in Chapter 3, section
2.2). According to another member(Cl), the committee takes seriously any member's unease
about a proposed release by helping the person to formulate their reasons.
Each application could serve as a dress-rehearsal for defining adequate and relevant evidence
of safety:
Very often members recognize at the outset that the proposed release is a
straightforward, low-risk thing, that the discussion is play-acting, treating the
application [its safety aspect] seriously but as a trial case for establishing the range of
questions, the protocols of information to be requested. The committee is using the
application to probe at the issues. In one or two cases, the committee has said 'no'
because insufficient information or bad presentation meant that we couldn't assess
whether or not there was any risk (S 11).
In this 'play-acting', apprehensions about abnormal organisms can be translated into technical
terms; a potentially reckless activity comes under safe control. Note the resonance with an
anthropological insight: 'Both in its plot and its symbolism, a ritual is an epitome of the
wider... social processes in which it is embodied', according to an anthropologist (Turner,
1967: 273).
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As in other modern rituals, then, symbolic meanings operate in the instrumental action of risk
regulation. Starting from a presumption of figurative guilt, due to biological abnormality,
GMOs can undergo a ritual normalization into innocence, at least for a particular step. Under
the controlled conditions of trial releases, evidence for the absence of environmental harm can
eventually be treated as evidence of safety, depending upon how one defines the relevant
uncertainties.
In summary, the ritual aspect mediates a gulf between different public meanings, not simply
'between personal meanings and public meanings' (Douglas, 1973). By symbolically
containing perceived risks, precautionary regulation may mediate between technical safety
judgements and ethical qualms about crossing the species barrier; it may even substitute safe
experimental control for the 'Faustian question' of sinister environmental control. However,
such gulfs became difficult to bridge in two cases where GMOs became associated with
pollution threats, as discussed in the next two sections.
3.0 HERBICIDE-RESISTANT CROPS
Perhaps the most controversial development of GMOs has been the genetic modification of
plant crops for herbicide resistance. Industry has portrayed such transgenic plants as
environment-friendly, while opponents have criticized them on ecological, agronomic and
ethical grounds. Safety concerns include the unintentional transfer of the herbicide-resistance
gene to weedy relatives, especially relatives of oilseed rape or sugar beet in Britain, as in the
cases described below. Critics also raised systemic issues about crop-herbicide linkages,
irreducible to the safety of the crop as such (see Chapter 3, section 1.4).
Herbicide-resistant plants represented roughly half of all transgenic plants released in field
trials in the USA in the late 1980s (Goldburg et al., 1990). By contrast, there were no known
releases of herbicide-resistant crops in Britain until 1990. This section will contrast two
different local experiences in that year: an industry field trial which elicited no apparent
reaction, and an academic field trial which provoked local resentment.
3.1 Lincolnshire 'weedkiller test'
In 1990 the Maribo Seed Company began small-scale field trials of sugar beet which had been
genetically modified for resistance to Roundup, also known as glyphosate. ACRE had
recommended approval of the small-scale field trials, under specified conditions, though some
members had qualms about longer-term implications (according to my interviews).
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As described in the company's 1990 press statement, 'Tolerance to Roundup was achieved by
transferring a gene developed by Monsanto into Maribo Seed sugar beet breeding material'.
The statement avoided the term 'genetic', except in mentioning the 'Advisory Committee for
[sic] Genetic Manipulation'. The 1991 press statement used the term 'transformed', a standard
technical equivalent of 'genetically engineered'; it also acknowledged that Roundup is
manufactured by Monsanto. According to the press statements, the releases would investigate
the plants' characteristics under unsprayed conditions, with a view towards producing 'an
improved sugar beet variety' (Keyline Publicity, 1990, 1991). The statements also
emphasized the widespread view that glyphosate was more environmentally benign than other
herbicides then in commercial use.
Both statements were distributed widely to the local, national and farming press. The
Lincoinshire Echo, which had an agricultural correspondent, published an article based on the
first press statement, with no additional commentary. Independent Television interviewed a
Maribo representative and broadcast an excerpt as part of a Leeds-based feature on GMO
releases. The company was not asked to advertise the releases and did not do so (telephone
interview with Maribo, 3 June 1992).
The Lincoinshire trials came to national attention only when a London-based science
journalist learned about ACRE's discussion of the proposed 1991 release, long after local
announcements of the 1990 release. His newspaper article had the alanning title, 'Sugar beet
mutant in weedkiller test', whose wording implied that the field tests sprayed herbicide. The
article quoted critical comments on the agricultural implications: it is highly questionable
whether any so-called advance which increases the use of any pesticide is helping the
environment or consumers', stated Friends of the Earth (Erlichman, 1990). Soon Maribo
announced further trial releases which would spray the plants with glyphosate (Keyline
Publicity, 1992). Throughout the entire period, however, there was apparently no local
reaction.
3.2 Cornwall 'genetic test fears'
Also in 1990, different herbicide-resistant crops were released in North Cornwall. These were
oilseed rape resistant to the herbicide glufosinate, or Basta; the seeds came from Plant Genetic
Systems, a firm which was developing these GMOs as commercial products (Crawley et al.,
1993; Fishlock, 1993). The North Cornwall releases were part of the Prosammo programme
of biosafety research, which was testing for unintended effects of the genetic modification
rather than for its efficacy (see further Chapter 8, section 1.2).
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In the 11 October 1990 issue of the Cornish Guardian, there appeared a closedly-printed
advert, barely legible, which announced field trials of oilseed rape which had been 'genetically
engineered' for resistance to the herbicide Basta. The ad explained that the trials, carried out
on Forestry Commission land, would 'compare the growth and survival of conventional and
engineered varieties'; it also explained some safety precautions.
According to the research manager, Michael Crawley, he had delayed publishing the ad until
after obtaining a MAFF licence for the trial releases (personal communication, 17 July 1992).
By the time the ad appeared, the releases had already occurred -- as journalists soon
discovered. The next month, the same newspaper featured an article with the headline,
'Genetic test fears', which reported public resentment (Anon/Wreford, 1990). In May 1991,
Crawley attended a special meeting of concerned Cornwall residents to answer their questions.
In contrast to Lincolnshire, the Cornwall public reaction cannot be explained simply by
Crawley's behaviour, e.g. the delayed advert and apparent secrecy, nor by having used the
term 'genetically engineered' rather than 'transformed'. Several reasons can be found in the
Cornish Guardian article:
* Inadequate consultation: Although the local Environmental Health Officer had discussed
the releases beforehand with the chair of the environment committee, he had taken the matter
no further: 'We do not view the local council's involvement as being that great. Prime
responsibility lies with the Health and Safety Executive.'
* Choice of herbicide-resistance gene: Basta had not yet been licenced for commercial use in
Britain.
* R&D priority: 'It is appalling. It proves once again that Cornwall and Scotland, where other
tests are taking place, are regarded as expendable. These people should be looking at
something of benefit to the world rather than herbicide resistance', declared Jenni Thompson,
a local councillor, also a member of the South West Environmental Protection Agency (ibid.).
According to the local journalist, people also feared that the experiment itself would be
spraying Basta (Alistair Wreford, personal communication, February 1991). This was a
misunderstanding, though not merely so: it perceived this particular 'step' as already bearing
and promoting likely consequences of an eventual commercial product. This unease also
focused upon the inserted gene for resistance to Basta, as an unlicenced herbicide. By
contrast, according to my interviews, ACRE members felt relatively less concerned about any
problems from trial releases of Basta-resistant crops than glyphosate-resistant ones: that is,
existing herbicide usage would not be disrupted by any mishap from the former releases, such
as unintended gene transfer to weedy relatives of crops (see Chapter 8, section 2.1.5).
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Local people also feared a threat from large-scale commercial forces. They foresaw the
stepwise procedure taking a quantum leap, beyond their control. Although they
acknowledged that the Prosamo results could enhance regulatory control over safety, they also
regarded the release as a step towards rewarding commercial motives; these were perceived,
for example, in the DTI's involvement, in the use of Forestry Commission land, and in the
patent on the herbicide-resistance gene (Martin and Taft, 1992: 41-49).
They also cited more immediate, tangible threats: that the transgenic material would disrupt
local crops, harm bees, or contaminate honey. They regarded the prior testing as inadequate
for averting these risks, though the safety measures were designed to prevent pollen spread
(ibid.). Subsequently a national newspaper published an article on 'mutant honey', about
potential health hazards from genetically modified pollen (Watts, 1991).
Informally, some regulators attributed their Cornwall difficulties to contingent circumstances,
such as the delayed advertisement and recent events there. In a 1988 accident in which the
water supply was accidentally poisoned with aluminium, after which the authorities initially
denied the mishap and then denied the health damage. Moreover, many residents had settled
in Cornwall to escape the contaminations of industrial society.
These special circumstances may have strengthened a collective cognitive basis for perceiving
risk more broadly; by articulating pollution threats, they expressed resentment at a sinister
environmental control. While local people identified some environmental uncertainties which
perhaps could have been tested, they also evaluated this 'step' in terms of the values and
commercial forces which it embodied. In effect, their response challenged the stepwise
procedure -- which treats biotechnology as a benign environmental control, identifies testable
uncertainties, progressively extends the realm of safe experimental control, and so eventually
demarcates between 'real versus perceived' risks. Even within Britain's precautionary
approach, the stepwise procedure had difficulty containing perceived risks within a particular
step.
4.0 VIRAL INSECTICIDE
Another difficult case was a viral insecticide, also known as a baculovirus. The applicant,
David Bishop, had pioneered a precautionary approach, in the dual sense of generating
evidence of safety and consulting environmental groups. As he stated,
We have been cautious in our science, in a way that is probably unwarranted in terms
of risk; we have done so because it is unprofessional for us to do otherwise. Indeed,
our step-by-step approach has affected the regulatory procedures in general. In ten
years from now, that careful approach may be seen as unnecessary for our baculovirus,
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but we would rather prove that it is unnecessary by establishing the scientific basis
with a track record. (interview, 25 September 1991)
Nevertheless, his R&D trajectory turned Out to strain any regulatory consensus on a step-by-
step approach.
The test organisms were developed by Bishop's team in Oxford at the Institute of Virology
and Environmental Microbiology (IVEM), attached to the Natural Environment Research
Council. The unmodified parent organism was a baculovirus called the AcNPV. Although
mass produced by Sandoz, the AcNPV was not registered for commercial use in the USA until
1994, and it has not been proposed for registration in Britain.
A baculovirus can fatally infect a susceptible larva which ingests sufficient quantities of virus.
In the case of a nuclear polyhedrosis virus (NPV), the protective protein coat is broken down
in the larval gut; the virus multiplies in the gut cell nuclei, eventually reproduce their
polyhedron coat, and then are released from the larva when it dies and liquefies. The virus
may repeat this cycle and thus generate an epizootic (or epidemic). Requiring several days to
kill the host, baculoviruses are used more widely in forestry, where trees can tolerate and
repair considerable pest damage, than in agricultural fields (Payne, 1986).
The Auto grapha calfornica NPV (AcNPV) is named after the insect from which it was first
isolated. This virus has an irregular host range within the Lepidoptera: the most susceptible
species are members of the Noctuidae family, while members of other Lepidoptera families
tend to be susceptible at much higher doses.
Before conducting the first releases of genetically modified AcNPV, IVEM sought to clarify
the host range by testing various insect species, selected in consultation with the Nature
Conservancy Council (Bishop et aL, 1988: 153). According to the NCC Director, later also an
ACRE member,
We asked them [IVEM] to test a range of other species, which they did. The different
reactions of very closely related butterflies illustrate the ecological unpredictability....
David Bishop's group are actually exemplars in the way they have tackled both the risk
assessment and the publicity end of it. (Derek Langslow, interview 28 August 1991)
In testing the virus' host range, the insect species were chosen partly for their ecological
importance, such as moths in the food chain of early-reared birds (Bishop interview, 10
August 1992).
In 1986 the HSE's ACGM recommended approval of P/EM's proposed experimental design.
The AcNPV was genetically modified to incorporate a marker gene, designed for tracking the
virus' spread and persistence; insect larvae were fed the virus particles and then placed on
sugarbeet plants within plexiglass-covered subenclosures, in turn surrounded by netting.
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Monitoring showed that the virus persisted within the subenclosures for 6 months, before that
area was disinfected. No virus was detected outside the subenclosure, nor inside it after the
formaldehyde treatment (Bishop et aL, 1988).
4.1 'Crippled' vir
For subsequent AcNPV releases in 19 87-89, IVEM deleted the gene for reproducing the
polyhedron coat. As the 'crippled' baculovirus would have a reduced persistence, some
members of the ACGM's IISC felt all the more comfortable with recommending approval.
During that period, 'Other members thought the baculovirus harmless because it was
engineered not to persist in the environment', according to one member. However, some were
concerned about how the insecticide might develop as a commercial product.
Meanwhile 1VEM made great efforts to inform local people about the releases. Bishop
emphasized that physical and biological containment measures provided extra protection for
-an intrinsically safe release. He also cited the potential environmental benefits of eventually
substituting a baculovirus for chemical pesticides. There was no reaction from local
environmental groups, such as Friends of the Earth.
However, a leading FoE officer expressed concern about an ultimate commercial product.
Speaking at a public conference in 1988, he argued that the IVEM trial releases gave a
misleading impression of likely GMO products, which surely would not be modified for
reduced persistence. He described the crippled baculovirus as 'a Trojan horse for the genetic
engineering industry'. Lees quoted a well-known ecologist, Professor Freda Taub, from the
University of Washington: 'Engineering [for] efficiency and safety... cannot be addressed
simultaneously' (Lees, 1990: 138).
Bishop insisted that these criteria were compatible: 'We know that the "crippled" virus is an
efficient biopesticide' (in Wheale and McNally, 1990: 138, 151). However, its efficacy had
been demonstrated mainly in laboratory tests. In further field trials, under adverse weather
conditions, the 'crippled' baculovirus killed few of the pre-infected larvae (Possee et al., 1992:
49; IVEM, 1991b, Appendix 1).
Beforehand IVEM staff had emphasized the in-built biological safety measure, for example,
by claiming that the crippled virus 'should be even safer than the natural virus' (Possee et al.,
1990: 58). However, as IVEM shifted its R&D strategy back to the uncrippled virus, Bishop
downplayed any difference in safety:
The polyhedrin-negative [crippled] virus is not preferable for the fmal product, but it
would be preferable for setting up a model system to ask questions about hazards. We
want to study how the virus moves among infected caterpillars by using a genetically
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marked virus. If the virus degrades away, there is no environmental risk, but studies
showed that its half-life was too short to be useful. We had hoped that it would be
effective, but it wouldn't be efficient as an insecticide. So we are now going back to a
marked polyhedron-positive virus. I cannot imagine any difference it would make for
safety in the trial releases or in the final commercial product. (Bishop interview, 25
Sept 1991)
4.2 Scorpion-toxin virus
For its next test organism, the P/EM team retained the gene for the polyhedrin coat, thus
restoring the original virulence of the virus. They also changed the experimental host
organism to a more 'permissive' (susceptible) insect, Trichoplusia ni, to facilitate an epizootic.
Moreover, they inserted a scorpion gene, so that the baculovirus would produce an insect
toxin for killing the host somewhat faster, as they had already demonstrated in laboratory tests
(Stewart et aL, 1991). IVEM was now collaborating with Weilcome Environmental Health,
Berkamstead, possibly with a long-term view towards developing a commercial biopesticide.
However, the new insect host was not indigenous to Britain, much less a common pest there.
Why choose a gene for scorpion toxin? From an early stage of the AcNPV research, IVEM
had anticipated making the baculovirus more lethal. In 1988 Bishop had stated, 'Vie prefer to
insert genes from the caterpillar itself, for example caterpillar hormone genes' (in Wheale and
McNally, 1990: 151). As he later clarified,
We would like to use the hormone because it presents less risk than the scorpion toxin;
the hormone gene has been around for the virus [hypothetically] to pick up....
However, the caterpillar hormone [gene] so far is not producing a phenotypic change,
even though the gene is expressed. (interview, 25 September 1991)
In their June 1991 application to the ACRE Secretariat, IVEM proposed to test the new
baculovirus for insecticidal efficacy under field conditions, by spraying particles onto the
larvae on the cabbage leaves. P/EM proposed a further change from the previous design: to
contain the subenclosures with netting rather than plexiglass; they would use only a single-
barrier containment, on grounds that no virus had been detected beyond the subenclosures in
previous trial releases.
ACRE considered the P/EM application at their 9 July 1991 meeting. Some members
expressed unease that the experimental design no longer had the in-built biological
containment of the crippled virus, nor the double physical containment. Consequently, they
attributed greater significance to the virus' persistence, which could multiply any small risk
over a long time period (interviews with ACRE members, September 1991). Subsequently
the HSE corresponded with IVEM on both environmental and human safety issues, as follows.
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Regarding the host range, WEM's 1989 application had reported the results of laboratory tests
on numerous Lepidoptera species which were fed the AcNPV at quantities of 1O21O6 virus
particles. For the unmodified virus, the permissive (susceptible) species included a rare UK
butterfly, Boloria euphrosyne, the pearl-bordered fritillary (Table excerpted in Rechaussat and
Williamson, 1989, Appendix M: 8-9). Yet its June 1991 application defined insects as
permissive only if they were fatally infected by 1O particles or less; and its list of species
included no butterflies (WEM, 1991a).
Consequently, the HSE asked IVEM why its latest application had a Table of tested insects
which included fewer species than in 1989, and which omitted endangered species in
particular. In this context, the HSE also expressed concern at the AcNPV's wide host range.
The HSE even suggested that IVEM withdraw the application (points cited in reply from
IVEM, 1991b).
In his August reply, David Bishop stated that We do not wish to withdraw the application
since we consider that the answers provided below clarify all the issues raised by ACRE.' He
argued that it was more prudent for a Table of permissive species to be based upon repeat
tests, comparing the modified virus to the wild type; for this comparison, the selection had
been 'biased towards those insect species which are more likely to be susceptible to the
AcNPV' (IVEM, 1991b). Thus IVEM investigated only whether the genetic modification
altered the host range of the unmodified virus, whose safety was taken for granted.
Moreover, in its June 1991 application IVEM had already dismissed any prospect of the
AcNPV causing an epizootic: 'The modified virus would require a continuous replicative
chain in permissive species to persist in any environment. This is considered to be an unlikely
scenario' (IVEM, 1991a). In its August reply to the HSE, IVEM insisted that an epizootic was
unlikely, 'given these [physical] precautions' which would contain the virus (IVEM, 1991b);
thus the official safety claim became somewhat qualified.
Unofficially, Bishop discounted any epizootic by emphasizing ecological obstacles more than
physical ones:
In realistic field conditions, it is difficult to see how each insect would find, much less
eat, more than 101 virus particles at the first instar stage (or 102103 at the second
instar stage). More relevant than the technically 'permissive dose' is the hundred years
experience of epizootics. For example, when the Germans iried to use a baculovirus to
control the gypsy moth, no çpizootics in other species were observed.... A dead
caterpillar could produce 10 virus particles, but they would likely get diluted before
another insect found that material. From our experience, a second instar needs i02iO3
particles/cm2
 in order to set off a lethal infection (Bishop interview, 10 August 1992).
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Thus IVEM cited familiar experiences; including past epizootic studies, as evidence of its
experimental safety -- almost regardless of whether the AcNPV might escape from the
experimental site.
Challenging IVEM's rationale, an ACRE member asked why the AcNPV is so readily found
in the environment if an epizootic is so difficult to achieve. Regarding the virus' host range,
'IVEM has tested only about five butterflies, but we {Britain] have about twenty of them, and
butterflies are what people get excited about', he stated. Moreover, he drew an analogy
between the AcNPV and the chemical pesticides responsible for eliminating butterflies from
the environment.
ACRE members also expressed concern about the scorpion toxin. According to a toxicologist,
reluctant to say very much, he had inquired about 'a possible homology between the scorpion-
derived insect toxin and molecules of biological interest' (personal communication, 10
February 1992). Other members stated the concern less euphemistically: WEM had not
carried out a computer search for any similar substances toxic to humans. The ACRE
Secretariat invited another specialist to provide advice on that question at the 9 July meeting.
Consequently the HSE letter (as above) asked WEM to clarify data on the scorpion toxin's
toxicity to mammalian species.
In its August reply, IVEM argued that organisms could not be harmed simply by ingesting the
toxin in plausible quantities. Moreover, IVEM regarded toxicity to non-susceptible organisms
as an irrelevant issue because the scorpion gene could produce the toxin only by intracellular
means in infected insects: therefore the virus' host range superseded any wider range of the
toxin. And any 'homology' was irrelevant for a toxin already shown to be insect-specific
(WEM, 1991b). Bishop resented suggestions that he redo toxicity tests already conducted and
published by other scientists (interview, 25 September 1991).
That rejoinder raised the stakes for confidence about the virus' narrow host range. In
laboratory tests, IVEM had fed virus particles to insects from various genera of Lepidoptera,
in order to ascertain the LI)50 ' the dose which would kill half the host population. From
some ecologists' standpoint, however, such figures wrongly assumed that the infection and kill
rates were determined entirely by the number of virus particles, regardless of other factors.
Moreover, there was no scientific understanding of why the LI)50 varied by several orders of
magnitude for different insects, including closely related ones, though the standard taxonomy
itself was based largely on aesthetic characteristics.
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According to one ACRE member, the issue of insect-specificity took on greater importance
for contextual reasons. HSE had the statutory authority to forbid a GMO release on human
safety grounds, under the RSWA 1974, though not on environmental grounds. The 1990
Environmental Protection Act was not yet implemented, so neither was the statutory
requirement on information disclosure. Bound by confidentiality, ACRE members felt that
they could not divulge details and publicly raise the safety issues.
The only overt challenge came in a published letter from an ACRE member, who argued that
the virus' sporadic host range conflicted with the EC's risk-assessment criteria. He cited the
plausible scenario of an unintended epizootic harming non-target insects; in this way, he
questioned the technical criteria for how to define a 'permissive' host (Williamson, 1991). His
query had some basis in the inherent complexities of modeling a baculoviral epizootic -- for
which science had no methodological consensus (e.g. Hochberg and Waage, 1991).
4.3 Containing uncertainty
Given all these concerns, some ACRE members had suggested that IVEM withdraw its
proposal, or at least strengthen the physical containment. IVEM instead reasserted its safety
claims, e.g. by citing laboratory evidence on the virus' host range and toxin's insect-specificity
(as described above, WEM, 1991b). ACRE members accepted claims that the virus' delivery
system was specific to insects, and that a plausible amount of ingested toxin could not harm
any mammal. In autumn 1991 the HSE informed IVEM that it was now satisfied with the
human safety of the proposed release.
There still remained all the uncertainties about environmental safety, for which IVEM sought
the DoE's agreement, even though it was not legally required. Eventually IVEM offered to
surround the experimental site with an additional fence and water-filled trench. ACRE's April
1992 meeting recommended approval of the release with the extra containment. As one
member reflected, 'We delayed the approval for nine months, but for no longer...
Experimental protocols were traded off against uncertain risks -- though that cannot be done
for all risks.'
In sum, although IVEM had pioneered a precautionary approach, its R&D trajectory strained
the very notion of a thinkable 'step'. By abandoning the in-built biological containment of the
crippled virus, the IVEM proposal created a dilemma for ACRE members, who felt reluctant
to rely upon the physical containment for safety. In effect, they used the ambiguous pre-
statutory situation to request additional evidence of safety, even to challenge the acceptability
of IVEM's evidence (Levidow, 1995).
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From previous releases, IVEM could cite some evidence for its capacity to identify and
contain the virus, but not for the virus' persistence, much less for the basis of its host range in
the dynamics of an epizootic. On the other hand, ACRE members had scant basis for directly
opposing the release -- especially without evidence of harm or public protest. Although they
had some grounds for safety concerns, they were also projecting hypothetical hazards of large-
scale use onto this small-scale field trial.
In so doing, and in drawing pollution analogies, they were perhaps 'thinking like members of
the public', as some members had advocated (see Chapter 6, section 3.4). In this way, the
committee's internal dynamic epitomized a wider social process of accommodating public
unease, even prior to official disclosure of the release. Yet such efforts could at most delay
the logic of taking the next step towards a more 'efficient' pesticide, while containing
uncertain risks in the experimental design.
5.0 CONCLUSION: LEGITIMIZING A 'STEP'
Early GMO releases were intended to push forward the regulatory system, while publicly
demonstrating safe control. The experimental design featured biological and/or physical
containment measures, though regulatory advisors preferred not to rely upon the physical
barriers for ensuring safety. Some advisors regarded the precautionary measures as 'avoiding
perceived risks' and so avoiding public alarm.
The safety measures can be interpreted more subtly, as leaving open the stereotypical
boundary between real/perceived risks. By anticipating public perception, the regulatory
procedure strengthened the hand of advisors who proposed more stringent controls, requested
more evidence of safety, or proposed more monitoring. By providing opportunity to
challenge safety claims, the procedure effectively reversed the usual meaning of the
government slogan, 'sound science' (i.e. awaiting evidence of harm). To some extent,
pollution analogies informed this precautionary approach: hypothetical hazards had to be
'perceived' before they could be translated into scientific terms, incorporated into safety
measures, and/or empirically tested.
Although advisors held diverse risk perspectives, they could generally reach a consensual
response to specific proposals. Such consensus was made possible by formally restricting risk
assessment to the particular 'step' at hand. In this way, the stepwise risk-management
procedure framed risk assessment, contrary to the stereotypical sequence, which presumes a
prior agreement on identifying 'real risk'.
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The safety procedures can be interpreted as a 'judicial ritual', as an instrumental action which
produces symbolic meanings. The concept of GMOs as novel organisms provided a common
symbolic framework for negotiating diverse risk perceptions within the regulatory procedure,
which scrutinized each proposed release for suspected guilt of running out of control. The
ritual aspect potentially bridged awkward gulfs: e.g. between small-scale safety and larger-
scale implications; between technical safety and ethical qualms; or between a 'safe'
experimental control and a sinister environmental control. However, such gulfs proved
awkward to bridge in at least two cases, a herbicide-resistant crop and a viral insecticide.
In a low-key local protest in North Cornwall, residents emphasized commercial forces
involved in the design and future effects of a herbicide-resistant crop. Although they
identified short-term scenarios of potential harm, they also evaluated this modest 'step' in
terms of its systemic implications for the future. They responded to the GMO as a pollutant in
several senses, e.g. as a territorial invasion, as contaminated food or seeds, as a link to an
unlicensed herbicide, and as a chemical-dependent programme for agriculture. Indeed, they
characterized the herbicide-resistant crop as a sinister environmental control: a NIMBY
impulse merged with a NIABY stance of 'not in anybody's backyard' (cf. Tait, 1988, 1990;
Schwarz and Thompson, 1990: 20).
The Cornwall episode indicated some regulatory difficulties in formally separating the 'risk' of
a release from its R&D trajectory. It resonated with local protest against GMO releases in the
USA, where 'The political rhetoric of the popular culture stressed control over its
environment' (Krimsky and Plough, 1988: 108-9); the US protest has been interpreted as a
'cultural rationality' confronting the 'technical rationality' of risk assessment. However, as
Britain's procedure illustrates, the safety regulation too had a socio-cultural content: in taking
precautions beyond technical evidence of risk, it kept GMOs symbolically under safe control,
while promoting the advance of biotechnological knowledge.
In the case of a viral insecticide proposed for trial release, the GMO became problematic
within the risk-assessment procedure. Some ACRE members associated this GMO with
pollution imagery. They questioned the experimental design, especially its reliance upon
physical containment for safety; they also transposed long-term uncertainties onto the 'step' at
hand.
In requesting more evidence of safety, some members were discouraging the proposed release
and its R&D trajectory. Similarly, in other regulatory controversies, opponents have recast a
political judgement about acceptable risk into a scientific judgement about acceptable
evidence (cf. Jasanoff, 1990: 160, 232). With the viral insecticide, however, more meaningful
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evidence of safety could not be readily provided without carrying out and monitoring further
trial releases, in turn driven by attempts at enhancing efficacy. Within the regulatory
procedure, safety sceptics could only delay an experiment designed to advance knowledge
towards a commercially viable pesticide.
In both those difficult cases, a pollution imagery articulated safety concerns, even resentment
at an undesirable technological development. To some extent, the precautionary content
depended upon such imagery: hypothetical hazards had to be 'perceived' before they could be
formulated in scientific terms, incorporated into an experimental design, and empirically
tested (if possible). By facilitating this technical translation, the regulatory procedure was
containing perceived risks, in several senses of the verb; it was maintaining a 'safe' stepwise
control, while displacing anxieties about a sinister environmental control.
Each in its own way, the two difficult cases also illustrate a pervasive tension within the
stepwise regulatory procedure. Such tension arose from a procedural rationality which
abstracted out technical 'risk' from the commercial forces which constitute the
biotechnological project. The authority of safety judgements depended upon treating the
particular 'step' alone as the risk-generating system, as if the R&D trajectory were desirable or
simply not in question (cf. Wynne, 1982: 172). Nevertheless, with few exceptions, the
regulatory procedure successfully demarcated between an acceptable present 'step' and some
future step. Thus it could eventually establish a more credible boundary between
'real/perceived' risks.
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Chapter 8
A PRECAUTIONARY 'SOUND SCIENCE'?
As described in the previous chapter, Britain's regulatory procedure was symbolically
containing perceived risks. The procedure could generally accommodate diverse risk
perceptions about small-scale field trials. Officially, relaxation of those initial controls was to
be based upon gaining evidence of safety from earlier steps (OECD, 1986: 29, 41).
Given that Britain claimed to base its 'precautionary approach' upon 'sound science', what did
these terms mean in practice? What was its basis for maldng risk assessment more 'objective'?
How did it define the range of uncertainty relevant to potential harm? Where and how did
value judgements arise in these efforts?
This chapter analyses how Britain's regulatory system prepared for relaxing initial controls. It
discusses:
** how biosafety research defined testable uncertainties (section 1);
* how regulatory advisors acknowledged and justified value judgements in risk assessment
(section 2); and, in sum,
* how a precautionary 'sound science' remained a contradiction in terms (section 3).
In citing comments from members of Britain's advisory committees, this chapter will identify
them by the coding system used earlier (see Chapter 7, section 2): T = trade-union nominee,
C = industry nominee, S = other specialist member, D = departmental assessor, also R =
member of Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. This chapter excerpts parts of
their cognitive maps in text form, rather than reproduce all the maps; the dash (--) denotes the
phrase 'in order to'.
Terminological note: Also as in Chapter 7, here the term 'genetically modified' is often
replaced with 'gm or 'transgenic'.
1.0 UNCERTAINTIES TESTED BY PROSAMO
For regulating GMO releases, the British government declared its intention 'to reduce the risk
of harm to people and the environment through precautionary controls supported by rigorous
research to improve our understanding' (HMG, 1990: 183). Towards this end, GMO releases
used genetic markers to monitor the movement of the organism or the inserted gene.
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However, according to ACRE members, most releases provided minimal monitoring of effects
relevant for the step-wise relaxation of controls. This was partly because the releasers
prioritized testing for the efficacy of the inserted gene or of containment measures. Moreover,
the experimental design often limited what could be learned from the release. As one ACRE
member said, 'The MAFF people are concerned mainly about the safety of the present small-
scale trial release; but if you take precautions to make it safer, then you lose information' (cf.
OECD, 1993: 23-24). The results lend themselves to declaring that 'There was no evidence of
untoward effects', rather than 'There is evidence of safety' on particular criteria, though the
distinction could be ambiguous.
For clarifying scientific uncertainties, there arose an interdisciplinary research effort,
promoted by new journals such as Molecular Ecology. This research used genetic markers for
tracking genes and organisms, thus learning more about ecological relationships. One ACRE
member welcomed the opportunity for 'much more rigorous studies' of dispersal and
competitive advantage, though he doubted this would fulfill regulators' expectations for a
predictive ecology: 'the best that can usually be done is some explanation after the event'
(Williamson, 1992: 5). Other biologists emphasized difficulties in studying organisms'
behaviour in nature, even by using the new molecular techniques, which could yield
misleading results (e.g. van den Eede and van Montagu, 1992).
Nevertheless, the regulatory system attempted to specify research which could inform the
step-by-step relaxation of controls. Many countries funded biosafety research designed to
clarify particular uncertainties. In Britain, these included various DoE-funded projects and the
Prosamo programme, as analysed below.
The DoE funded a diverse range of projects, including basic ecological research relevant to
GMOs though not using them. These areas initially included: improving techniques for
identifying, tracking and isolating organisms; detection and impact of gene flow to feral
populations; identifying factors which facilitate invasion; and developing techniques for
monitoring the impact of introduced organisms on established communities (DoE, 1991).
Prosamo, the 'Planned Release of Selected and Modified Organisms', began in 1989 as a three-
year £1.5m research programme, jointly funded by the Dli, AFRC and industry. Its sponsors
expected the research to resolve key uncertainties, so as to justify relaxing initial controls on
GMO releases. Unlike its microbial research, the plant research used GMO releases --
specifically, seeds for transgenic crops already closest to the market stage (Fishlock, 1993).
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Although Prosamo used the genetic markers to research safety questions, the marker genes
had been inserted for commercial purposes.
Prosamo's initial aims were three-fold: to develop better methods for detecting specific micro-
organisms, to detect any enhanced competitiveness of transgenic plants, and to detect gene
flow from crops (Prosamo, 1989; Young, 1989). The rest of this section will examine the
three areas, in turn, while juxtaposing Prosamo with the wider risk debate.
1.1 Microbial monitoring
In general, GMO regulation faced greater difficulty in assessing microbial releases than plants.
For some regulatory advisors, this was partly because the intended effect of a transgenic plant
is more direct than that of a transgenic micro-organism intended to carry out an indirect effect,
e.g. a biopesticide. Moreover, recent studies indicated that 'natural' gene transfer goes beyond
the limits observed in the laboratory and beyond the microbiologists' classifications of
microbial species (Davies, 1990; Maynard Smith, 1991). This greater knowledge could imply
greater ecological uncertainty, warranting further research.
By 1991 the only release of transgenic bacteria had been Rhizobium. As it forms nodules on
plant roots, Rhizobium was considered more readily detectable than other micro-organisms.
At the same time, the root environment was associated with ecological uncertainty: 'Because
roots leak nutrients into the soil, organisms can grow relatively rapidly in the rhizosphere.
You find them in high densities, which maximise the possibility of genetic exchange between
microbes and plants, or among microbes' (interview with ex-IACI member, 24 March 1991).
Research projects other than Prosamo were investigating this 'microbial hot spot', so labelled
by rhetorical analogy to radiation hazards.
For microbes in general, better detection techniques were sought in order for trial releases to
enhance scientific knowledge about bacterial survival, mobility and gene transfer. Prosamo
focused upon developing techniques for marking and detecting two representative soil
bacteria, Pseudomonasfluorescens and Bacillus subtilis. The latter, whose genetics was well
known, had long been used as a model organism for studying gram-positive bacteria.
Prosamo sought to detect low numbers of those microbes, amidst a large background of
indigenous organisms.
Prosamo awarded contracts to two academic departments, each for a different detection
technique, to be used initially for monitoring microcosms. Professor W.A. Hamilton at
Aberdeen University led a research project which genetically modified bacteria by inserting a
Lux gene, whose expression lights up each UMO cell. By using a special microscope, direct
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observation of this bioluminescence could detect just a single colony in a treated soil sample,
and thus see where the gene has gone.
Meanwhile Professor Tim Gray at Essex University led a project using automated flow
cytometry (AFC). AFC rapidly sorts large numbers of individual cells according to their
binding with immunofluorescent antibodies; it can also store selected cells for subsequent
culturing or further tests. Its automated facility can detect lower-intensity fluorescence than
the human eye could do.
The AFC machine was originally devised by medical cytologists for quantifying animal cells.
Subsequently, other institutions developed it for identifying specific bacteria in water and in
soil (Pickup and Saunders, 1990; Page and Burns, 1991). By extending AFC to the two soil
organisms designated by Prosamo, Essex University found that the machine not only could
identify them within soil samples, but also could distinguish between the vegetative and spore
forms of Bacillus subtilis.
How might this technique assist monitoring a microbial release? According to Tim Gray, its
rapidity would allow monitoring to look at a greater proportion of the soil microflora than
previously possible; detecting spore forms is particularly important, as they could act as a
long-term genetic reservoir. However, he remained 'healthily sceptical' about how well such
sampling could represent the population at hand, especially in field conditions:
You might not get a representative sample because the bacteria are not uniformly
distributed throughout the soil sample; they will occur in clusters in specific places,
partially inside organic particles, and be hidden. For that sort of reason, microbial
ecology is based on the supposition that you are dealing with a non-uniform
environment. And microbes may have a different physiology in the soil than they
have in the test tube. [By contrast] laboratory microbiology takes for granted a more
or less uniform environment that you've constructed, and supposes that you can keep
the cells going under constant conditions. From our background in microbial ecology,
we are more concerned about what we're missing than what we're finding in our
samples (Tim Gray, interview 24 March 1991).
His cautious view may indicate why the Prosamo committee short-listed bids only from
institutions which had backgrounds in microbial ecology, even though other laboratory
microbiologists had already developed similar techniques.
What were the prospects for requiring the routine use of AFC for monitoring a GMO release?
As the machine involves a level of cost and sophistication similar to an electron microscope,
institutions might have difficulty buying one, though conceivably they could send soil samples
for AFC analysis elsewhere. Its prospects could depend upon the machine's sensitivity: 'What
we're trying to do is to increase the sensitivity, to detect a smaller number of cells in a bigger
background; so that, if we're doing a depth or survival curve, we don't have to extrapolate
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downwards; we can actually measure it downwards' (ibid.) According to a DoE-funded
assessment, however, AFC was 'judged to represent poor value for money, requiring .extensive
development for utility' (DoE, 1991). Thus, perhaps echoing the BATNEEC criterion, this
'best available technology' apparently entailed excessive cost.
In any case, even by identifying individual microbes, science would remain far from
establishing the 'baseline of normality' which some ecologists were seeking for risk
assessment. And even if better detection techniques could identify individual microbes,
regulatory policy faced scientific disagreements over how and even why to monitor gm
microbes.
Such issues arose publicly at Regem 2, the second international conference on the 'Release of
Genetically Engineered Micro-Organisms' [GEMs], held in August 1991. Some participants,
mainly among the few ecologists present, anticipated GEMs perturbing an ecosystem in
unpredictable ways, possibly generating hazards not yet identified. An official from Britain's
Health and Safety Executive posed the question: how can monitoring measure a GEM's
impact, unless the ecological baseline is known?
In that spirit Professor Jim Lynch, from the AFRC Institute of Horticultural Research,
welcomed the use of genetic markers to study the impact of introductions on a natural
microbial community, measured against its critical baseline factors, especially by monitoring
its dominant members. Rather than attempt to detect all prevalent microbes in a population,
some ecologists proposed to survey its collective properties. That is, by measuring a
metabolic profile, a microbial population could be monitored for unusual changes after
introducing a GEM (reported in Colwell, 1992; Levidow, 1992a).
By contrast, some Regem 2 participants regarded a perturbation in itself as irrelevant to
assessing whether genetic modification could or does make an organism more harmful.
Laboratory scientists in particular wanted to focus any such anticipation upon identifiable
hazards, some of which were deemed acceptable. According to John Beringer, the Chairman
of ACRE, the multiplicity of organisms in an environment means that knocking out one
species probably wouldn't matter (ibid.: 57). Thus different concepts of environmental
stability favoured investigating a different range of natural facts.
There was also a conceptual divide over whether novel niches are limited by genetic novelty
and/or by environmental constraints (see Chapter 4, section 1.2). According to recent
ecological research on a particular micro-organism, only a few genetic variations are found
across diverse environments. Different scientists interpreted these same results in opposite
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ways: i.e., to suggest that niches are limited by environment or, alternatively, by natural
genetic recombination (ibid.: 57; Bale et al., 1992; Young and Wexier, 1988). The latter
model implied greater ecological unpredictability from releasing GMOs.
In summary, new evidence could lend itself to different models of the scientific uncertainty
relevant to risk assessment. Conversely, environmental values could influence priorities for
biosafety research, even the criteria for meaningful detection techniques, as in Prosamo. Thus
the regulatory system faced dissensus on what 'uncertainty' had to be reduced.
1.2 Competitive advantage of transgenic plants
The early GMO debate featured a dispute over the 'excess baggage hypothesis': Would the
metabolic demands of an inserted gene weaken the competitive ability of an organism? Or
alternatively, could an inserted gene induce pleiotropic effects which, for example, make a
crop more weedy?
Speculation on competitive advantage was further complicated by differences in
conceptualizing 'the natural environment'. As a US ecologist argued, 'whether or not certain
natural communities will reject new species [e.g. a GMO} will often be an irrelevant issue,
since much land is obviously disturbed and much that looks natural is not really natural'
(Regal, 1987: 78; cf. Dixon, 1988: 21, 24). This argument could work both ways: a 'disturbed
environment' could explain away documented weedy behaviour as a special case, or it could
warn against presuming behavioural predictability in any environment.
Scientists' views on predictability have depended somewhat upon how they conceptualize
familiar crops and weeds. In particular, some ecologists have identified up to twelve plant
characteristics which correspond to weedy behaviour. Rating some well-known crops, one
ecologist drew a sharp division between those crops and weeds; accordingly, pleiotropic
effects would need to change several characteristics in order to transform a crop into a weed
(Keeler, 1989).
Other ecologists criticized her selectivity, and even the entire rating system, for exaggerating
the difference between crops and weeds. Indeed, the distinction becomes particularly
misleading for some plants which are treated agronomically as a crop in one place and as a
weed in another (Fitter et al., 1990). The latter authors argued for taking special precautions
with GMOs derived from crops which are already minor weeds; for example, oilseed rape
grows on roadside verges and potatoes persist in following crops (Williamson et al., 1990).
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Some of these uncertainties were addressed by the Prosamo programme, in studies done by
Michael Crawley of Imperial College (see also Chapter 7, section 3.2). He proposed to carry
out sufficient GMO releases in order to draw meaningful generalizations from the results, but
encountered regulatory pressures to limit the releases. According to him, the DoE's earlier
advisory committee (TACT) took the view that Prosamo was trying to do too much, too
quickly; they saw it as too ambitious, going beyond the step-by-step approach (interview 10
July 1990). As one MAFF official explained, they wanted to ensure that the GMO releasers
'would have adequate resources to deal with unexpected conditions', and to avoid widespread
dispersal of transgenic pollen which might harm human health (interview, 27 April 1990),
though Prosamo eventually overcame these reservations.
Crawley advocated approaching ecological complexities with 'reductionist tools', by isolating
testable parameters to answer simple questions: e.g. in the absence of any obvious selection
pressure, would genetic modification itself enhance the competitive advantage of a crop? He
initially ca_rried out trials to provide baseline data on the persistence and invasive capacity of
familiar crops. Subsequently he compared the behaviour of transgenic crops with their
unmodified versions.
In the Prosamo trials through 1991, the transgenic crops had genes inserted for kanamycin
resistance and herbicide resistance -- without, of course, applying those chemicals in the
fields. In 1990 Crawley carried out trials on oilseed rape, at four different sites, with four
different habitats. In all the habitats without cultivation, not a single seed reproduced; in some
cultivated habitats, the transgenic versions were slightly less viable than the unmodified crop
(Cherfas, 1991; Crawley, 1990, 1991). Similar patterns were confirmed after two generations
and with more varied habitats (Crawley et al., 1993).
He announced his early results as meaningful evidence of safety: 'The preliminary results of
the Prosamo experiments suggest that transgenic rape plants are unlikely to pose more of a
threat to the environment than their conventional counterparts' (Crawley, 1991: 148). After
several such trials on potatoes, maize and oilseed rape, a brochure concluded: 'Although
repeats are still needed, to allow for our variable climate, early results indicate that these
crops, at least, are unlikely to pose significant problems' (Prosamo, 1991).
These reassurances conflated 'crops' with 'crop-gene combinations', as if pleiotropic effects
were independent of whichever gene might be inserted. Moreover, some ecologists had
expressed greater concern about inserted genes which could more plausibly enhance viability,
such as for a toxin which provides resistance to insects. Crawley did not expect much
differential effect from such a gene, as he regarded competition with other plants as a more
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important factor than insect predation (Cherfas, 1991), though he later reserved judgement
(Crawley et al., 1993), as did his Prosamo colleagues (Dale et al., 1993: 15). Thus there
remained a methodological indeterminacy over how an experiment could best simulate the
conditions in which a genetic modification might turn a plant more weedy.
1.3 Gene flow from transgenic plants
With the prospect of unintentional gene transfer from a transgenic plant, safety questions are
extended to all relatives with which it might hybridize. Not only pleiotropic effects, but also
resistance to pests or herbicides, could be transferred to weedy relatives. Although such
'leakage' back and forth is nothing new, the transgenic origin and character of the inserted
gene broadens the range of possible effects; this new uncertainty met different scientific
interpretations.
As some ecologists argued, there are already documented cases where gene flow from crops
has generated more aggressive weeds, which can be more difficult to control, especially where
they mimic the crop. Moreover, while traditional breeding has generally selected for traits
which would be maladaptive in weeds, genetic modification can more readily insert genes
intended to confer a fitness advantage. From this perspective, past agricultural experience
serves as a warning: 'The hazards created by crop-weed hybridization are not unique to
genetic engineering' (Ellstrand and Hoffman, 1990; cf. Young, 1989). By contrast, some
scientists cited past experience to downplay potential problems: 'Evidence from crosses
between weed species and conventionally bred varieties indicate that hybrids tend to become
more crop-like rather than aggressive weeds' (Dale, 1991). This reassurance took for granted
a naturalistic model of the uncertainty, conceptualizing the agricultural context as merely
environmental variations.
For early GMO releases, risk assessment considered the traditional agronomic practice of
maintaining a standard isolation distance in order to protect a crop's purity from contamination
by weedy relatives. That precaution was widely regarded as inadequate for GMO releases, for
several reasons: effective pollen contribution from a crop to a weed might be different than
vice versa (Ellstrand and Hoffman, 1990); and an acceptable level of crop contamination by a
weed might be regarded as an unacceptable level of weed contamination by a GMO (ACRE,
1992: 5). The prospect of generating a more competitive weed, which could displace other
wild plants or invade agriculture, raised the stakes for knowing more precisely the extent and
effect of transferring the inserted gene. However, argued one ACRE member, long-distance
gene flow depends upon so many factors that it is 'almost impossible to conceive of trying to
measure it' (Chris Gliddon, quoted in Young, 1989).
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In Prosamo, all these ecological-agronomic complexities were analytically reduced to two
questions: What is the extent of unintended gene transfer? What is the viability of the
unintended hybrid? The investigation was carried out by Professor Richard Flavell and Philip
Dale at the AFRC Institute for Plant Science Research (which moved from Cambridge to
Norwich, becoming part of the John Innes Institute).
In order to measure gene flow, they planted transgenic crops, with an inserted genetic marker,
near their unmodified counterparts and/or weedy relatives. In the case of oilseed rape, which
is insect-pollinated, transgenic progeny more than 100cm from the transgenic source were so
few in number that further experiments would be needed to substantiate the figures (Prosamo,
1991). Another release planted out transgenic Desiree potatoes, also insect-pollinated, near its
Solanaceous relatives; after screening the progeny, no evidence of crossing could be found
(Phil Dale, interview 27 June 1991). Next on the experimental list would be sugar beet, which
is wind-pollinated; its pollen was already known to travel more than a kilometer and to
hybridize with weedy relatives, so it might provide less reassuring or less reproducible results.
For each gm plant, We attempted to design an experiment that would give a statistically
significant answer for the environment in which it took place', rather than attempt to represent
a wider environment (Richard Flavell, interview 27 June 1991).
Second question: What would be the viability of any hybrid? From greenhouse studies of
attempted crosses between potatoes and their relatives, Prosamo had 'no evidence of any
hybrid being produced'; using high-tech means to hybridize oilseed rape with a close relative,
the research found that the hybrids 'tend to be sterile, which acts as another barrier to gene
spread' (Cherfas, 1991). The barriers for potato were confirmed by a Dutch plant breeder in
attempting to transfer disease-resistance genes from another nightshade; he attempted
thousands of pollinations with embryo culture but produced no viable hybrid (Philip Dale,
interview 27 June 1991; cf. Dale et al., 1992: 75).
What blocked the hybridization process? Here Prosamo took a null result as cause for further
investigating why, rather than for presuming safety. The explanation mattered because,
according to Philip Dale, 'The further it gets through the [hybridization] process, the more
likely it is that that rare event will happen' (quoted in Young, 1989).
1.4 Demonstrating safety?
What safety conclusions could be drawn from Prosamo's results? Industrialists, as well as
some ACRE members (e.g. D5), hoped that Prosamo would help regulators to categorize•
crops according to their safety and predictability for GMO releases. They sought to vindicate
particular crops of suspicion of unintended behaviour, such as gene transfer, regardless of the
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inserted gene. Otherwise, it would be extremely expensive to carry out Prosamo-type
experiments on every crop-gene combination intended for release.
In this vein, a Prosamo contractor spoke about gene flow:
It would be difficult to extrapolate from genes inserted now, to those inserted in the
future. So we decided to concentrate our efforts on the crop factors, of which the most
important are cross-compatibility, and the distance that pollen will travel and give
cross-fertilization. Once we have generated data on those two factors, it can be used
for all subsequent field releases with those crops, starting with potatoes and oilseed
rape (Philip Dale interview, 27 June 1991).
On the basis of such data, the experimental protocols were simplified for small-scale field
trials of GMO releases, by allowing a shorter isolation distance and the presence of weedy
relatives (Dale et al., 1992: 76).
A public-relations account of Prosamo soon appeared in an industry-sponsored exhibition,
Biote chnology for Europe '92. In the section entitled 'Demonstrating Environmental Safety', it
summarized the Prosamo results as follows: 'Careful studies with modified plants show that
gene dispersal is minimal' (CIA, 1992). Although technically accurate, the claim implied that
the results demonstrated the safety of transgenic products. Similar reassurances came from
Prosamo itself (Prosamo, 1991; Fishlock, 1993).
However, some ACRE members regarded the Prosamo results as relevant mainly for assessing
small-scale field trials, rather than for resolving longer-tenn, large-scale uncertainties. 'An
experiment may be related to the component parts of an ecosystem, but not to the totality; I'm
not sure Prosamo understands that' (S2). One member (T2) had anticipated that the results
'would probably confirm the suspicions on which the committee has been acting', e.g.
regarding isolation distance. Another (SlO) put this more strongly,
Prosamo will be of no use to us because it is looking at whether a minor modification
has an effect; each organism's ecology is unique, so an aspect of ecology could affect
one crop but not others. We are now getting better data on gene flow, but the rare,
long-distance event is often the most important one. Knowing the isolation distance is
useful at the preliminary stage but irrelevant for commercial introduction.
Prosamo contractors acknowledged some limits to the safety conclusions. As Michael
Crawley stated, 'There is no way that you would carry out an introduction based on it [the
GMO] being a supposedly safe distance from a potential recipient, if the product of that cross-
pollination would be seen as hazardous' (interview, 10 July 1990). His Prosamo colleague
concurred:
The isolation distance derived from our data would be used in the evaluation phase
[small-scale field trials of a GMO]. During that period, a decision has to be made as to
whether the gene would be safe if it got into adjacent crops or wild species. Oncea
gene is accepted as having no adverse consequences, then isolation could no longer be
practiced... If you were particularly concerned about a gene transferring, then you
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should question whether that gene [in a GMOIJ is an appropriate release (Philip Dale,
interview 27 June 1991).
Regarding competitive advantage, even the most cautious ecologist did not expect a few trial
releases to yield evidence of an invasive problem; any pleiotropic effect would be a rare
occurrence, and enhanced viability even rarer. As Philip Dale acknowledged, any test for
competitive advantage would require the presence of some relevant selection pressure for the
inserted gene. Yet how would such interaction be meaningfully tested?
Taking up this question, an ACRE member proposed a more daring test of potential
consequences: 'A better experiment [than Prosamo] would be to take a gene from oilseed rape
which changes a protein in the seed, and put the gene into weedy turnips.' As a Brassica, that
plant is a wild relative of oilseed rape; and the protein change in seed could change the rate of
predation, one way or the other (cf. Williamson, 1992: 4). Such an experiment could better
simulate the few cases where unintended gene transfer might enhance viability under some
plausible selection pressure.
As some ecologists further argued, the effects of slightly different environmental conditions
'are likely to be minor compared to the different management practices or habitat factors (such
as predators) that will be experienced'. Consequently it might be difficult to determine which
habitats are appropriate for testing the weedy potential of a GMO (Perrins et al., 1992: 48,
54). Those systemic factors also pose difficulties for making behavioural predictions on the
basis of trial releases, especially for crops which already have weedy characteristics, such as
oilseed rape, potatoes and sugar beet (Williamson, 1992: 3).
Taking their logic even further, one could imagine the following 'thought experiment': insert a
herbicide-resistance gene into a weedy relative of a crop, plant it near fields where the
herbicide is being sprayed routinely on the crop, and monitor the weed. Of course, such a
simulation of hazard might be regarded as too hazardous or alarming -- hardly 'allowing the
public to feel comfortable' with GMO releases (see Chapter 7, section 1). This thought
experiment illustrates an inherent dilemma in finding acceptable ways to test plausible
hazards.
Moreover, the different interpretations of Prosamo's results derive from different concepts of
the environment, e.g. as stable or fragile. Portraying the environment mainly as a threat to
crops, some industry officials posed a semi-rhetorical question about unintended
consequences, such as gene flow: '(Why) does it matter?' (cf. OECD, 1993: 27). Trial releases
could not answer that question by analytically reducing ecological complexity to testable
uncertainties; yet neither did the tests simulate hazardous effects.
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Lastly, for the hypothetical hazard of GMOs enhancing weedy behaviour, science lacked even
consensual criteria for defining such a phenomenon. In a DoE-funded survey, scientists were
asked to rank plants on an ordinal scale of weediness: in their replies, members of different
disciplines gave significantly different scores to the same plant. As the authors note, 'a weed
classification can depend almost as much upon the interests of the scientists producing it as the
weediness of the plants themselves' (Perrins et al., 1992: 54). Thus evidence of weediness
depends upon one's cognitive framework -- in designing research as well as in interpreting its
results; safety tests invariably favour some account of the uncertainty rather than another.
2.0 VALUE JUDGEMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT
Surveying some high-profile biosafety research, the previous section described some problems
of reducing environmental complexities to testable uncertainties, so as to minimize value
conflicts over unintended outcomes. This section describes parallel problems in risk
assessment, by drawing upon comments from members of the regulatory advisory committees,
particularly ACRE and its predecessor committees. (Again, excerpts from individual
cognitive maps use the dash -- to denote 'in order to'.)
Alongside pressures to contain perceived risks (see Chapter 7), ACRE members felt under
various pressures to accept proposals submitted for GMO releases. According to one member
(S9), industry and MAFF members often expressed the view, 'Let this technology go forward'
for the sake of expected benefits, though not to push through any particular GMO release. 'In
real terms, the individual members are under pressure from industry to move faster' (S2).
And that pace became formalized in rules requiring a government reply to each release
application within 90 days: 'I doubt you could have a full, open debate within that short
timescale' (Si). One member expressed some resentment (S8): 'The people pressing for
releases are either manufacturers themselves or scientists in the pay of the manufacturers; it is
definitely profit-driven.'
Implicit government policy sometimes hindered obtaining additional evidence of safety: The
committee must follow the government line to regulate releases, rather than obstruct them --
accept that GMO release will go forward, rather than press one's reservations -- accept that
desired (though trivial) safety data may be missing' (excerpt from cognitive map D3).
Regarding such data (Si), 'The committee is under commercial pressures in deciding the
policy question of what testing we can reasonably expect a company to do.' Complained one
member (Sb), 'The committee is stacked in favour of GMO releases because of ACRE's
remit: it has to prove that a release will be an environmental hazard, and that's difficult to do.'
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To some extent, those tensions become personified within the committee.
Some members are out to find the problems, and then look for safety reassurances.
Other members see the burden of proof the other way; their value judgement is that the
release is safe unless someone produces facts to show otherwise. The latter view
comes mainly from those with an academic background in genetics, molecular biology
or microbiology, almost regardless of their official role (e.g. trade union, industry,
independent, etc.). The civil servants are cautious; industrialists are in favour of
release but will be as cautious as anyone on the committee (Sb).
Said another (S 11), 'In the committee discussion you can get a hawks-doves split, but it's a
great mixture and it depends upon the proposal.'
According to another member, the committee 'walks a finely balanced line between safety and
innovation', towards making risk-assessment criteria and administrative costs more
predictable: 'The committee accepts the duty to formulate a standard protocol -- industry
knows the extent of the testing requirements -- industry can decide on investment in particular
GMO categories' (excerpt from cognitive map S8). In all these ways, diverse pressures
become translated into criteria for generating, evaluating and eventually standardizing new
scientific information.
2.1 Regulatory
 advisors: composite map
Drawn from interviewees' comments, Map 8.1 depicts the sorts of value judgements which
arise in risk assessment, especially in preparing to relax controls. Interviewees generally
interpreted the term 'value judgement' to mean the likelihood of harm from a GMO release.
When asked about the acceptability of definition of environmental harm, some interviewees
gave interesting answers, though many were reluctant (see sections 2.1.5-7).
Regulatory advisors expressed different views on how to make value judgements, as explained
below. Their differences did not lend themselves to entirely distinct maps which would
consistently distinguish some advisors from others. Therefore a single composite map
encompasses all of them (see Chapter 2, section 5.2).
In this map, all the concepts lead to 'prevent anything untoward happening', in order to 'keep
releases safe', so that 'society gets benefits'. Of course, the former aim leaves open the
question of whether most releases would be just as safe without the precautionary measures or
special regulatory procedures. Acknowledging that ambiguity, one member (C3) emphasized
that regulation should 'prevent potential environmental harm'. That aim entails conflicts over
how to assess the likelihood or acceptability of undesirable outcomes, as indicated on the left
and right-hand sides of the map, respectively.
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The map links the lower-order concepts to intermediate ones, near the top. Moving from the
left to right, these concern how to:
* replace value judgements with objective judgements;
* detect any agronomic difference;
* draw parallels with 'novel organisms';
* trace gene flow;
* judge acceptable outcomes; and
* consider benefits of GMO releases.
Formally, the cognitive map depicts these penultimate concepts leading to the higher ones,
e.g. judge 'realized risk' and 'acceptable risk'. Informally, the sequential logic also runs back
downwards (see section 2.1.7).
2.1.1 Replace value judgements (column 1):
For reasons of safety and legitimacy, though with varying emphases between the two, there
was wide agreement on taking a cautious approach. For example, 'err on the side of caution'
(S8,S7); indeed, 'be almost over-cautious' and thus avoid even minor environmental damage,
such as a plant going weedy (S7). Similarly, 'overdo controls with pioneering examples' (C2).
Hence the widely accepted need to 'do field tests for all releases, rather than extrapolate from
lab tests' (eg S8,C3).
Such experience would enable regulators to'use empirical science, rather than politics,
theory or emotion' (e.g. C 1,S8) and thus to 'base risk assessment on proven facts' (D9,D2,D5).
Additional scientific information would enable the risk assessment to 'replace value
judgements with objective judgments', at least to some extent (D9,S1), and to deal with
potential effects 'in a rational way' (D3).
Some members, especially CBI nominees, suggested that science could entirely replace value
judgements; one (C 1), for example, aimed to 'get beyond the art of plant breeding',
presumably to some truly objective science. Some (C4,C3,D5,D9) advocated quantifying real
risks for each release; eg 'reduce unquantified risk into a more precise form' (C4). By
collecting appropriate evidence, one said (C3), ACRE could answer the 'what if'?' question by
ascertaining a negligible risk, rather than have to make awkward value judgements on its
acceptability. Another saw the quantification helping to allay public fears: 'find the chances
[risks] are small at each step -- give a fair degree of safety -- the public feels regulators are
aware of its anxiety' (excerpt from cognitive map S 12).
By contrast, others (S1,S8,S1O) ridiculed attempts at quantifying risks. At least initially,
'The regulation boils down to a few pragmatic statements of principle, all these cliches they
churn out; the risk assessment is based on all manner of fictions' (S8). And others (T2,R1)
emphasized that the committee exists in order to make value judgements about uncertainties,
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not to cite pure facts or to quantify risk; after all, value judgements are integral to ecology
(R2).
One member (Si) emphasized that the people involved in GMO releases won't act exactly as
expected, so actuarial information from minor accidents should be added to the monitoring
data. Whenever farmers allow herbicide spraying to go outside their fields, for example, their
behaviour would affect any weeds which acquire herbicide resistance. His emphasis on
agronomic practice challenged any naturalistic account of making risk assessment 'objective'.
2.1.2 Anticipate any agronomic difference (columns 2-3):
As a commonly stated aim of safety precautions, members sought to learn whether genetic
modification makes any agronomic difference'. In the context of the 'product versus process'
debate (see Chapter 4, section 1.2), a subtext was how uncertainties might arise from the
genetic modification technique and/or its resulting novelty.
Some members mentioned the gm process as a possible source of uncertainties: for example,
the genetic stability of mobile vectors (D3) or of gm vaccines (D5), or factors inadvertently
altered by gm (D5), or potential behavioural changes due to the fact of gm, not just from the
type of gm (S8). All these uncertainties needed to be tested. For industry, 'You need to take
precautions until you are sure of a new technology' (C3), almost as if the gm process itself
were on trial.
For most members, however, the risk problem arose mainly from the genetic novelty. The
starkest formulation came from one member who accepted that 'gm is generally safer and
more predictable' than earlier techniques, but the committee rightly considered 'novel
organisms as guilty until proven innocent' (T2). In that cautious view, 'assume that any
genetic novelty will mean unknowns, rather than assume that a precise genetic change makes
the results more predictable' (S8,D3,D6,S1). Some GMOs could not have arisen naturally, so
we should recognize their potential for a striking impact (R2). For example, the added gene
might make the organism or its wild relatives more weedy (C2,D3,S1,S1O). By contrast,
other members (S5,C1) felt that GMOs are benign, provided the introduced gene doesn't
provide a competitive advantage; they implied that science can readily know or ascertain
whether the gene would do so.
Suggesting greater predictive complexity, some emphasized that ecological behaviour such
as weediness depends upon environment, as an analogy to GMOs' potential behaviour
(D3,T2,Si). Some advocated context-specific monitoring of unexpected effects (S8,S2,S1),
so that the trial-release results would warrant generalization for diverse contexts.
Emphasizing uncertainties about what makes micro-organisms pathogenic, one ecologist
expressed concern that 'a new piece of genetic information could lie there until an advantage
comes about'; he proposed adopting 'a Gaia model of mutual equilibrium between organism
and environment' (S2).
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Members advocated studying the possible effect of gm upon genetic transfer or instability, as
well as the organism's mobility and viability -- albeit for somewhat different reasons. Some
(D2,S 12) expected that GMO releases would show that gm confers a disadvantage for survival
and dispersal, according to the 'excess baggage' hypothesis. Others, particularly ecologists
(e.g. S8,SiO), criticized that assumption.
It was considered necessary to study the 'natural' or wild-type form of each organism as a
baseline of experience (S5), e.g. so that trial releases could monitor GMOs for enhanced
weediness or genetic transfer from the organism. Thus, in assessing evidence of a GMO's
behaviour, they could 'learn whether the gm makes any agronomic difference'. By the same
token, it was necessary to study non-gm, live vaccines, for making comparisons to gm
vaccines (D5).
From those comparisons, accumulated experience and a database (C2,D4,D2), regulators
could 'make better predictions'. By eventually codifying data from field tests, they could
'build a case law' (D5) and 'develop a science of releases' (S7). However, members attributed
somewhat different significance to 'the baseline of experience' in agriculture.
For example, one member wanted the committee to 'develop a detailed [safety] checklist for
the lead crops', rather than duplicate the list each time a GMO release is proposed; thus, a
study of the unmodified organism would help to 'clear each crop for gm' (D3), independently
of the particular inserted gene. In a similar comment, 'Risks can be assessed pretty closely
from experiences with other organisms, with similar organisms' (S7). More sceptical about
such predictions, another (S8) advocated studying agricultural ecology, rather than take the
complacent view of the 1986 OECD report. In that vein, some members cited a special
problem with oilseed rape (S1,S1O), which already shows weedy characteristics, as well as
sugarbeet (T2), whose cultivation already encounters problems from weedbeet, which may
interbreed with it.
The case of the potato highlighted various concerns about a familiar crop. One member had
challenged an applicant's reassurance that the potato isn't frost-hardy, and questioned whether
all parts of Britain get frost every winter; for him, such uncertainties might become a problem
when small-scale releases go large-scale (Si). Another member (S9) raised the prospect of
global warming, whereby declining frost may allow the survival of GMOs that are presently
assumed to die over winter. Some (S1,S5,S1O) felt that the potato, already a minor weed in
agriculture, could become a more serious one, especially if transgenic potatoes gain frost
resistance, though there was no sign of such R&D.
In summary, the goal of improved predictions remained problematic, given views about an
inherent ecological complexity, as well as some worrying characteristics of 'familiar' crops.
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2.1.3 Draw parallels with novel organisms' (column 4)
There was wide agreement upon taking genetic novelty, especially genetic recombinations
across species, as the main cause for concern and criterion for adjudicating whether an
organism was a GMO. The emphasis on genetic novelty, more than the gm process as such,
has guided safety regulation of gray areas such as organisms derived from protoplast cell
fusion. Members have considered the probability of the particular genetic alteration
happening naturally, or its feasibility via an earlier technique; and the criterion is applied to
cytoplasmic DNA, such as in organelles, as well as nuclear DNA. Thus the regulation should
'include interspecies but not intraspecies cell fusion' (T2), and should include 'any cell fusion
that couldn't otherwise be achieved directly' (Si). As others said, gm is not just about
particular techniques but about crossing species boundaries (S9,Si 1).
Again, emphasizing genetic novelty, there was wide agreement with the administrative
decision to regulate GMO releases together with non-indigenous organisms, in order to 'assess
similar risks of 'novel organisms' (S5,S8,S4,D3,T2,D6,C1,C3). By widening ACRE's remit to
encompass all novel organisms, the regulation would be 'logically consistent' (T2). However,
that apparent agreement contains a tension regarding where to draw parallels between GMOs
and 'novel' organisms (D3). With a GMO, 'we are dealing with what is in effect a non-
indigenous species' (S ii). In that vein, we should study invasions by 'alien genotypes', for
their relevance to GMOs; drawing that parallel, some members emphasized unpredictable
effects of a single-gene alteration in an otherwise familiar organism (S8), even in familiar
crops (Si).
Others accepted the parallel for administrative purposes but d9ubted its substantive validity
for risk assessment. They expressed confidence about the predictability of the GMOs which
they could foresee being released (T2,C1). Field tests would help to 'prove that the
probability of the unexpected from gm is low' (D2), 'to confirm the predictability of GMOs'
(Di).
Some acknowledged some unpredictability for transgenic crops but foresaw no hazardous
effects, perceiving crops as threatened by the environment rather than vice versa (e.g. Cl).
For example, 'It is often harder to maintain something in the environment than to envisage
something becoming rampant'(S7), especially a crop outside of cultivation. 'As long as it's
crop plants, with a very long history of safe use, I see no major problems' (S5).
CBI nominees in particular accepted some burden of evidence: 'try to find any problem for
each new gm variety' (C 1); 'try to prove there isn't a problem' (C3); and even 'prove that the
gm crop is risk free' (C2). By comparing the behaviour of all novel organisms, they could
demonstrate the predictability (Ci), or even prove the safety (C3), of well-known crops which
have single-gene alterations. As one stated (Cl), 'history will show that they are predictable
and safe', particularly in the case of long-standing non-indigenous crops, such as potato;
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vulnerable to a hostile climate, 'they are unable to jump the fence', and they lack weedy
relatives.
Amidst those perceptual differences, members agreed on trying 'to demonstrate the safety of
GMOs', whose proponents would bear considerable burden of evidence. For some, to 'reduce
the uncertainties' meant to 'identify bands of well-understood categories', ordinally ranking
organisms according to risk levels. In this way, the regulation could 'take more care with
contentious organisms' (S7), and 'direct the greater concern at the greater hazard' (C2,D3); the
latter was referring to contained use of plant pathogens for the gm process, as well as 'real
horrors' such as gm insects, fish, and rumen-living bacteria.
2.1.4 Trace gene flow (column 5)
It was widely recognized that unintended gene flow presented an important uncertainty for
Britain's indigenous crops, e.g., flow from transgenic oilseed rape to other Brassicas, and from
sugar beet to weedbeet or seabeet. One member argued (S 10) that past gene flow has
probably altered populations of wild oilseed rape and weedbeet; containment measures on
GMO releases had hitherto postponed these safety issues for the inserted genes. Some
(S1,S10) thought that gm on the Desiree potato warranted more scrutiny because it produces
seeds and thus greater potential gene flow. Another concern was gene flow from forage
crops, which persist in natural environments [though no such GMOs were created until 1992].
Members attributed different significance to unintended transfer of any inserted gene. Some
stressed the importance of tracing gene flow, through geographical spread and/or
hybridization (C2, S5, D3, D5). By learning where or how far the introduced gene goes, the
assessment can know what difference the gm could make, and what ecological difference the
resulting GMO might eventually make, e.g. by giving weeds a competitive advantage (C2).
Although isolation distances were important to know for small-scale trials, they would be
less relevant for large-scale releases (S 10), where gene escape cannot be controlled or
monitored. Some members, with otherwise divergent views (C1,Sl,S8,S9,S10), agreed that 'a
release is forever', and that the genes will probably go wherever you don't want them to go.
Therefore what matters is 'realized risk', the ultimate ecological effects of any unintended gene
flow.
That is, the ultimate question was, 'So what?' Consequently, one member (Si) preferred
simply that no one release a GMO which might do harm if it, or its inserted gene, were to
disperse long distances. Others (S8,C1) hoped to find a satisfactory answer to the 'So what?'
question by inducing hybrids and studying their viability, e.g. a cross between oilseed rape
and other Brassicas (cf. section 1.3 on Prosamo).
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2.1.5 'Judge acceptable outcomes' (columns 6-8):
Most members acknowledged the necessity of making value judgements, if only because of
scientific uncertainty, though they were more reluctant to discuss judgements about
acceptability. Some acknowledged that even better scientific information would not eliminate
the need for making value judgements, especially about acceptable outcomes
(D4,S1,S8,S1,T2): 'By its very nature, risk assessment is a subjective process, regarding what
you value, though you can codify the subjectiveness by putting it in a rational order' (S 11).
One member (D6), who regarded GMOs as suspected pollutants, wanted more research to
identify 'any deviation from the normal baseline of the environment', so as to assess what to
count as harm. To avoid relying on blind ignorance, the government should match
biotechnology funding with research in microbial ecology in particular: 'it will take years to
accumulate the information for a sensible risk assessment' (S 10). Likewise emphasizing
ecological uncertainties, others (S9,S 11) suggested that any environmental perturbation could
result in harm, in unforeseen ways.
The case of oilseed rape occupied a gray area between likely and acceptable harm. One
ecologist (Si) preferred that there be no releases of gm oilseed rape, as the cultivated version
already shows weedy characteristics and has weedy relatives. Others portrayed that problem
as merely contingent: 'We see oilseed rape growing along roadsides, but only where man has
come along and disrupted the plant community; you don't see it in "natural", undisturbed
environments' (S5). Another somewhat undermined that reassurance by saying, The whole of
the UK is a highly disrupted ecosystem; in managing it, man sometimes makes mistakes' (Cl);
yet he expressed confidence about safely managing the environment by learning from
mistakes.
The acceptability of undesirable effects also depended upon the corrective power of human
intervention. For example, if a herbicide-resistance gene transfers from a crop to a weed, it
would have no selective advantage for persistence; if necessary, it could be controlled by
using a different herbicide (S12,C1,C4). Some members regarded such an unintentional
transfer as acceptable only for herbicides not yet being used in Britain. For example, one (S8)
seemed untroubled by using Basta-resistant genes in GMO trial releases, which might spread
such resistance. Another member (S6) specifically opposed risking the spread of resistance to
any existing weed control agent; such loss of efficacy would indirectly be environmental
harm. For more fundamental reasons, 'It would be difficult to reach any consensus on whether
more herbicide resistance in the countryside would matter; it depends on how you value these
things'; he defined unintended gene how as 'general environmental pollution' (Si).
What should be the status of farmland in environmental protection? Some members tended
to exclude it conceptually from environmental regulation, as when confidently expecting to
remedy any herbicide-resistant weeds invading agriculture (see also Chapter 9, section 2.3).
Some more cautious members likewise regarded herbicide-resistant weeds in agriculture as an
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acceptable effect, though for different reasons: 'Crop ecosystems are so artificial anyway;
what happens in them doesn't matter' (S9). Similarly, 'Agriculture uses a factory system; we
want to make sure it doesn't damage the rest of the environment' (S 11). In contrast, others
defined 'the environments to include farmland (Sl,S8), or even defined weeds as plant pests
(D2). One emphasized connections between agriculture and the wider environment, in the
sense that even the latter is semi-managed and thus vulnerable to changes in the former (e.g.
D6).
The case of a viral insecticide also highlighted the question of acceptable harm, even to
target pests. One member advocated more extensive testing of the virus' host specificity (see
also Chapter 7, section 4.2). Another (Si 1) sought greater consideration of the overall
ecological role played by any targeted pest, though he acknowledged that its assessed 'value'
might depend upon its aesthetic showiness, as perceived by the public. As the former
sardonically noted (Si), conservationists are relatively less keen on preserving tapeworms and
viruses than butterflies.
2.1.6 Judge benefits? (column 9)
Although interviewees were not asked their view of benefits from GMO releases, diverse
members foresaw some benefit for society as a potential which safety regulation could
enhance (eg C4,C2,S1,S8,D9,R2,R1). Some expressed doubts about the net benefits of
certain gm products, such as herbicide-resistant crops (S4,S6,S1). One had wider doubts: 'On
a rational level, you could say that the whole thing {GMO release] is so dangerous that we
shouldn't do it; we don't need more agribusiness' (Si).
Many members saw the judgement of acceptable risk as linked to benefits, but in different
ways. Some (S8,S6) suggested a negative linkage for any 'trivial release', lacking expected
benefits in either scientific information or social benefits. Such a proposed release hardly
warranted taking any environmental risk (S6) and had to be judged more stringently: 'The
main benefit we look for is the advance of scientific knowledge' (S7). These members sought
a significant knowledge-benefit as a trade-off with risk, even if a minor or hypothetical risk;
on such implicit grounds, ACRE sometimes asked the applicant to reconsider the experimental
design. According to one member (S9), every ACRE discussion involves at least some
implicit risk-benefit judgement, for example, in assessing the most appropriate form of
containment measures; however, discretion over such measures wouldn't make much
difference in expense for the small-scale releases so far permitted, all of which ACRE had
regarded as fundamentally safe.
Two members (D9, D2) wanted the committee to consider the scientific or ultimate social
value of a release; this was in order to balance risk with benefits, particularly if the risks as
such were ambiguous -- not clearly acceptable or unacceptable (D2). Another (D3) spoke
about making certain that any risks fall into a low band, such as mere weediness, so that they
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can be acceptably balanced with product benefits; he argued that risks taken 'on behalf of the
community' should be made explicit in advance, in case of unforeseen consequences. Thus
regulators could 'reach a consensus not so restrictive as to prevent GMO releases' (D3).
Although sceptical of industry's reassurances about unintended effects, one ecologist (S8)
wanted ACRE to 'consider environmental benefits such as reduced herbicide usage, closer
targeting, etc.', though not economic effects. A yet more complex version was, 'Balance
benefits with publicly perceived risks' (D9), where both parts of the risk-benefit analysis
might take public perception as a reference point. Another complained that the committee in
effect was already influenced by expected benefits: 'Many members assume there is a positive
benefit, so one has to come up with [identify] an environmental hazard to balance that, in
order to recommend against a release' (S 10).
Some members (T2,S 1 ,S9) did not want the committee to consider benefits at all, as its
proper role is to avoid environmental harm. As one defiantly said (Si), 'We only assess risks,
rather than balance risks against benefits; that's what industry doesn't like about the
committee.' However, this account was contradicted by others who acknowledged the implicit
role of risk-benefit judgements.
2.1.7 Assess acceptable risk and/or 'realized risk'
Members differed over how to judge 'acceptable risk'. They variously defined it as 'almost
no risk' (T2), 'no more risk than the unmodified organism (S5)', 'no perceptible risk'(T2), 'no
unreasonable risk' (Ci), etc. One (S7) described the issue as 'where to draw the line on the
numerical value' of acceptable risk. Another even foresaw increased knowledge allowing the
risk assessment to reduce the probability of harm to 10-12 and thus more easily to decide its
acceptability (C3). By contrast, some ecologists ridiculed any attempt at quantitative risk
assessment; another advocated 'keeping releases within publicly acceptable bounds, rather
than use quantitative risk assessment (S6)'.
Amidst such disagreements, some members emphasized the 'so what?' question; this meant
'assess realized risk', the ultimate tangible consequences of unintended effects. Although
some advisors mentioned unacceptable effects, the semi-rhetorical 'so what?' question tended
to marginalize intangible harm or complexities, and to emphasize remediable harm, e.g.
herbicide-resistant weeds.
Starting from different environmental values, advisors held different criteria for adequately
answering the 'how likely?' question. For example, they could cite 'no evidence of harm' to
vindicate the safety of the crops already tested. Or, alternatively, they could seek additional
evidence of safety, to accommodate more complex ecological and agronomic models.
Such views can be depicted by reversing the direction of the arrows on the cognitive map --
from 'assess realized risk', back downwards towards investigating whichever uncertainty
might produce an unacceptable outcome. In effect, this reverses the stereotypical sequence of
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risk-assessment steps (see Table 8.1, 'Evaluating Uncertainties in Risk Assessment', column
on ACRE members).
2.2 Genhaz proposal
The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution took a leading role in formulating a
rationale for precautionary regulation: 'This should allow safety issues to become part of the
development of the technology rather than having to be introduced following problems'
(RCEP, 1989: 36). For 'risk identification techniques', its 13th report mentioned Genhaz as a
potential method for anticipating the unforeseen from GMO releases, if adequately devised,
such a procedure 'could contribute to the reduction of risk and to the reassurance of the public'
(ibid.: 42).
The Genhaz procedure was based upon 'Hazop', the 'Hazard and Operability' method already
used for anticipating hazards in the chemical industry. According to the RCEP, The
technique is based upon the assumption that incidents arise not because of a lack of knowledge
or experience, but because of the complexity of designs, needing systematic but imaginative
analysis to uncover the hazards' (ibid.). Hazop expresses that complexity through a series of
'guidewords' -- more, less, other than, etc. -- which help to identify potential deviations from
operating intentions, their cause, possible consequences, and preventive measures.
How, then, did Britain's regulatory advisors initially regard the Genhaz idea? Many noted
that it would encourage imaginative lateral thinking, even wild extrapolations, though they
had diverse expectations for what such an exercise could achieve. One member (S8) doubted
that scientists had an adequate theoretical basis for assessing all the hypothetical 'bizarre
scenarios' that Genhaz would generate. A more hopeful though modest view was that Genhaz
would help identify weaknesses in risk assessment, and so clarify what additional data were
needed (Dl), or at least establish a standard checklist of points for all proposed releases (T2).
More optimistically, Genhaz was even expected to help 'quantify real risks for each proposed
release' (member D9).
Giving more sceptical responses, some members feared that Genhaz would encourage over-
confidence: 'I am wary of models because you feed in the information that you have available;
Genhaz is likely to give you the answers that the model was designed to get' (S5). Moreover,
another member commented sardonically (S2),
Hazop would have said that the Flixborough plant was safe, because there was a piece
of information that we didn't know about; according to Hazop, Chernobyl and Three
Mile Island should not have happened. If your knowledge of the ecosystem is
complete, then Genhaz analysis is fine.
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By the time the RCEP (1991) issued a report specifically on Genhaz, its advocates had
overcome some of the reservations expressed above. Genhaz had been tried Out on a
hypothetical GMO release by a group at the IPSR under Professor Richard Flavell, who
afterwards spoke favourably of it, despite earlier scepticism. The RCEP's Genhaz report was
also welcomed by Professor John Beringer, chair of ACRE. Another ACRE member (Si),
previously wary of any overconfidence derived from Genhaz, now had a more modest
reservation: 'Genhaz has showed how little we know about biological populations in the wild.
If Genhaz turns out to be a cost-effective way of controlling risks, it will be adopted.'
How were some earlier reservations overcome? A key problem for Genhaz proponents was
how to extend Hazop from chemical to biological complexity. According to a RCEP
member, Charles Suckling, many biologists initially doubted that this procedure from the
chemical industry, with its linear flow diagrams, could encompass the complexity of
biological systems; indeed, they feared that Genhaz would stultify biological thinking. A
principal problem was how to express the design intention of a GMO release, while using
Hazop-type guidewords to imagine all possible deviations. Such an adaptation of Hazop was
developed partly by the IPSR exercise, with suggestions from Keith Powell of ICI, where
Charles Suckling himself was formerly General Manager of Research and Technology
(interview 29 August 1991).
In the published version of Genhaz, each proposed GMO release is to be systematically
analysed in terms of the recipient organism, the genetic construct (vector) and transgenic
product designed for release. Characteristics of those three components are considered
through a series of stages, from making the GMO, though to release and finally 'clean-up'. At
each stage the assessment applies a list of guidewords, expanded from Hazop to encompass
biological systems; any possible deviation is taken to challenge the supposed safety of the
release (RCEP, 1991). In that way, the Genhaz schema requires asking whether the spatial
and temporal limits of a release would be knowable or controllable.
There was another significant adaptation of Hazop: the latter starts by considering realistic
causes of deviations from the design intention, while Genhaz starts by considering the
consequences of any deviations. This starting point helps to emphasize causal links among
chains of consequences in the natural environment. The report suggests that a Genhaz team
first generates possible consequences, then assesses them to decide which are acceptable, and
then seeks realistic causes for any unacceptable consequences. 'The outcome is essentially the
same as it would have been under the Hazop protocol but the emphasis on the various steps is
slightly different' (RCEP, 1991: 11-12).
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3.0 CONCLUSION: STEPWISE DILEMMAS
The British government claimed to base its precautionary approach upon 'sound science', yet
the latter term acquired paradoxical meanings. At issue was how best to assign and then relax
the burden of evidence for safety. At least implicitly, the criteria for such evidence depended
upon environmental value judgements -- regarding the likelihood, acceptability or desirability
of potential effects.
In preparing to relax controls, Britain's regulatory system sought to reduce uncertainty about
risk, yet the experimental results often sharpened methodological conflict about how to define
and investigate the relevant uncertainty. This experience paralleled other regulatory systems,
which have likewise encountered difficulty in overcoming political disputes through
additional scientific research (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986: 5 1-60; Salter, 1988: 166, 199-
20 1). For this case of precautionary regulation, morever, the procedure could plausibly
consider an even wider range of 'what if?' scenarios.
Scientists from different disciplines emphasized different kinds of past experience as a guide
for assessing GMO releases, even for generating new evidence of safety. For microbial
releases in particular, some scientists wanted research to ascertain the normal ecological
baseline, so that monitoring efforts could detect any perturbation and thus anticipate
unidentified hazards. Others, especially laboratory scientists, justified limiting risk assessment
to identifiable hazards, especially their testable components.
The same new evidence could elicit contrary interpretations for risk assessment. As Krimsky
(199 1: 151) notes, geneticists and ecologists embed facts in a different model of causality, so
new facts do not necessarily bridge the disciplinary divide. Indeed, new knowledge opened
up more areas of scientific uncertainty for risk-assessment research, such as microbial gene
transfer.
Interpretation of new test data depended, to some extent, upon disciplinary views about
ecological stability -- for example, whether ecological niches are restricted by environment or
by genetic novelty. Accordingly, scientists justified different methodological approaches for
biosafety research -- regarding, for example, how (or even whether) to monitor microbial
populations for perturbations; how to test transgenic plants for pleiotropic effects; how to
simulate a plausible selection pressure which might impart a competitive advantage to GMOs
or to their weedy relatives; and how to set experimental criteria for identifying 'permissive
hosts' of a viral insecticide (see Chapter 7, section 4).
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Biosafety research was mainly testing the null hypothesis, i.e. the claim that genetic
modification would have no unintended effect. At issue was the range and type of conditions
which would warrant generalizing from evidence of 'no untoward effect' from a GMO release.
Such preliminary evidence was cited as enhancing predictability, though its interpretation
depended upon one's cause-effect model of potential harm.
In various ways, biosafety research deferred to industiy's R&D priorities. It depended upon
market-led innovation for resources (e.g. Prosamo funding, transgenic seeds, detection
techniques); and it defined hypothetical risk as testable uncertainties of specific organisms.
Biosafety research tested whichever uncertainties it could credibly and reproducibly control,
such as gene flow and competitive biological advantage; the research deferred other
uncertainties, such as the significance of herbicide-resistance genes in various environments.
As in risk assessment more generally, the research converted fundamental ignorance into
'marginal' imprecisions, which could then be progressively reduced with additional data
(O'Riordan and Wynne, 1987: 393). Yet some advisors held doubts about what could be
learned from testing properties of an organism in a carefully controlled environment. The
more the experimental design contained the transgenic material, the less opportunity for
unintended effects to occur, so the less could be learned from a trial release. Moreover, they
anticipated agronomic practices as sources of harm, not simply as environmental variations, as
in the prevalent naturalistic model of risk.
Despite obtaining additional scientific knowledge, the regulatory system faced implicit ethical
judgements on the acceptability of undesirable effects. Advisors disagreed over how to
evaluate hypothetical outcomes, such as enhanced weediness from herbicide-resistant crops.
Asking themselves 'so what?', they gave qualitatively different answers -- for example, in
defining agriculture as inside or outside 'the environment'; in defining weeds; in
conceptualizing unintended gene flow as 'genetic pollution'; and in foreseeing remedies for
any agricultural disruption. These answers, in turn, influenced the perceived importance of
resolving ecological uncertainties prior to relaxing controls.
For regulatory advisors, environmental values did not simply fill a gap left by scientific
uncertainty; rather, advisors emphasized different ranges, types and consequences of
uncertainty (Levidow, 1994a). Such a logical sequence, from acceptability judgements to
relevant fact-finding, was formalized by the Genhaz proposal for improving risk-identification
procedures. This resonated with advisors' view that the 'so what?' question ultimately takes
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priority over the 'how likely' question. These pervasive environmental value judgements, in
effect, reversed the stereotypical sequence of risk-assessment steps (see Table 8.1).
Genhaz also proposed to make such judgements more publicly accessible. This proposal
acknowledged that any fact-finding priority required some cognitive argument for its
relevance. As in other risk controversies, 'the production or mobilization of belief becomes a
central source for the social enforcement of validity claims' (Beck, 1992a: 166-68).
Given this prime role for acceptability judgements, which expressed different cognitive
frameworks, precautionary regulation held some potential for democratizing risk assessment,
even for influencing innovation. By requesting more complex evidence of safety, the
regulatory procedure would better accommodate safety concerns, and/or it would effectively
discourage particular types of biotechnology R&D. Conversely, by portraying risk assessment
as 'objective', the procedure would define the uncertainty more narrowly, privilege the
existing technical expertise, and so more readily relax controls.
In such ways, the regulatory procedure was serving to define safety and legitimate innovation.
In so far as the procedure imposed a burden of evidence for safety, it undermined the 'rational'
stereotype of risk-assessment steps. A precautionary 'sound science' remained a contradiction
in terms.
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Chapter 9
ROUTES TO MARKET APPROVAL
While the regulators were judging the safety of proposed trial releases, they were expected
ultimately to set criteria for approving GMOs as commercial products. As the final 'step' of
the stepwise procedure, market approval was also an explicit aim of GMO regulation.
However, process-based legislation had deferred some contentious issues: for example,
whether socio-economic criteria would supplement safety criteria; how the latter would be
standardized; and how (or even whether) GMOs would enter sectoral product-based
regulation.
How, then, did regulatozy actors anticipate GMOs reaching market approval? How did they
attempt to influence the regulatory procedure and criteria? How did the state authorities set
the terms for eventually treating GMOs as normal products?
This chapter analyses conflicts over the appropriate route to market approval. In particular, it
describes:
* how the European Community accommodated industry's proposals for 'rational' regulation
(section 1);
* how Britain's regulatory actors foresaw the shift to market approval, according to different
notions of 'the product' (section 2);
* how these conflicts bear upon prospects for normalizing GMOs (section 3).
1.0 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: Limiting Precaution
When DGXI was drafting the Deliberative Release Directive 90/220, its 'rational' status was
disputed within the European Commission (see Chapter 4, section 3.2). After the Directive
was enacted in March 1990, a similar dispute erupted publicly between DGXI versus industry.
However, industry lobbyists aimed strategically at limiting the precautionary content of
process-based regulation, while still using its framework to legitimize the step-by-step
relaxation of controls.
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1.1 New industry alliance
In the mid-1980s, Europe's embryonic biotechnology industry accepted the need for an EC
Directive regulating GMO releases. In particular, such a proposal was endorsed by the
European Biotechnology Coordination Group shortly after it was founded in 1985 (Shackley
et al., 1992). Subsequently the EBCG played little further role, perhaps because it attempted
to represent the broadest possible consensus within the industry (Ebis, July 1991: 5; cf.
Cantley, 1992: 24).
A more active umbrella group was the Green Industry Biotechnology Platform (GIBiP),
whose name denoted plant breeding, rather than a political colour. Its booklets served as a
lobbying tool within European Community debates on biotechnology regulation. Specifically
it argued against imposing 'a moratorium on the commercial development of plant
biotechnology until the completion of exhaustive risk investigation programmes'; this
argument was implicitly directed against a proposal from the European Parliament's
Environment Committee. GIBiP also argued that 'safety, quality and efficacy (assessed
scientifically) must be the only criteria' for regulatory approval (GIBiP, 1989: 6); this
argument was implicitly directed against proposals for a Fourth Hurdle, which would add a
criterion of socio-economic need. Yet it acknowledged that, 'As the concept of risk is purely
theoretical, decisions about risk and safety inevitably involve value judgements' (ibid.).
GIBiP accepted process-based regulation of GMO trial releases but opposed extending that
basis to the market approval stage (GIBiP, 1990: 56). In this respect, its position roughly
coincided with an early draft of the Deliberate Release Directive (CEC, 1988: 7-8). However,
the latter was subsequently amended so as to require a 'similar' risk assessment in any product
directive intended to supplant 90/220 Part C for market approval of a GMO product (see
Chapter 4, section 3.1; Hodgson, 1992). GIBiP successfully lobbied EC officials to oppose
some other proposed amendments, though it could not prevent the strengthening of Part C
(interview, 4 January 1991). After the Directive was enacted, GIBiP (1990: 56) sought a way
to shift market approval of GMO products to sectoral legislation: 'After it has been proven that
genetic modification has introduced no extra risks as compared with existing commercial
products, existing directives for product approval in appropriate market sectors should be
applied.'
A more aggressive response came from the chemical industry organization, CEHC, which set
up the Senior Advisory Group on Biotechnology (SAGB) in July 1989. SAGB represented
major agrichemical and pharmaceutical multinationals which were investing heavily in
biotechnology. A GIBiP official distanced himself from SAGB when he remarked,
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SAGB came into existence through frustration that GIBiP was not interacting at the
right level. SAGB is a much more senior group; rather than research staff, it consists
of the heads of major European companies, who aim to go right to the top in the
European Commission (GIBiP interview, 4 Jan 1991).
SAGB was formed too late to influence the Directive, which had reached its nearly final form
by early 1989, though not enacted until March 1990 (see Chapter 4, section 3.1).
Subsequently the Group attacked process-based regulation as such. Referring obliquely to the
Directive, a SAGB (1990) booklet criticized 'a tendency to think of "biotechnology" as
fundamentally different from other technologies and therefore requiring special rules'. SAGB
argued that more favourable public policy in the USA and Japan was helping Europe's major
competitors in biotechnology.
Advocating product-based regulation on the US model, SAGB called upon the EC to 'apply
existing, non-discriminatory approaches for safety in research and industrial processes'. This
would mean, for example, assessing organisms according to 'the inherent characteristics of the
product'; such approaches must draw upon 'professional competence of the highest standard'.
Opposing a Fourth Hurdle, it proposed that regulation 'should assess only safety, quality and
efficacy for man and the environment, on the basis of objective scientific criteria' (SAGB,
1990). A related press release attacked the EC for 'political hostility' to the European
biotechnology industry; SAGB claimed that over-regulation was driving its members out of
Europe to the USA and Japan (Dickson, 1990a).
In response DGXI's Director General, Jan Brinkhorst, defended the Deliberate Release
Directive. He justified taking the recombinant DNA process as the administrative basis for
regulation: although the risk assessment must consider product characteristics as well, 'there is
no denying the special safety problems associated with GMOs'. Despite his overt
disagreement with US policy, Brinkhorst further argued that the Directive would generate no
substantive difference in biotechnology safety regulation between Europe and the USA
(Dickson, 1990b). With that rejoinder, DGXI implied that some universal regulatory science
could link the US and EC approaches. By contrast, SAGB echoed the US government's 'risk-
based' language to justify regulating GMOs only within existing product legislation, as the
only rational framework for expert objective assessment.
In practical terms, industry could not directly undo the Directive but could limit its
precautionary content. In so doing, SAGB's intervention attempted to shift the balance of
power: among Directorates-General within the European Commission, between the
Commission and the Parliament, and between political forces beyond those institutions.
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Industry pressure took the form of restricting the type of expertise and range of ecological
uncertainty deemed relevant for regulatory decisions.
One British industrialist, criticizing the extension of the Directive's Part C to all GMO
products, now regretted having earlier accepted process-based legislation. He had done so,
given that 'industry were not able to convince people in Europe how illogical it was to single
Out products of a particular process for discriminatory regulation'. Industry now had to 'limit
the damage', in particular to 'curtail the power of DGXI and add scientific competency'
(interview, 22 March 1991).
After intensive lobbying, industry's attempt at damage limitation achieved a symbolic success.
In April 1991 the European Commission published the Bangemann report, entitled 'Promoting
the Competitive Environment for the Industrial Activities Based on Biotechnology within the
Community' (CEC, 1991). Co-ordinated by DGIII, the Industry Directorate-General, it
echoed many arguments from its industry precursor (SAGB, 1990), as well as from its US
counterpart (BWG/Quayle, 1991).
The Bangemann report defended high environmental standards as opportunities for the
biotechnology industry to develop more precise, effective and non-polluting products;
implicitly this passage appealed to industry's self-interest in ecological modemisation (see
Chapter 4, section 1.1). Towards strengthening the European biotechnology industry, the
report confirmed that regulation would follow a single procedure of assessment and
authorisation for GMO products. At the same time, it supported a 'complementary' relation
between horizontal and vertical regulation, i.e., between process-based and product-based
regulation, respectively. The report also relegated any Fourth Hurdle to 'exceptional cases':
after all, regulatory 'decisions have to be based upon objective assessments'. The document
drew sharp distinctions among the following: environmental risk assessment, value-laden
issues, socio-economic impacts, and other matters (CEC, 1991).
Thus the Commission affirmed SAGB 's key distinction between 'objective' assessment of
product safety and merely subjective views on other aspects. Also, the term 'complementary'
implied an early shift to product legislation, though a DGXII official privately described this
wording as a 'massive fudge'. Industry gave the report a guarded welcome, as the wording
remained 'open to many interpretations' (Hodgson, 1991). By contrast, Green MEPs criticized
the report for fulfilling an industry 'wish-list' (Hill, 1991).
In the same period, the Commission established the new Biotechnology Co-ordinating
Committee, which was expected to ensure that forthcoming Directives complied with the
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policy of the Bangemann report (Hodgson, 1991). The BCC was nominally intended to
'develop a coherent Community policy in biotechnology' (Ebis, May 1991: 3), though it was
also designed to shift the internal balance of power. In preparing the Bangemann report, just
as in establishing the BCC, 'a DGI&DGIII&DGXII alliance prevailed over DGVT&DGXI,
though one doesn't write these things down', according to a DGXII official. After all, 'The
BCC was set up under growing pressure from some parliamentarians and very much from big
industry and the industry ministries; now we can take our arguments to this tribunal' (DGXII
interview, 18 July 1991). Clearly, DGXI was to be a defendant at the tribunal.
These political changes coincided with diminished prospects for organized resistance to
biotechnology. The late 1980s had seen the height of environmentalists' influence in Germany
and the European Parliament; until then, industry had feared the prospect of even more
stringent regulation than the Directive, such as a virtual ban. However, after the 1989
elections the Green MEPs became a less effective opposition; and by 1991 'there was no real
tangible pressure now on the biotech industry' (Envt Cttee interview, 17 July 1991). To some
extent, process-based regulation may have helped to relieve such pressure.
As DGXI's Director General, Jan Brinkhorst, sardonically commented,
When industry was afraid it was going to be banned, it came to us and said, 'Please
pass a law to stop them from banning things [GMO releases].' Now that there's no
danger of that, they are saying we don't really need the law at all (quoted in B alter,
1991).
Although there was no prospect of discarding Directive 90/220, industry did attempt to limit
its precautionary effect, while using the Directive's procedure for normalizing biotechnology.
In this dispute, SAGB's stance was encouraged and deployed by DGXII from within the
European Commission. As a DGXII official retrospectively described his warning signals to
industry in 1988, 'Industry was not yet fully alert to the damage that the Directive would do to
their interests; that [realization] came the following year' (interview, 18 July 1991). Far from
acting as industry's agent in the Commission, DGXII saw itself as educating both industry and
the Commission about their true interests in developing 'rational' regulation, and so
minimizing regulatory obstacles to biotechnological progress (cf. Cantley, 1992).
Thus industry's belated lobbying could take advantage of conflicts within the European
Commission. Here the putatively 'objective' status of safety regulation became a rhetorical
weapon for narrowing the range of uncertainty deemed relevant for regulating biotechnology.
Value conflicts took the form of disputing technical criteria; these were manifest in industry
attempts to avoid a Fourth Hurdle and to narrow the risk-assessment criteria, as described in
following sections.
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1.1.1 Avoiding a Fourth Hurdle
The Fourth Hurdle was a proposal to subject biotechnology products to a regulatory criterion
of socio-economic need. The additional criterion would strengthen the discretionary power of
DGVI, the Agriculture Directorate-General, which was advocating the proposal within the
Commission. DGXII had persuaded the Commission to oppose any systematic Fourth Hurdle
for biotechnology (CEC, 1991: 8).
A Fourth Hurdle was originally mooted for the special case of the growth hormone BST (or
BGH), designed to increase cows' milk production. BST encountered organized opposition
from wide range of organizations, especially small-scale farmers and animal welfare groups.
DOW repeatedly blocked market approval of BST by extending the 'evaluation period' for
safety assessment; the delay was really an implicit Fourth Hurdle on ethical and/or economic
grounds (e.g. Nathan, 1992). From an industry standpoint, DGVI was undermining the
authority of its own advisory committee, which had found no safety grounds to warrant
blocking approval of BST; its manufacturers accused DGVI of opposing any product which
enhanced productivity or efficiency (Vandaele, 1992).
Given that a Fourth Hurdle was operating informally, Ken Collins MEP (1990) had proposed
formalizing it for such special cases as yield-promoting veterinary pharmaceuticals. Thus the
licensing system could coherently accommodate all policy considerations, rather than rely
upon scientific justifications alone. Collins portrayed a selective Fourth Hurdle as protecting
industry's interests, by avoiding lengthy political scrutiny of every new product.
Industry opposed Collins' proposal as a dangerous precedent which undermined rational
regulation. At least privately, some companies regretted that BST had become a test case for
public acceptance of biotechnology, but the industry feared that any formal Fourth Hurdle
might be extended to all of biotechnology. In response, industry reiterated the three criteria
used routinely for assessing drugs -- safety, quality and efficacy; these now acquired a
rhetorical significance as universal objective parameters, in contrast to a merely 'subjective'
fourth criterion (CEC, 1991: 8).
In this vein, the language of scientific rationality became central to the dispute, as reported in
a British television programme. Dieter Brauer of the German firm Hoechst warned against
imposing additional criteria 'which have emotional backgrounds, which are not based on
logical and scientific backgrounds'. ICI's Peter Doyle feared 'a move away from a predictable,
science-based regulatory framework'. Similarly, his ICI colleague Ed Dart speculated, 'If for
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some irrational reason Europe opts not to follow this technology...' Throughout the
programme, industry speakers expressed confidence in assessing products as unambiguously
'safe' and in predicting benefits; they emphasized the socio-economic 'risks' of obstructing
product development. By contrast to industry, Ken Collins MEP described the present
assessment procedure as a 'system of irrational non-decision making', incapable of making
'rational decisions' about risks and benefits (BBC, 1991).
In all those ways, protagonists put forward opposed versions of rationality -- either claiming
an objectively scientific expertise, or proposing to make value judgements explicit rather than
conceal them behind technical safety criteria. Thus, although BST itself was not a GMO, the
Fourth Hurdle debate took on a wider importance in reaffirming a stereotypical scientific
rationality as the proper basis for regulating biotechnology in general.
1.1.2 Narrowing risk assessment
For GMO releases, deregulatory moves took the form of narrowing the range of scientific
uncertainty deemed relevant to risk assessment. Regarding Directive 90/220, in dispute were
technical Annexes which specified the definitions of a GMO and the risk-assessment criteria;
the latter went beyond those which would otherwise apply to biopesticides, plants, etc. As the
technical specifications now had full legal status, they could be changed only through special
procedures involving the environmental ministries of member states (EEC, 1990: 21, Articles
20-2 1).
Partly for that reason, DGXII had opposed granting Directive-level status to the Annexes. In
retrospect, DGXII acknowledged that the 1990 Directive had been 'a political requirement at a
certain moment in time, and scientifically justifiable as a response to uncertainty, but in need
of frequent review as flexibly as possible'. It later proposed that DGXI delegate some of the
technical details 'to a standards body like CEN [Comite Europeen de Normalisation], which
would be controlled by industry', and which might justifiably alter the risk-assessment criteria
'as an adaptation to technical progress'. Derogating OMO products to specific product
legislation would facilitate such adaptation (DGXII interview, 18 July 1991). By the same
token, DGXI opposed delegating technical details to CEN or to separate product legislation
superseding Directive 90/220: What industry really wants is... to edit out any additional
assessment' of GMOs, as compared to non-GMOs (DGXI interview, 18 July 1991).
A long-standing body, CEN had responsibility for setting Europe-wide product standards In
March 1990 it established a Technical Committee on Biotechnology, TC233, whose chair was
Brian Ager, also Director of the SAGB (Ebis, November 1990: 6). CEN soon set up working
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groups, with an official from Roussel-Uclaf chairing the group on agricultural and
environmental applications (Ebis, March 1991: 15-16).
Not only was the CEN subcommittee 'controlled by industry', as DGXII had noted, but it was
headed by prominent lobbyists for deregulating biotechnology. CEN's possible role in risk
assessment had been left open by the Bangemann report (CEC, 1991: 14). Although CEN
could not change the Annexes of Directive 90/220, its advice could influence how they were
adapted in any further directives superseding Directive 90/220.
1.2 Pesticide directive
There was no industry-wide consensus, much less Commission support, for abandoning the
Deliberate Release Directive 90/220. In practice, SAGB and DOX11 prioritized weakening
Part C, which all of industry regarded as a problem (e.g. GIBiP, 1990; see Chapter 4, section
3.2). They attempted to supersede Part C with vertical product directives, sooner rather than
later.
After the Bangemann report had ambiguously affirmed a 'complementary' relation between
horizontal and vertical legislation (CEC, 1991), the first test case came with thedraft
Directive on Plant Protection Products, colloquially known as the pesticide directive. At issue
was whether GMO biopesticides would still have to undergo market approval under the
Deliberate Release Directive 90/220 Part C, depending upon whether that procedure was
superseded by the pesticides directive. Industry protested that GMO biopesticides might have
to satisfy both both types of directive; such 'dual regulation' would impose increased
regulatory costs and uncertainty, thus discouraging European investment in biotechnology
(CBC, 1990: 35).
1.2.1 Bypassing precaution
The draft pesticide directive declared that its procedures were 'not appropriate' for
environmental risk assessment of GMOs (CEC, 1989: 4); the wording left open how and when
GMO pesticides would be included. For example, some MEPs suspected that pesticide
regulation would allow GMOs to bypass Directive 90/220, so they sought to strengthen the
draft pesticide directive. In February 1991 the Parliament approved a 'compromise
amendment', which strengthened the 'not appropriate' to read 'not adequate', clarifying that
additional criteria were needed for assessing GMO biopesticides; it also specified that such
products must first obtain 'a clearance for release' under Directive 90/220 (EP, 1991a). With
that proposed wording, the Environment Committee wanted to ensure that the additional risk
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assessment would be defined by 90/220, not by some other formula (Envt Cttee interview, 17
July 1991).
The Commission accepted that amendment in March 1991, but a leaked document later
suggested that the Commission was devising a substitute amendment. The latter would
incorporate a procedure for an environmental risk assessment analogous to the one in 90/220,
within two years of adoption. In May the European Parliament issued a resolution in protest
'about this potential breach of undertakings made by the Commission to the Parliament' (EP,
1991b). Few MEPs had any understanding of the safety issues involved; they protested
mainly on procedural grounds: i.e., that the Commission was reneging on a previous
agreement with the Parliament. The resolution was initiated by Green MEPs, who also raised
the substantive issue, but they could not interest other MEPs in protesting on environmental
safety grounds (Envt Cttee interview, 17 July 1991).
DGXII, a leading advocate of the two-year timetable, argued as follows: The existing
expertise in product regulation is the most appropriate base for 'the learning process'; that
expertise might rightly judge the risk-assessment criteria of 90/220 to be scientifically
unwarranted for some products. GMO biopesticides, for example, should not be classified as
GMOs: 'A pesticide is a pesticide. The pesticide authorities should, if necessary, buy
themselves or teach themselves biotechnology... These people should take over' from the
environmental authorities (DGXII interview, 18 July 1991).
By contrast, DGXI drew a less reassuring analogy to regulatory practices in agriculture
ministries. Precisely because biopesticides have posed few problems, pesticide regulation has
focused upon environmental effects of 'residues' from chemical pesticides. Such expertise was
hardly appropriate for self-reproducing biopesticides, much less for GMO biopesticides.
Moreover, 'the assessors are more likely to concern themselves with efficacy than with safety';
agriculture ministries hadn't the capacity or inclination to extend the Directive's risk-
assessment criteria to the market approval stage (DGXI interview, 18 July 1991).
DGXI's stance received public support from Green MEPs, who mounted similar arguments in
order to generate public protest by NGOs. Staff issued a briefing document which attacked
the new amendment as deregulation, for the following reasons: It would 'kill horizontal
regulation for the marketing of [pesticidal] GMOs', rather than fulfill the 'complementary'
relation announced in the Bangemann report. The two-year timetable would remove GMOs
from the Deliberate Release Directive even before the environment ministries had
accumulated much expertise through the experience of trial releases, whose knowledge would
then be lost; their role would be replaced by agriculture ministries, whose expertise lay in
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assessing synthetic chemical pesticides. Contrary to industry's claims about dual regulation
being 'inefficient', product-based regulation 'would require a proliferation of different
committees for each GMO product category....' Moreover, 'It is not scientifically sound' to
presume product safety on the basis of small-scale trials (Bullard, 1991). In Britain the
Genetics Forum (1991) made similar arguments in a letter to the government.
Implicitly in dispute here was how to interpret the significance of genetic novelty and how to
assign the burden of evidence. Although traditional biopesticides already underwent safety
regulation, the Greens' document neglected to explain why that knowledge base was
inadequate for GMO biopesticides. Classifying GMOs as inherently novel rather than as
familiar organisms, their 'efficiency' argument presumed that some new type of knowledge
was needed. In this way, the Greens implicitly challenged the stereotypical meaning of 'sound
science'.
Within the Commission, DGXI strongly opposed the two-year timetable for the pesticides
directive to supersede 90/220 Part C, though to no avail, and it felt unable to dissent publicly
from the Commission's new policy (DGXI interview, 22 May 1992). The lead agency for the
pesticide directive, DGVI, favoured a longer transition to vertical regulation, i.e. five years, as
did DGXI and the Parliament. Within the Commission, DGVI was supporting DGXI, in
return for DOXI supporting DGVI on a proposed Fourth Hurdle for BST. However, it
became clear that the five-year timetable had no support in the Council of Agriculture
Ministers, apart from Denmark. To avoid defeat there, DGVI conceded to the Commission
and Council majority by accepting a two-year transition (DGXII interview, 18 July 1991;
Envt Cttee interview, 17 July 1991).
Finally in July 1991 the Council of Ministers approved an amended pesticides directive, which
mandated adding risk-assessment criteria specifically for GMOs within two years (EEC, 1991:
4). Once implemented, the pesticides directive would include GMO biopesticides within the
standard licensing procedure of a DGVI expert committee, representing the national
authorities which already regulated agrichemicals (Mackenzie, 1991). These were mainly
agriculture ministries, which held responsibility for both promoting and regulating agricultural
products, and which were relatively less open to public consultation.
For such reasons, among others, the Greens warned that DGVI's Brussels committee would
'bypass the expertise and concerns of the national environment ministries' (ibid.). In Britain
environmentalists were apprehensive about the pesticide directive superseding Directive
90/220 Part C: probably ACRE would still provide safety advice on a GMO biopesticide at the
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market approval stage, but MAFF rather than the DoE would ultimately decide whether to act
on the advice (Green Alliance interview, 30 October 1991).
Once industry had won the dispute over the pesticide directive, further demands followed. It
now criticized the broad risk-assessment criteria in Directive 90/220 as scientifically
unwarranted and as regulatory discrimination against GMO biopesticides. Such arguments
came from an industry speaker at a major conference on biotechnology regulation, held on 23-
24 June 1992 in The Hague. Representing European pesticide companies, Eva Sorensen
argued,
If initial tests show no hazard, then they don't require [warrant] further testing.... The
environmental risk assessment needs to evaluate whether the genetic change will pose
a risk to the environment. It should not request unnecessary information on the GMO,
such as its metabolic role in the environment [a reference to 90/220 Annexe II]. The
extra requirement puts a burden upon scientists and regulators; it prevents explaining
the real prospects to the public.
This argument retrospectively clarified industry's reasons for having turned against process-
based regulation. Now it explicitly intended to edit out any additional assessment for GMO
products (as DGXI had privately claimed). In complaining about the administrative burden,
industry was attempting to minimize the precautionary content and hasten the symbolic
normalization of GMOs.
What might this mean for the precautionary content of 90/220? Even at the R&D stage,
covered by Part B, the testing of ecological uncertainties would depend partly upon whatever
data requirements were anticipated at the commercial product stage. If releasers expected that
DGVI's procedure could bypass the precautionary intent of Part C, then they would have less
incentive to design trial releases for collecting any safety data beyond those required for non-
GMOs. Thus the procedural and technical features of product-based regulation favoured
reliance upon traditional expertise, anticipating only those hazards already documented.
1.2.2 Whose denwcracy?
How did the amended pesticide directive result from the EC's democratic procedures? When
DGXI attempted to keep GMO biopesticides within Directive 90/220, European industry
portrayed that stance as undemocratic, self-serving and irrational. According to a SAGB
representative, the Council of Agriculture Ministers had wanted the pesticides directive to
include GMOs, but the Environment Directorate DGXI had them excluded from the
Commission's draft proposal:
Regrettably, the Commission worked behind the scenes, and we still have [the prospect
of] dual regulation. We don't have a democratic system operating in Europe... DGXI
has to be willing to negotiate. A few dictators around the world have said 'No, no.'
190
Saddam Hussein has got his come-uppance; we'll see what happens in the future
(interview, 22 March 1991).
In July 1991, when the Commission adopted industry's proposal for the pesticide directive,
presumably this was the moral equivalent of Operation Desert Storm, re-imposing the
democratic rule of law.
By contrast, Greens MEPs had argued for prolonging process-based regulation, especially
because 'the creation of new forms of life presents our ailing planet with a unique challenge'.
As the manoeuvres around the pesticide directive illustrated, 'industry is more powerful than
the only democratically elected institution at a European level' (Bullard, 1991). Thus the
Greens identified industry as a dual threat to the environment and to democracy.
The meaning of European democracy depends upon whether one's main reference point is the
Council of Ministers or the European Parliament -- and therefore who had bypassed whom.
Directive 90/220 gave an initial role to environment ministries, partly accommodating
environmentalists' concerns. However, Part C allowed for product-based regulation, whose
procedure would favour the agricultural policy of national governments.
Here it is instructive to recall that Directive 90/220 had its legal origins in Article base lOOa,
for completing the EC internal market. When such a market seemed threatened by organized
opposition to GMO releases and regulatory disharmonies, a political opportunity opened for a
precautionary approach. Yet the original market rationale ultimately strengthened the national
ministries responsible for approving and promoting agricultural products.
Some officials welcomed such a shift as 'the withering away' of Part C (e.g. DCXII interview,
18 July 1991; HSE interview, 26 September 1991). It also meant a withering role for the
European Parliament, DGXI and the environment ministries; such bodies had little scope for
influencing the pesticide directive. Much less could environmentalist groups mount a public
campaign, once the value conflicts took the form of technical criteria, long before any relevant
products might have gained public attention.
1.2.3 Whose competitiveness?
The pesticide directive had marked a victory for the rhetorical imperative of international
competitiveness. Industry's warnings about disinvestment helped to persuade government, as
reflected in the Bangemann report (CEC, 1991). As one industrialist described his successful
lobbying on regulatory policy, 'Now at last [Jacques] Delors and senior members of the
[British] cabinet have realized that the industrial base of Europe is in serious jeopardy'
(interview, 22 March 1991).
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Lobbying to hasten product-based regulation, industry and DGXII emphasized GMOs'
familiarity, their presumed benefits, and the economic costs of over-regulation. However, this
latter claim exaggerated the importance of regulatory costs; in reality such costs had little
bearing upon strategic R&D decision-making in large biotechnology firms, such as those
represented by their lobbying organization, the SAGB (Chataway and Tait, 1993).
In the late 1980s, moreover, few GMO biopesticides were undergoing trial releases in EC
countries anyway; Europe had far fewer microbial than plant OMO releases, as compared to
the USA (OECD, 1990a: 113). Although several EC-based companies were developing GMO
biopesticides, most were conducting their trial releases elsewhere, mainly in the USA, where
they anticipated finding a larger market anyway, given the greater problem of plant pests there
than in Europe. For example, the Danish-based Novo Nordisk was linked with the US-based
Entotech (Cutler, 1991); likewise Royal Dutch Shell with a small US firm (Mycogen
Corporation, 1989: 14). Thus EC regulation could hardly drive Out an investment which had
already gone to the USA for other reasons.
Why, then, was 'dual regulation' such a problem? Whenever a company obtained commercial
product approval from the USA's Environmental Protection Agency, the product might then
face more stringent testing requirements for importing the product into Europe. This was why
EC regulation would make an important difference, according to a spokesperson for European
pesticide companies (GIFAP interview, 24 June 1992).
Thus European industry was urging a deregulatory move which would facilitate US exports to
Europe (Levidow, 1994b). If EC biotech companies were not already multinationals, then
they were developing trans-Atlantic joint ventures, thereby following a more general
industrial pattern (Ramsay, 1992: 29; Assouline, 1989; Petrella, 1989). In general, regulatory
standards have assisted precisely this international integration of capital, rather than any
geographically-based competition (Picciotto, 1991). As a further irony, the biotechnology
industry was urging the EC to imitate US 'risk-based regulation', yet this framework was
proving contentious in the USA, where only the USDA had so far issued any regulations (see
chapter 4, section 2). In sum, EC biotechnology regulation was deferring to a rhetorical
rationality which concealed its own political agenda.
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2.0 BRITAIN: 'Regulating the Product'
During the EC-level disputes over how GMOs might obtain market approval, there was little
public debate or press commentary in Britain (except, e.g. BBC, 1991). By 1992 the market
approval stage had been reached by only one GMO product involving a live release; this was a
bakers' yeast, whose approval met a brief flurry of newspaper articles which expressed
resentment at inadequate public consultation (analysed by Kemp, 1992). No other GMO had
advanced beyond the stage of small-scale field trials.
Nevertheless, within Britain's regulatory system, routes to market approval were already being
debated, long before products had reached this stage. The debate entailed diverse concepts of
a GMO 'product'. This section analyses, in turn: industry's scenarios; regulatory advisors'
scenarios; and the special case of herbicide-resistant crops.
2.1 Industry scenarios
SAGB was attacking the EC's entire regulatory framework, but British industry remained
somewhat ambivalent towards abandoning process-based regulation. Industrialists did prefer
a shift to product-based regulation, but they located such a shift within quite different
strategies. These differences can he seen by comparing excerpts from individual cognitive
maps; below, the dash (--) denotes 'in order to'.
At one extreme, a Dli official (individual code 15) regarded the process-based regulation as
entirely misguided, even at the R&D stage, because it confirmed rather than allayed irrational
fears about GMOs. Therefore, 'Put GMOs into product regulations -- avoid the view that
GMOs are inherently risky -- people's fear recedes -- get rational regulation.' By invoking
scientific rationality as both a guiding principle and goal, his formula coincided with DGXII's
early warning to industry about the political hazards of process-based regulation.
One industrialist (11) preferred ideally to 'hive off the R&D stage to the relevant product areas
-- avoid an unwarranted discrimination against GMOs -- avoid increased regulatory burdens
on industry'. Yet he reluctantly accepted the political necessity of process-based regulation at
the R&D stage: 'Adopt satisfactory product legislation, and exempt GMO products from Part
C of the Deliberate Release Directive -- base regulation on the inthnsic risk of the final
product.'
In a similar vein, another industrialist (16) recognized the flexibility in the 1990
Environmental Protection Act as it applied to the market stage: 'Government keeps the
fuzziness of the Act, rather than develop process-based regulations -- UK implements the Act
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on a product basis, rather than adopt overly stringent regulation -- innovation is hastened,
rather than delayed.' At the same time, he acknowledged some political risks of that scenario:
'Ideally the research phase would be regulated on a process basis, but the development phase
would be regulated as an existing category of regulated products, e.g. pesticides. Of course a
product-based approach risks increased regulation of earlier (non-GMO) products, but we
hope that sensible people won't do so.' That is, regulators might take GMO regulation as an
occasion to reconsider inadequately regulated hazards of wider product categories. (For such
proposals, see section 2.2.)
Another industrialist (13) felt confident that regulators would remain 'sensible'. According to
his scenario, 'Structure regulation on the basis of good science all the time, rather than a PR
basis -- apply the same regulation to identical products, rather than different regulation to a
gm product -- gm products go through only one form of approval.' Meanwhile, in parallel,
'Get a regulatory continuum from the first release onwards, rather than an overlap of
regulatory authority -- build up an information base in stages -- require no new data at the
product [market] stage -- the GMO product gets ultimate clearance as it pops out the top.'
Industrialists looked to the regulatory procedure for predictably normalizing transgenic plants
as they 'pop out the top'. For example (17), 'Know what genes you have changed with gm,
rather than random changes from traditional breeding -- know what changes to look for --
establish that gm is safer than traditional breeding.' Although some biotechnologists had
made similar statements as first principles, here they were stated as hypotheses for testing:
regulatory experience would vindicate the genetic modification process as precise and
therefore safe. Process-based regulation could even make itself obsolete, according to one
ambitious scenario (Il): 'Experimental results are held together centrally -- develop data on
safety of gm process -- prove the novel techniques are safe.'
In sum, although industrialists reluctantly accepted process-based regulation of GMOs at the
R&D stage, they wanted regulators to regard the organisms from the start as prospective
products, not the results of a problematic process. 'Regulate the product' expressed both a
guiding principle and desired shift to product-based regulation, warranted by objectively
testable properties. Next, let us compare Britain's regulatory advisors to industry's notion of
'sensible people'.
2.2 Advisors' scenarios
The regulatory officials in the ACRE Secretariat brought different concepts of GMOs to bear
upon the proceedings (as noted earlier in Chapter 6). The DoE asserted a scientific rationale
for process-based regulation, particularly through an analogy to non-indigenous organisms.
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By contrast, an HSE official shared the prevalent industry view: 'There is not a great deal of
scientific logic in the process-based regulation; probably the regulation will remain process-
based for research, but there will [and should] be a rapid shift to product legislation' for
market approval (interview, 26 September 1991).
ACRE members held diverse views on that anticipated shift, as depicted in the Cognitive Map
9.1. Divergent views concerned 'products' in at least two senses of the word: how to
conceptualize GMOs' characteristics, as shown roughly in the bottom half; and how to
regulate products at the market stage, as shown in the top half. Scenarios for
straightforwardly normalizing GMOs appear on the right-hand side, while more cautious
views appear on the left-hand side. The map shows a superficial convergence at two main
concepts, where each turns out to have different meanings for different advisors. (This map
overlaps somewhat with the bottom of Map 8.1, in order to demonstrate links between those
value judgements and routes to market approval; see Chapter 8, section 2.1.2.)
* 'Assess all novel organisms'
Near the bottom of Map 9.1 is the first convergence: 'Compare GMOs to the risk of
introducing a new species', so that regulators can 'Use the same criteria to assess all novel
organisms', be they genetically modified or non-indigenous (S8,T2,C1,C3). Advisors
regarded this as a more scientifically sound basis than regulating GMOs alone (as described in
Chapter 6, section 2), though for quite different reasons.
Some advisors accepted that dual remit as a way to avoid stigmatizing GMOs, while credibly
disproving the hypothetical analogy to non-indigenous organisms, especially for single-gene
changes in well-known crops. For example, in the lower right of the map, 'Consider the
inherent properties of the organism, rather than consider GMOs as inherently risky'
(D4,C 1 ,C3); this expresses confidence in GMOs' predictability. 'Distinguish different areas of
concern' (Cl) means to obtain experimental results which show that 'GMOs pose no special or
unexpected hazards' (S7,C1), and thus 'confirm that the greatest risk comes from [newly
introduced] non-indigenous organisms' (Cl).
Other advisors, however, emphasized an ecological complexity which small-scale field trials
might not adequately anticipate. They wanted the regulation to 'consider gene expression
dependent upon environment', and so 'recognize the unpredictable effect of genetic novelty'
(S8,S2,S1). Anticipating unpredictable effects, moreover, two advisors (52,S4) wanted to
'regulate reproducible gm products separately', even at the commercial product stage.
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Some advisors spoke as if the genetic modification process were on trial, though not mainly
for the reasons given by ecologists. 'Resolve concerns about the genetic modification aspect'
(D2) meant, for example, verifying the stability of the new genetic combination and safely
using plant pest vectors. Even for broader safety criteria, laboratory tests and small-scale field
trials could enable us to 'conclude that the probability of the unexpected from genetic
modification is low'. Although others were less confident, they too spoke in terms of
vindicating the technology: 'If the technology is proven safe, then the constraints should be
relaxed to the point of being no hindrance' (S 8). Thus, within a formal case-by-case approach
for assessing individual GMOs, advisors acknowledged a pervasive subtext of 'process' stigma
and uncertainty, to be overcome through testing.
* Regulate the product, not the process'
From the first convergence, the composite map continues upwards: 'monitor results of releases
-- try to find any problem for each GMO -- 'regulate the product, not the process'
(D4,S8,D2,C1,S1), which provides the second main convergence. Nominally this meant
regulating each GMO 'on the basis of its intrinsic properties, rather than on the process by
which it was produced' (e.g. D4,C1,C3). However, advisors expressed differences about how
those 'intrinsic' properties can be adequately known, even if one knows the precise genetic
changes, and how their benign character can be verified at the commercial product stage.
The upper right-hand part of the map depicts a confident view of safety and predictability
(though does not depict all the concepts mentioned here). Monitoring results would soon
warrant allowing some GMOs to 'short circuit the risk assessment' and to enter a 'fast-track'.
Regulators could resolve questions about large-scale trial releases, and finally put some GMO
products into the existing product regulations, wherever available (C2,C1,C3,D4), rather than
face 'dual regulation'. In this way (Cl), industry could know its regulatory costs in advance,
rather than undergo unpredictably higher costs and marketing delays; industry would then
have the incentive to invest in the UK and Europe, rather than shift gm work to the USA and
elsewhere.
The upper left-hand part of the map shows more cautious meanings of 'regulate the product,
not the process.' In addition to the two advisors (S2,S4) who advocated separate regulation
for GMO products, some expressed reluctance about simply putting GMOs into existing
product regulations.
Emphasizing ecological uncertainties, some advisors favoured subjecting GMO products to
extra risk-assessment criteria at the commercial stage, in order to avert any extra ecological
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T2,S9) wanted adequate information disclosure on prospective products, so that public debate
could lead industry R&D in an environment-friendly direction. CBI nominees (C1,C2)
wanted to 'let the market decide' social need, rather than introduce any Fourth Hurdle.
A potential dilemma arose from biotechnologists' claims that GMOs are just as safe as the
products of traditional breeding. In that context, 'be cautious about statements comparing
GMOs and non-GMOs', lest such statements lead to increased regulation of traditional
breeding (as some advisors advocated above). Through accumulated testing, we can
'overcome discrimination against GMOs, rather than regulate traditional plants as well' (C 1).
As shown near the centre of the map, there is a negative link to the proposed strengthening of
product regulation.
Several advisors felt that risk assessment could not afford to depend upon the particular
manner of using a product, because restrictions on product use would be unfeasible at the
commercial stage: 'If it needs special controls at that stage, then we have really lost it' (Si).
Safety tests would have to 'prove that the product is risk free', so that commercial use would
'require no special handling of the product, rather than trust the farmer to make no mistakes'
(C2). However, that apparent agreement involved disagreements about the criteria for
regarding product safety as independent of human behaviour.
The ostensibly common goal, 'society can benefit', served to justify different priorities. Given
various scenarios about potentially harmful effects, some advisors foresaw additional
regulation as necessary so that GMO products could 'avoid environmental harm', as shown in
the upper-left hand side of the composite map. For others, especially the CBI nominees,
industry must 'avoid unnecessary regulatory burdens and delays', as shown in the upper right-
hand side.
In summary: The consensual slogan -- 'regulate the product, not the process' -- concealed
different concepts of the 'product' as predictable and/or benign. Advisors disagreed on how to
define the risk-generating system: e.g. as a testable property of a product and/or as all its
concomitant practices, including indirect effects. There were related tensions around
vindicating 'the technology', as if it were reducible to the genetic modification technique.
Advisors' views indicated that a precautionary approach might pose difficulties for
normalizing GMO products -- indeed, even for equating normality with safety.
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2.3 Herbicide-resistant crops
The prospect of herbicide-resistant crops most clearly evoked different concepts of product
risk (see also Chapter 7, section 3). Hypothetical hazards had special urgency for oilseed rape
and sugar beet: as particularly lucrative crops, they also happened to have indigenous weedy
relatives, with which they might interbreed. As one advisor had suggested, unintended effects
'can be put in a rational order', as follows.
First, could a herbicide-resistance gene impart a selective advantage to a weed? Some
industrialists and biosafety researchers offered a reassurance: 'For resistance to a particular
herbicide, transgenic plants would be at a selective advantage only if the herbicide was used in
natural plant habitats' (Dale, 1991). Others regarded this reassurance as naive, given that
crop-spraying often strays outside cultivated areas, even apart from the possibility of
pleiotropic effects.
Second, if herbicide-resistant weeds became a nuisance to agriculture, then should this effect
be regarded as environmental damage? Some ACRE members had suggested not, when
arguing that farmers could switch to another herbicide, and that such a nuisance was 'only a
problem for agriculture', as ACRE's chairman stated at a public conference in June 1990. On
the contrary, insisted some other members, 'The environment includes agricultural fields'
(Williamson, 1992: 3), as implied by Britain's statutory definition of environmental harm
(EPA, 1990: 116).
Third, what if herbicided-resistant weeds arose indirectly, from the sheer selection pressure of
changed herbicide usage? This scenario apparently lay beyond the remit of process-based
GMO regulation, though it was discussed by regulatory advisors, as exemplifying the
warnings about a genetic and/or chemical treadmill. In response, one research manager (C4)
considered biotechnology R&D as adequate to 'solve the technical problems of homogeneous
monoculture with technical means'. Others expressed unease at agribusiness generating the
need for yet more technological solutions (e.g. Si). Another advisor (S4) resented the
prospect of herbicide-resistant crops being mass-marketed: 'This makes me uncomfortable
because genetic modification isn't about avoiding pesticides; it's just making them a little less
hazardous. I'm not very happy about that. And the committee wouldn't look at [assess] that.'
Indeed, the herbicide-crop link strained regulatory boundaries. Existing pesticide legislation
required manufacturers to make a new application to MAFF for any change in the terms of
approval, such as extending a herbicide's use to additional crops; this change would be
assessed by MAFF's own Advisory Committee on Pesticides. Few ACRE members favoured
broadening their remit to consider the herbicide implications, but some doubted that MAFF
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would adequately handle these, much less the complex link between crops and herbicide
usage. As one ACRE member said (S9), 'The agronomic implications of the herbicide/seed
combination is a value judgement which ACRE is trying not to make, as it lies outside our
genetic [modification] remit; the issue is slipping between ACRE and MAFF.'
Industry advocated separating the 'science-based' safety assessment of the crop and the
herbicide. According to a CBI nominee (Cl), environmentalist groups were pursuing an
illegitimate 'linkage' between GMOs and herbicides by attempting to treat them together: 'It is
illogical because it is assuming that the two are linked... Herbicide usage, or misuse, or lack of
use, is considered by the pesticides committee, and its safety is verified. The two things are
separate.' And relative environmental benefits or preferences were an 'ethical question', not a
safety issue (interview 22 March 1991; note the rhetorical resonance with the USA's rejection
of a proposed 'linkage' among issues in the Gulf conflict.)
In response to these arguments, a MAFF official prepared a discussion document (Bainton,
1991; cf. Bainton,1993). Recasting the issue, it reduced environmental problems to separate
considerations about the gene, crop and herbicide. Indeed, 'herbicide-resistant crops do not
form a uniform group with similar characteristics'. By denying systemic hazards, it relegated
risk assessment to separate risk factors for specific cases: 'risk' as a testable property of things.
The MAFF document briefly mentioned commercial pressures, but solely as if they provided
an incentive for farmers to reduce herbicide usage: 'the assessment of the value of the benefits
is for the market to decide'. Like industry, MAFF portrayed market relations as a free choice
of individual consumers to buy products already approved for safety. The document ignored
competitive pressures upon companies to market particular gene-crop combinations and upon
farmers to buy them. Although it acknowledged the potential for sheer selection pressure to
generate herbicide-resistant weeds, it suggested no way to prevent or even anticipate that
outcome, conceptually delinked from market relations. Moreover, as the Greenpeace (1991c)
reply noted, MAFF made 'no attempt to consider whether there were other approaches to the
problem of weeds which might carry less risk'.
Thus MAFF's analytical reductionism, and ACRE's alloted role within it, abstracted risk
factors from a wider risk-generating system. In this way, the regulatory system prepared to
displace issues of commercial pressures perpetuating herbicide usage. Such issues were
conceptually fragmented into a technical risk assessment of unintended effects, and a free
consumer choice of desired effects.
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3.0 CONCLUSIONS: NORMALIZING GMO PRODUCTS
Long before GMO products were proposed for commercial use, the terms for their market
approval were being debated and foreclosed, in ways which highlighted different concepts of
a biotechnology 'product'. After the EC Deliberate Release Directive was enacted,
agrochemical multinationals attacked process-based legislation as irrational; they claimed that
it lacked any scientific basis, hindered the competitiveness of the European biotechnology
industry, and stigmatized the genetic modification process. From within the European
Commission, DGXII encouraged industry demands for a policy shift towards product-based
regulation; in effect, such a shift would minimize the precautionary content of the EC
Directive, while still using its framework to legitimize moves towards market approval.
In particular, industry lobbying efforts gained a significant step towards removing GMO
biopesticides from process-based regulation; once implemented, a new pesticides directive
would shift risk management to those national authorities which had previously regulated
agrochemicals. In this conflict, victory went to the side which portrayed risk assessment as an
objective scientific matter of assessing 'inherent product characteristics'. Complementing this
portrayal, industry subsequently proposed to delete the broader risk-assessment criteria for
GMO biopesticides.
This political pressure was indeed motivated by market imperatives, though in quite different
ways than were officially claimed. In practice the market competition was among trans-
Atlantic multinationals or joint ventures. The deregulatory moves were less about enhancing
'European' biotechnology, than about facilitating US-based exports into the EC and the
international integration of EC-based firms. Such changes would also privilege the
established scientific expertise, and perhaps minimize popular influence over regulatory
policy. (Compare this with industry's anxiety about excessive public participation, in Chapter
6, section 3.)
Similarly, as a major study of chemicals regulation concluded, 'Evidence of an emerging
international consensus can strengthen the hand of regulators who are engaged in difficult
domestic proceedings... bureaucratic policy making in Brussels can be used by national
governments to widen their already substantial advantages over the legislature' (Brickman et
al., 1985: 294, 67). In the case of GMO biopesticides, moreover, national agriculture
ministries strengthened their advantage over environment ministries, as well as over the
European Parliament, even though the Single European Act supposedly strengthened the
Parliament vis a vis the Commission and the Council.
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During these EC-wide disputes, industry was urging government to 'regulate the product, not
the [gm] process', as in the US government slogan; however, the concept of 'product' had
problematic meanings. In Britain's regulatory system, advisors preferred to judge product
safety without presuming any special conditions of use. In this way, risk assessment could
avoid naively assuming that commercial use will strictly follow safety rules. However, by
seeking an unconditional version of safety, the assessment would have to consider a wider
range of ecological and agronomic uncertainties, hardly amenable to standardized testing.
Thus market approval entailed a practical dilemma: how to achieve social legitimacy by
specifying testable uncertainties of a GMO product.
Although regulatory advisors accepted the need to 'regulate the product', they interpreted
'product characteristics' in divergent ways. Industry in particular sought a standard regulatory
procedure for testing inherent properties of organisms. Industrialists expected the procedure
to vindicate the genetic modification process as safe, to clear GMOs of suspected hazards, and
thus to normalize GMO products.
By contrast, some regulatory advisors sought more wide-ranging studies to anticipate
ecological complexities and product uses. They foresaw commercial pressures and agronomic
practices causing environmental harm, which might arise from using some non-OMOs as well,
especially in the Context of intensive monoculture. Some hazards apparently lay beyond the
remit of safety regulation: for example, herbicide-resistant crops influencing herbicide usage,
or herbicides generating resistant weeds, or biopesticides generating resistant insects. For
industrialized agriculture, as in other industrial systems, the context constitutes the hazards
(Wynne, 1992: 284).
In response to such concerns, some advisors (and many environmentalists) favoured
subjecting biotechnology products to a 'Fourth Hurdle', i.e. socio-economic and/or ethical
criteria. For them, herbicide-resistant crops in particular exemplified how commercial
pressures become embedded in R&D priorities and harmful agricultural practices. In
response, the regulatory system justified assessing such crops separately from herbicide usage,
thus denying their mutual linkage within R&D and agricultural practice; thus issues of
commercial control could be displaced into technical risk assessment.
The wider debate on a proposed Fourth Hurdle had a double-edged role. On the one hand, it
highlighted potential harm which lay beyond safety regulation. On the other hand, the state
and industry rhetorically distinguished the merely subjective Fourth Hurdle from a putatively
'objective' risk assessment. Moreover, the latter portrayal became a self-fulfilling claim, as
industry attempted to narrow the range of uncertainty deemed relevant to risk assessment.
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In summary, by demanding moves toward product-based regulation, industry was pursuing
several aims: to obtain a short-cut normalization of GMOs, to restrict the range of relevant
ecological uncertainty, to limit the precautionary content, and to minimize the potential for
public involvement. In this way, industry might obtain more predictable safety standards and
thus protect its prerogative to direct innovation. Yet it thereby jeopardized the social
legitimacy which market approval could provide for GMO products.
This dilemma arose from an endemic regulatory tension. Although industry arguments about
competitiveness were misleading, the deregulatory pressure did arise from market imperatives,
which had made the EC Directive possible in the first place. After all, both the regulators and
regulated were engaged in a common project: to establish the political conditions for an
international market to treat GMOs as normal products. Even within the precautionary
framework, the very concept of 'safety' tended to internalize market constraints -- by
abstracting 'risk' from the context of intensive monoculture, and by standardizing testable
uncertainties of prospective commodities. Thus, in disputing the terms for market approval,
regulatory actors were playing out a pervasive tension between commercialization and social
legitimacy.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions:
CONTESTED RATIONALITY
This study began with research questions about the system developed for regulating GMO
releases. Drawing upon earlier chapters, this one discusses the following questions:
* How does GMO regulation construct some type of rationality? (section 1)
* How might further research test or strengthen the argument of this thesis? (section 2).
1.0 CONSTRUCTING A PROCEDURAL RATIONALiTY
In the thesis I argue that GMO regulation was managing a tension between social
legitimacy and commercialization. This internal contradiction helps to explain the
pervasive regulatory dilemmas: how to acknowledge the stigma associated with GMOs, in
a way which can overcome it; how to justify risk-management rules in terms of a
hypothetical risk identification; how to define safety criteria which can depoliticize
'uncertainty' about risk; and how to make safety judgements unconditional, i.e.,
independent of human behaviour. The thesis extends earlier theoretical insights on such
dilemmas, regarding how regulators defend their own cognitive framework (Beck, 1992a:
167-69) and how safety judgements bound the risk-generating system (Wynne, 1982:
172).
In so doing, the thesis recasts theories of safety regulation as a distinct rationality.
According to such theories, technological-risk controversy should be analysed as a
recurring conflict between safety regulation versus other rationalities. In the case of GMO
regulation, such conflict did indeed arise -- between regulators, industry and
environmentalist groups -- yet it also arose within the regulatory procedure itself.
Thus I argue that the regulatory procedure mediated between internal poles of tension
which various theories attribute to distinct rationalities. In particular, the regulatory
framework derived its context, and even its technical content, from the need to overcome
potential threats to a market; such a feature should not be attributed to a distinct
'individualist' rationality (as do Schwarz and Thompson, 1990). Also, as precautionary
measures went beyond technically measurable parameters, or even beyond identifiable
hazards, these measures conveyed symbolic meanings of environmental control; such
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features should not be attributed to a distinct 'cultural' rationality (as do Krimsky and
Plough, 1988).
In analysing the internal tensions of a procedural-technical rationality, the thesis builds
upon theories of how safety regulation constructs stereotypical objective/subjective
boundaries. The argument is elaborated below by linking the original research questions
to the literature survey (Chapter 1, sections 1.4, 2.0), and then by discussing 'the
precautionary principle'. The questions were:
* How does the regulatory system handle diverse accounts of the risk problem? How
does this treat some 'perceived risks' as if they might be real? (subsection 1.1).
* How is a risk-management regime devised and justified? What is the significance of
'national regulatory styles'? (subsection 1.2)
* How does the regulatory procedure attempt to reduce uncertainty about risk? How does
this effort depoliticize scientific uncertainty? (subsection 1.3)
* What is the precautionary content, and why? (subsection 1.4)
1.1 Defining the risk problem
From an early stage of R&D, biotechnologists faced political challenges to their avowed
project of further industrializing agriculture. Opponents cast the 'risks' as a cultural
danger, expressed in both ethical and ecological terms. They foresaw biotechnology
aggravating the hazards of intensive monoculture: GMOs threatened to cause instabilities
which would mean greater agricultural dependence upon laboratory expertise and
commercial interests.
By contrast, industry celebrated biotechnology as a reprogrammed, precisely controlled
nature which would safely supersede the limits of chemical-intensive agriculture and thus
realize nature's cornucopian potential. 'Environment-friendly' products would protect a
fragile agriculture from environmental threats. Through a rhetorical greening of
biotechnology, industry naturalized the project of investing nature with metaphors of
computers and commerce (see Chapters 3, 4 and 9).
In challenging biotechnology as a mode of control, critics appealed to environmental
images which express divergent 'myths of nature' (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990: 3-4, 62-
68). Some depicted GMOs as potential pollutants, running out of control and thus
threatening a fragile Nature, which could tolerate only 'trial without error'; some also
attacked biotechnology as a sinister control over nature and society. Although some
industrialists acknowledged that biotechnological progress might entail some 'trial and
error', they presumed that any mishap would be minor or remediable (see Chapters 3, 8
and 9).
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Each account of the problem had its own inner link between risk and benefit. On one
side, society was 'at risk' from biotechnology, which imposed a sinister control,
transgressed natural boundaries, created new pollutants, and/or excluded beneficial
alternatives. On the other side, society was at risk from failing to reap the indispensible
benefits of biotechnology, whose environment-friendly products offered a benign mode of
coniroffing environmental threats to agriculture.
Despite the cornucopian rhetoric of biotechnologists, their practice and strategic aims
were more complex (than the distinct rationalities theorized by Schwarz & Thompson,
1990: 66-67). Industrialists sought an official safety imprimatur which could overcome
political threats to biotechnology R&D and to an eventual market. Recognizing this need,
regulators proposed safety procedures as essential means of protecting biotechnology as
well as the environment (see Chapters 4 and 5).
GMO regulation analytically separated 'risk' from benefit; it cut across the stances of both
biotechnologists and their opponents. Safety regulation took for granted socio-
environmental benefits from biotechnology, by offering to protect its wealth-creating
potential. At the same time, safety regulation attempted to anticipate any physically
measurable, direct harm from GMOs or their inserted genes; regulation proceeded as if
some hypothetical hazards were unacceptable, while defining them in naturalistic ways,
abstracted from the risk-generating system of intensive monoculture (Chapters 4, 5 and 8;
see also below, section 1.2).
The step-by-step principle provided a means for Britain's regulators to postpone
distinguishing between 'real versus perceived risks', and thus to legitimize early trial
releases. By confining the genetically modified material, initial precautions went beyond
identifiable hazards and so accommodated diverse risk perceptions. Regulatory advisors
could reach agreement on the conditions for each small-scale field trial, while
symbolically containing perceived risks. This often meant selecting initial releases for
public acceptability, and/or designing them to demonstrate that GMOs were being kept
under safe control (see Maps 6.8, 7.1).
However, such measures could not always contain fears of biotechnology as an ominous
control. In a low-key local protest in North Cornwall, some residents responded to the
small-scale field trial of a herbicide-resistant crop as a commercial and territorial invasion;
they perceived the particular release as a 'step' towards undesirable agricultural practices,
as well as a short-term potential for harm. In the case of a viral insecticide which was
proposed for trial release, regulatory advisors cited plausible hazards which went beyond
the scientific uncertainties testable in a laboratory; some safety questions were apparently
intended to discourage the applicant's genetic redesign of the virus for eventual
commercial use (see Chapter 7).
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In both those difficult cases, and perhaps more generally, pollution imagery informed a
precautionary approach: hypothetical hazards had to be 'perceived' before they could be
translated into scientific terms, incorporated into safety measures, and/or empirically
tested. Formally, regulators assessed the safety of present 'step' only, but sometimes this
became difficult to separate from the commercial forces which were driving it. At the
same time, an R&D trajectory could be rendered more acceptable through a dual 'advance
of knowledge', whereby enhanced efficacy provided the resources and incentive to test
safety as well.
In all these ways, Britain's stepwise procedure can be understood as a cultural form, a
shared symbolic framework for acknowledging and potentially overcoming the perceived
abnormality of GMOs. Thus it would be misleading to theorize GMO regulation as a
'technical rationality' which considers only measurable parameters, as distinct from a
'cultural rationality' (as do Krimsky and Plough, 1988: 108, 306). At the same time, those
authors rightly attribute local US protests to a feared loss of environmental control (ibid.),
in a way similar to the concerns expressed by Cornwall residents; in these local protests,
NIMBY and NIABY features merged. Both episodes ifiustrate how new technological
developments generate 'rational anxieties' which environmental regulation displaces rather
than addresses (Grove-White, 1991: 439-40).
The above features warrant extending one philosopher's argument: that risk controversy
cannot be resolved until 'people stop trying to distinguish real risk from perceived risk';
and that such controversy obstructs social negotiation on technological progress (Shrader-
Frechette, 1991: 85-87). Certainly, GMO risk management rendered small-scale field
trials more acceptable, as their design effectively suspended the distinction between
'real/perceived risk'.
However, such a distinction could not be abandoned but only deferred, perhaps until the
stage of market approval. Moreover, some critical responses did not readily distinguish a
trial release from the commercial aims and institutional forces which it embodied; in
effect, safety sceptics were disputing the boundary of the risk-generating system. Such a
dispute over 'real' risk became the only available means of socially negotiating a
contentious form of technological 'progress' (notwithstanding Shrader-Frechette, ibid).
In sum, the stepwise procedure initially suspended the stereotypical distinction between
'real/perceived risk'. In making authoritative safety judgements on each step, the
procedure took for granted the benign R&D agenda of industrializing agriculture, of
further reconstructing nature as a commodity. By ensuring and demonstrating that GMOs
would not run out of control, it displaced issues of socio-agronomic control -- though not
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always successfully. By symbolically containing these concerns, safety regulation
mediated a tension between social legitimacy and commercialization.
1.2 Justifying risk management
In establishing a risk-management regime for GMO releases, it was difficult to justify
formal rules in terms of a prior risk identification for hypothetical hazards. Nevertheless a
scientific rationale was devised to justify a regulatory system which served political-
administrative needs. These systems (in the USA, EC and Britain) can be analysed as
fulfilling several roles: e.g. providing a cognitive framework, handling the stigma
associated with GMOs, and managing political conflicts.
Given the national differences in political protest and regulatory responses, an
international consensus remained elusive. Although regulators nominally accepted the
1986 OECD proposal to follow a stepwise relaxation of containment, there were sharp
disagreements on its proper legal and scientific basis. In this regard, the 'product versus
process' debate concerned how to classify GMOs for regulatory purposes.
The US government adopted a product-based regulatory system, also called a 'risk-based'
approach, which gave several meanings to the term 'product'. An implicit aim was to
portray GMOs as otherwise normal products, i.e., to avoid stigmatizing them by
association with the genetic modification process. Through new administrative rules, the
government classified GMOs according to their ultimate product use and assigned them to
Federal agencies accordingly, under existing product legislation; this legal status narrowed
the types of hypothetical hazards for which agencies could demand safety data. The rules
also compelled each agency to justify any 'additional' regulation of a GMO release in
terms of specific product characteristics which would warrant such scrutiny; yet the
government had difficulty finding a practicable, consensual way to specify such grounds
for a risk-management procedure.
Indeed, in the name of keeping the rules 'rational', the US government inadvertently made
regulatory science appear even more political. Its administrative rules pre-empted risk-
assessment issues, by presuming that the available knowledge was adequate to predict the
significance of genetic novelty, and by imposing cost-benefit criteria upon any 'additional'
regulatory procedure. Consequently the new rules provoked public controversy,
highlighting conceptual differences among the Federal agencies, as well as among other
protagonists, especially environmentalist and industry groups (see Chapter 4). USDA
regulators even acknowledged that their safety criteria might not adequately reassure the
public about 'perceived risks' at the market approval stage (see Chapter 7, section 1).
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In the USA, GMO regulation extended features of the characteristic 'adversarial' style:
interested parties had much opportunity to challenge risk-management rules, while official
appeals to a scientific basis intensified political conflict. US regulators were left with the
burden of evidence for imposing any 'additional' regulation upon GMO releases. For the
Environmental Protection Agency in particular, executive-level constraints hindered the
attempt at negotiating scientific criteria through its advisory committee. Biotechnology
regulation could not readily stabilize a 'science policy', as chemicals regulators had
recently done (Jasanoff, 1990).
In contrast to the USA, the EC adopted a process-based regulatory system, which arose
from the imperative of overcoming national regulatory differences. Some officials called
this 'uncertainty-based' regulation, thus acknowledging indeterminate cause-effect models
of potential harm. Although the 1990 EC Deliberate Release Directive was called
'preventive', it went beyond preventing documented hazards. The Directive had several
precautionary features: it subjected all GMO releases to broad risk-assessment criteria;
applicants held the burden of evidence for demonstrating safety, with respect to
hypothetical hazards.
Shortly regulators encountered attempts at limiting the precautionary effect of the
Directive. Agrochemical multinationals attacked process-based legislation as irrational,
on grounds that it lacked any scientific basis and hindered the competitiveness of the
European biotechnology industry. Their lobbying efforts gained a significant step towards
removing GMO biopesticides from process-based regulation; once implemented, this
would shift risk management to those national authorities which had previously regulated
agrochemicals. In this episode, victory went to the side which portrayed risk assessment
as an objective scientific matter, assessing only 'inherent product characteristics'.
Complementing this portrayal, industry attempted to narrow the range of ecological
uncertainties relevant to risk-assessment, and so gain a short-cut normalization of GMOs
(see Chapters 4 and 9).
The advocates of product-based regulation were more complex and varied than their
rhetoric might suggest. DGXII had no direct responsibility for safety regulation, unlike
the biotechnologists whose research it was funding, and unlike the agrochemical
multinationals which comprised the SAGB. Although these firms challenged the
conceptual basis of the process-based Directive, their regulatory officials also participated
in developing its framework, at least in Britain, thus using it to legitimize R&D trial
releases. Indeed, leading industrialists in Britain accepted the political necessity of
adopting process-based legislation there, if only for obtaining an official safety
imprimatur.
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As the EC framework pushed Britain to go beyond the HSE's voluntary controls, the DoE
took the opportunity to formalize a precautionary rationale for process-based legislation.
When the British government incorporated the EC Directive into a new law, the DoE
gained industry support for a statutory licensing system but met criticism for its
precautionary legal language; this conflict symptomatized the dilemma of how to legislate
credibly for hypothetical hazards. At the same time, by rejecting proposals for a Public
Biotechnology Commission, the government confirmed that the environmental regulation
would narrowly define the risk-generating system, by excluding effects on and from
agricultural practices (see Chapter 5).
Britain's new advisory committee, ACRE, complemented the statutory control of
hypothetical hazards, by establishing a consensual risk-management regime prior to any
agreed risk-assessment methods. As a scientific basis for the committee's existence,
regulators cited the genetic novelty of GMOs, by analogy to non-indigenous organisms;
industry pragmatically accepted this cognitive framework as a basis for ACRE, despite
having dismissed such an analogy earlier. Placed under an HSE/DoE Joint Secretariat,
ACRE could discreetly negotiate the different safety perspectives of those two (and other)
departments, combine human health and environmental considerations, and signal the
DoE's greater role in biotechnology regulation (see Chapter 6).
In establishing its broad-based committee, the British government implicitly
acknowledged the social negotiation of regulatory science, while attempting to keep it
within confidential procedures. In deciding ACRE's membership, the government
stretched the 'specialist' category to encompass an informal public-interest representation;
the latter members personified the tensions of translating 'risk' as cultural danger into 'risk'
as manageable, testable uncertainties. ACRE's composition also embodied the tension
between easing market approval versus gaining social legitimacy -- a tension which was
manifest even within the same member (see Chapters 3 and 6, including the cognitive
maps). With a broadly-based confidential procedure, Britain's consultative regulatory
style was extended from other hazards to GMO releases. ACRE's composition in
particular exemplified 'responsible co-optation', which serves to protect the neutral image
of regulatory science, while gaining public deference to expert committees (cf. Vogel,
1986: 5 1-52; Brickman et al., 1985: 310; Jasanoff, 1986: 66).
Having surveyed the regulatory frameworks in the USA, EC and Britain, this thesis
supports the theoretical claim that cognitive differences 'render policy making possible',
by virtue of attaching symbolic meanings to issues (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990: 68).
Such analysis contradicts a recent lament that 'rational' risk-management institutions have
been difficult to design, supposedly because risk debate 'has become heavily politicized
around different cosmologies or worldviews' (Royal Society, 1992: 153) -- as if risk
management could exist outside of a cognitive framework. As Britain's case illustrates, a
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hypothetical biological analogy served as a pragmatic compromise, which many
participants provisionally accepted as a framework for demonstrating safety and thus for
eventually allowing process-based regulation to 'wither away' (see Chapter 9).
As this thesis also argues, each risk-management regime had an implicit political aim
which found a scientific rationale. The British government cited the ecologists' analogy
between GMOs and exotic organisms; this helped to justify an administrative
compromise, suitable for negotiating specific cases, in the British 'consultative' style. The
US government devised special risk-management rules for GMOs, yet used linguistic
euphemisms to avoid stigmatizing them; this stance provoked public debate about the
detailed scientific criteria, and so reproduced the US 'adversarial' style. From these
national cases, we can slightly rephrase the following aphorism: 'what matters most in risk
management is the process, not the outcome' (Jasanoff, 1986: 81); or rather, the most
important outcome is social legitimacy, in turn dependent upon the regulatory mode of
public representation.
This thesis also emphasizes difficulties in establishing and justifying a hierarchal, expert-
based authority. Such authority has been theorized as fundamental to a procedural
rationality -- which is 'more concerned with the proprieties of who does what than in
evaluating the outcome', if there is one (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990: 7). For GMO
releases, British and EC industry sought a formal hierarchy -- i.e., a licensing system
which could validate each risk assessment, specify the conditions of each release, and
exclude those who might discredit biotechnology. At the same time, some industrialists
sought to undermine the process-based framework for such an authority, and to narrow the
range risk-assessment criteria, particularly for the stage of market approval. This
indicates a tension between commercialization and social legitimacy -- within a procedural
rationality, not simply between distinct rationalities.
1.3 De/politicizing uncertainty?
For GMO releases, the early scientific debates featured antagonistic accounts of the
relevant uncertainty (see Chapters 1, 3 and 4). Biotechnologists celebrated their genetic
techniques as a benign precise control; they acknowledged (at most) an uncertainty about
product efficacy and about remediable damage to agriculture -- which they perceived as
fundamentally threatened by the environment, rather than vice versa. Their account was
challenged by ecologists who depicted scenarios of GMOs perturbing an ecological
balance and/or aggravating familiar agricultural problems.
Biotechnology critics emphasized such accounts of scientific uncertainty, and its
unacceptable consequences, when they turned GMOs into an environmental issue. They
portrayed biotechnology as a cultural danger, in both ecological and ethical terms: GMOs
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as nature out of control, and/or nature under sinister control. These warnings had a
rhetorical continuity with other protests, whereby activists articulated the scientific
indeterminacies in ways which raised issues of environmental control (Grove-White,
1991: 439, 441). By casting GMOs as a 'risk' problem, biotechnology activists posed a
political threat, in turn cited by regulators when proposing new risk-management
procedures.
Britain's precautionary legislation presumed the unacceptability of hypothetical harm from
GMO releases. Although the government justified its policy by invoking 'sound science',
GMO regulation reversed the earlier meaning of the term. In regulating hazardous
chemicals and pollution, for example, 'sound science' had served to defer or weaken
preventive measures, whose proponents were left holding the burden of evidence for
demonstrating harm (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1992: 22).
By contrast, process-based GMO regulation demanded evidence of safety. As an implicit
ethics, this requirement was justified by the uncertain potential for 'ineversible' harm, as
cited in the EC Directive and British policy documents (see Chapters 4 and 5). Within
this risk-management framework, Britain's regulators could generally accommodate
diverse criteria for evidence of safety, and so legitimize the initial 'step' of small-scale
field trials (see Chapter 7).
However, prospective conflict arose over the scientific basis for routinizing those small-
scale trials or for relaxing controls. As in the earlier debate, scientific arguments
expressed cognitive differences over how genetic novelty might affect ecological
relationships; accordingly, they emphasized different kinds of past experience as a guide
for reducing uncertainty about GMO releases. For microbial releases in particular,
ecologists advocated research to ascertain the normal ecological baseline, so that
monitoring efforts could detect any perturbation and thus anticipate unidentified hazards.
Others, especially laboratory scientists, justified limiting risk assessment to identifiable
hazards, especially their testable components (see Chapter 8).
In various ways, GMO risk research tended to test whichever uncertainties it could
credibly and reproducibly control, such as gene flow and selective biological advantage of
crops; in testing the host range of a viral insecticide, the research took for granted a
reassuring model of viral epizootics (see Chapters 7 and 8). As in risk assessment more
generally, biosafety research converted fundamental ignorance into 'marginal'
imprecisions, which could then be progressively reduced with additional data (O'Riordan
and Wynne, 1987: 393). Yet some advisors held doubts about what could be learned from
testing properties of an organism in a carefully controlled environment.
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Moreover, additional knowledge sharpened methodological disputes about how to obtain
relevant and adequate evidence for relaxing controls. The same new evidence could elicit
contrary interpretations -- for example, regarding whether ecological niches are limited by
genetic variation or mainly by environmental variables. Geneticists and ecologists embed
facts in a different model of causality, so new facts do not necessarily bridge the
disciplinary divide, as noted by Krimsky (1991: 151).
In GMO regulation, new knowledge opened up further areas of uncertainty for biosafety
research. Much research was testing the null hypothesis, i.e. the assumption that genetic
modification would create no unintended effects. At issue was the range and type of
experimental conditions which would warrant vindicating this hypothesis.
For GMO releases, risk assessment could plausibly consider an even wider range of 'what
if?' cause-effect models, whose perceived importance depended upon environmental value
judgements. Even for identifiable hazards from plants, regulatory advisors differed over
how best to generate and interpret relevant evidence (see Map 8.1). This dilemma
parallels other regulatory experiences, where more scientific knowledge has often
intensified methodological disputes (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986: 5 1-60; Salter, 1988:
166, 199-201).
Thus the regulatory system still faced judgements on the acceptability of undesirable
effects (see Chapter 8). Advisors disagreed over how to evaluate hypothetical outcomes,
such as enhanced weediness from a transgenic crop. Asking themselves 'so what?', they
answered that question in divergent ways. They differed, for example, in defining
agriculture as inside or outside 'the environment'; in defining weeds; in conceptualizing
unintended gene flow as 'genetic pollution'; and in foreseeing remedies for any
agricultural disruption.
The regulatory procedure tended to undermine the stereotypical sequence of risk-
assessment steps, i.e. from risk identification to risk evaluation. In practice, 'so what?'
took priority over 'what if?'; such a logical sequence, from value judgements to fact-
finding, was formally proposed by the Genhaz procedure for improving risk-identification
methods. That is, Genhaz acknowledged that acceptability judgements on a hypothetical
outcome would influence efforts to ascertain whether such an outcome has a realistic
cause (see Table 8.1).
Starting from different accounts of uncertainty, regulatory advisors differed on how
additional testing could eventually warrant market approval of a GMO product. Most
advisors nominally said, 'Regulate the product, not the process', but they gave the slogan
quite different meanings (see Map 9.1). Some advisors, especially from industry, sought
to codify safety tests; the resulting knowledge would vindicate the genetic modification
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process as safe, make the regulatory requirements predictable, and normalize GMOs as
benign products. In the case of GMO biopesticides, industry lobbyists even attempted to
narrow the original risk-assessment criteria of process-based regulation.
By contrast, other regulatory advisors expressed environmental concerns which went
beyond readily testable uncertainties; some also foresaw biotechnology products
encouraging agricultural practices which might indirectly cause harm. As they intuitively
recognized, the context of industrialized agriculture constitutes the hazards, as in other
industrial systems (cf. Wynne, 1992: 284). In proposing that socio-economic criteria
should supplement safety criteria, even some regulatory advisors questioned the context of
intensive monoculture, such as inner links between herbicide-resistant crops and chemical
usage. However, government protected GMO products from any Fourth Hurdle;
regulation would go no further than separately assessing the various products, e.g. crops
and chemicals. Thus the regulatory procedure would delink products from each other and
from the broader risk-generating system (see Chapter 9).
What did this mean for reducing uncertainty about potential harm? On the one hand, risk-
management rules provoked overt controversy over their scientific rationale, particularly
regarding the significance of genetic novelty. Regulators had to defend the cognitive
framework which underlay their administrative rules, both for the US product-based or the
EC process-based systems (see Chapter 4, 5 and 9). This feature illustrates how 'the
mobilization of belief becomes a central source for the social enforcement of validity
claims' (Beck, 1992a: 167-69); indeed, such mobilization politicized the official account
of uncertainty from GMOs.
On the other hand, regulators adopted naturalistic accounts of the risk problem -- e.g. via a
biological analogy between GMOs and plant pests (USDA) or exotic organisms (UK); this
provided a common symbolic framework for translating a broad cause-effect
indeterminacy into technical terms. By grounding the 'technical' upon a naturalistic
account, the regulatory system could depoliticize its own problem-definition (cf. Schwarz
and Thompson, 1990: 139). In so doing, it marginalized other accounts of the risk
problem, e.g. GMOs as a sinister control, as intensive monoculture, as herbicide-crop
links, etc.
GMO regulation illustrates the more general role of uncertainty in risk controversies.
Each protagonist emphasizes the potential consequences of a perceived 'uncertainty'. This
key term serves as a strategic argument for whatever is essential to know in advance,
rather than as the reason for disagreement (Campbell, 1985).
As this thesis argues, value conflicts made uncertainty more important, rather than vice
versa. That is, the uncertainty is always value-laden; it becomes politicizedr only in the
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sense that the values become publicly contentious. (See for example Schwarz and
Thompson, 1990: 159-62; Grove-White, 1991: 442). This role for uncertainty contradicts
some theoretical models, e.g. whereby scientific uncertainty allows greater opportunity for
contending values to fill a 'gap' between science and policy. (See Nelkin, 1979: 16;
Majone, 1989: 40; Jasanoff, 1986: v, 10; Jasanoff, 1993: 125).
On the contrary, as this thesis argues, 'uncertainty' was constitutive, not merely contextual;
the regulatory debate became constituted by contending accounts of the relevant scientific
uncertainty (Levidow, 1994a). By promoting some account of the unknown, or of the
unknowable, each actor was promoting a type of policy -- rather than filling an a priori
'gap'. Amidst these arguments, the regulatory procedure was undergoing pressures to
narrow the range of uncertainty.
By emphasizing and identifying testable properties of products, GMO regulation prepared
safety standards for eventually treating GMOs as normal commodities, even though this
incurred the political risk of jeopardizing their social legitimacy. Thus, in 'reducing
uncertainty', regulators faced a contradiction between commercializing and legitimizing
biotechnology.
1.4 Precaution: defining safety and innovation
This thesis argues that both the potential and limits of precaution derived from the project
of normalizing GMOs as benign products. This meant specifying testable ecological
uncertainties, rooted in some naturalistic analogy, in turn abstracted from issues of socio-
agronomic control. Precautionary efforts remained dependent upon biotechnologists' co-
operation, in providing resources and integrating safety criteria into innovation (as in
earlier cases of safety standard-setting, e.g. Salter, 1988: 169).
As the previous section argued, precautionary efforts probed new types of uncertainties.
GMO regulation sought different kinds of facts, rather than simply relaxing or shifting the
burden of evidence within the same empirical framework (cf. Wynne, 1993). Thus, when
discussing the precautionary principle, it was misguided for a major report to ask 'how far
public policy should run ahead of clear scientific findings' (Royal Society, 1992: 155) --
which assumes that policy is otherwise based upon 'clear findings'. By asking 'how far?',
rather than 'which way?', the report took for granted a linear scale of uncertainty and
safety, as if this were pre-given by 'the precautionary principle'.
In subjecting GMO releases to 'additional' regulation, whether precautionary or
preventive, it was difficult to justify risk-management rules in scientific terms (see
Chapters 4 and 5). This difficulty arose partly from the precautionary character of GMO
regulation, which was established prior to any evidence of harm from GMO releases.
216
However, the risk-management rules in turn responded to an incipient legitimation crisis
for the biotechnological project of industrializing agriculture. Although GMO regulation
may have undermined the 'rational' stereotype of risk assessment, it also constructed a
procedural rationality which made biotechnology R&D politically possible.
When the regulatory system translated 'risk' as cultural danger into 'risk' as expert
management, it necessarily made environmental value judgements on acceptable effects.
As regulatory advisors acknowledged, such judgements pervaded the entire regulatory
procedure, e.g. when establishing risk-management rules, when setting criteria for
evidence of safety, and even when directing biosafety research on hypothetical hazards
(see Table 8.1).
Given these pervasive judgements, and the underlying legitimacy problem, GMO
regulation bore some potential for wider public involvement. In this vein, some advisors
advocated more extensive public disclosure of release applications, partly as a means of
encouraging 'green' pressure upon R&D agendas (see Map 6.9). In particular, some
emphasized environmental concerns which could discourage types of R&D, e.g. on a viral
insecticide, on weedy crops, on herbicide resistance, etc. (see Chapters 7, 8). This
democratic potential was countered, in effect, by asserting the 'objective' status of risk
assessment, while narrowing the range of scientific uncertainties deemed relevant for
anticipating harm (see Chapter 9).
Such tendencies illustrate the double-edged character of safety regulation. Risk
assessments can serve as implicit ethical statements, even as 'an unwanted means' of
democratizing technoscientific progress (Beck, 1992a: 28). Yet such a potential was
hardly realized for GMO regulation in early 1990s Britain, where the more cautious
advisors and environmentalist pressure groups lacked tangible backing from public protest
(see Chapters 3, 7, 9).
Such tensions were again manifest in attempts to influence rules for market approval of a
GMO product; at this stage, uncertainties about the larger scale were compounded by
those of agronomic practices. On the one hand, regulators and innovators sought a risk
assessment which could certify product safety, independently of any conditions of use. As
they intuitively realized, risk assessment would lack credibility if it made assumptions
about human behaviour, for either small-scale releases or product use (cf. Wynne, 1989,
1992).
On the other hand, an unconditional product approval would require anticipating a wider
range of systemic uncertainties. Yet it was difficult to test these, short of literally
simulating hazards. For herbicide-resistant crops in particular, the regulatory procedure
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would treat the herbicide and GMO as separate matters, and so deny the linkage which
had generated public suspicion (see Chapter 9).
Thus the market approval stage highlights a dilemma. Namely, a safety judgement could
be definitive only by contextualizing the potential effects within the biotechnological
agenda of industrializing agriculture. Yet it could be authoritative only by pretending that
such an issue did not exist, i.e. by abstracting potential harm from intensive monoculture
(cf. Wynne, 1982: 172).
Bureaucratic language often flattens such contradictions into a potential dysfunction, e.g.,
as a problem of over- or under-regulation. For example, diverse commentators have
advocated a judicious 'balance', between allowing technological innovation versus
ensuring safety (Ravetz, 1989: 72; Environment Minister, in CBC, 1990: 17). The
'balance' cliche portrays regulation as adjusting a metaphorical pivot along some ordinal
scale, or as if operating a zero-sum game between two things: 'innovation versus
regulation'.
On the contrary, precautionary regulation was defining safety and innovative progress, in
the mutual design of safety tests and organisms to be tested. At stake was how safety
procedures might legitimize and/or influence the direction of biotechnological progress.
2.0 RELEVANCE AND LINHTS OF THIS STUDY
This thesis offers a way of interpreting disputes over the 'rational' status of GMO
regulation; it identifies sources of the practical dilemmas which faced the various
participants. The analysis may help regulators to understand the social conflicts which
they are managing via the terms of technical risk. It may also help biotechnology critics
to resist the regulatory strategies for marginalizing their accounts of the risk problem.
(Indeed, the thesis resulted partly from discussing early drafts of papers and chapters with
several key actors, whose comments are acknowledged elsewhere.)
This final section acknowledges some limits of the study:
* possible ways of counterposing alternatives to my interpretation (section 2.1); and
* questions for further research, on both past and future developments (section 2.2).
3.1 Alternative interpretations
As a way of testing my thesis, this section poses alternative interpretations; for each
challenge, I offer a counter-argument and suggest a line of further research.
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* Although market imperatives (unsurprisingly) influenced safety regulation, weren't
these really antagonistic forces? If they appeared as an internal tension, rather than as an
external tension, perhaps this is only because I take some actors' comments too much at
face value.
In reply: True, I could have interpreted the research material in terms of distinct
rationalities, by treating some comments as 'stolen rhetoric' (Schwarz and Thompson,
1990: 73). Perhaps regulatory officials were opportunistic when, for example, they
appealed to industry's self-interest in protecting a future biotechnology market; likewise
when industry officials devised precautions to anticipate hypothetical hazards. From the
present study, we cannot know the full intentions behind their arguments.
Nevertheless there is much evidence of practices consistent with the rhetoric. Regulatory
procedures and criteria did accommodate market imperatives. Meanwhile academic
scientists were recruited to conduct biosafety research, and industrialists did take
precautionary measures. In particular, ICI Seeds continued to devise and assess such
measures in a cautious manner, even while its officials were publicly criticizing the
regulatory framework as 'irrational'; strangely, it is the latter which most seems to be
stolen rhetoric.
The study was not designed to test cultural theory, which fundamentally concerns how
individuals attach themselves to organizations, so as to pursue preferred 'ways of life'; an
ethnographic study would be needed to investigate such features. Nevertheless I could
have more closely researched the internal development of the new regulatory agencies (the
biotechnology units of HSE, DoE and DGXI), as well as their mutual interactions. Such a
study could have clarified how each institution constructs an 'expert-based hierarchy',
defines the breadth of its competence, and perhaps internalizes commercial pressures.
Similarly, one could study how seed companies develop expertise for safety regulation of
products which never before underwent risk assessment.
* Although the regulatory procedure (unsurprisingly) bore symbolic meanings, weren't
these just incidental to the procedure? If a technical-procedural rationality appears
'cultural', perhaps it is because I exaggerate the explanatory importance of the symbolic
meanings.
True, I could have explained safety precautions in strictly scientific terms, especially
given the vague ecological 'uncertainty' which initially justified such measures. However,
according to the actors themselves, they did carefully construct precautions in order to
accommodate and transform risk perception; regulatory pressures were informed by
pollution analogies. Therefore it is valid to interpret symbolic meanings as integral to
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designing early GMO releases; such meanings made it possible to develop a safety
science, which might later justify relaxing some controls.
In my study, the symbolic aspects might have been clarified by systematically tracing the
step-by-step principle for some types of GMOs. In particular, I could have closely studied
a series of GMO release applications and queried interviewees in detail about the changing
experimental design. However, this research method would have required a second round
of interviews, given that I generally met the interviewee before requesting any copies of
release applications, so as to gain their confidence first (see Chapter 2, section 3).
Moreover, such pointed questions might have produced a defensive response, unlike the
open-ended interview questions which I did ask them.
* Although the regulatory procedure (unsurprisingly) encountered conflict over the range
of relevant uncertainty, doesn't the latter nevertheless explain the dispute? If the
uncertainty appears as a resource rather than as an explanatory cause, perhaps this is only
because I abstain from characterizing the 'real scientific uncertainty' (e.g. Jasanoff, 1986:
75; cf. Nelkin, 1985: 17).
True, I could have interpreted scientific uncertainty as an explanatory cause: i.e., that it
provided greater opportunity for actors to promote different values by emphasizing
different accounts of the unknown. However, such an explanatory model would take too
literally the apparent disagreement over worst-case scenarios from GMO releases. As
related evidence suggests, such scenarios express different environmental values --
regarding acceptable tangible effects of GMOs, and even regarding modes of
environmental control. Such links provide a richer analysis of social meanings and
motives, apart from whether one accepts a realist account of the 'uncertainty'.
3.2 Further research questions
This final sub-section suggests further research questions, which all concern how GMO
regulation defines safety.
* Innovation and regulation
If the safety regulation makes it politically possible to pursue biotechnological innovation,
then (how) does it influence the ultimate content of innovation? Does the regulatory
procedure always downplay whatever uncertainties defy meaningful testing? Does the
regulation simply normalize some GMOs first and others later? Or alternatively, does it
reshape product design?
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* Biosafety research and standards
As biosafety research provides funding for molecular ecology, how are GMOs designed so
as to explore their own risks? How do the research tools define the uncertainties to be
investigated? What explains the funding priorities? (How) does the research influence
safety and product standards? Even if a particular uncertainty is clarified, (how) is the
knowledge cited for clarifying safety?
* Democracy in risk assessment
If a precautionary approach offers greater potential for wider public involvement, then
why wasn't this potential realized? If the risk assessment entailed pervasive value
judgements, then why were these successfully kept within confidential procedures? As
R&D brings GMOs to the stage of market approval, will agronomic uncertainties provide
another opportunity for public involvement? Or alternatively, will these generate even
less public interest than did the hypothetical catastrophe from R&D trial releases?
* Regulatory styles
As some types of GMO releases become routinized, (how) will this affect national
regulatory styles? In Britain, what did it mean to shift Ministerial responsibility from the
HSE (Dept of Employment) to the DoE? Why was this shift delayed until 1993? Since
Britain started providing details on each proposed release in 1993, could this access affect
the official boundary between regulatory insiders/outsiders? How will NGOs take up the
new opportunity to challenge regulatory value judgements? In post-1993 USA, how
might the Clinton administration facilitate a 'science policy', i.e. negotiating regulatory
science Within expert committees? What would this mean for the US 'adversarial' style?
Such questions warrant further research, for which this thesis provides a theoretical and
empirical basis.
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